scholarly journals The (self-)empowerment of the European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis

Author(s):  
Eugénia C. Heldt ◽  
Tony Mueller
Ekonomika ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-31
Author(s):  
Deimantė Andriuškevičiūtė ◽  
Norbertas Balčiūnas

Abstract. The European Central Bank was forced to start using non-standard measures in order to manage the situation determined by the global financial and sovereign debt crisis, namely to sort out liquidity problems and expand credit supply. The European Central Bank is criticized for applying non-standard tools because of increase in inflation risk. However, the analysis shows that the inflation could be managed by the absorption of liquidity surplus. However, there is a negative side of using non-standard measures, such as a significant increase in the credit risk, which arises due to having government bonds in the balance sheet of the European Central Bank. In addition, this indicates that the European Central Bank indirectly finances governments.Key words: monetary policy, inflation, sovereign debt crisis, credit risk, quantitative easing


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Lena Högenauer ◽  
David Howarth

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument – defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik – that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB’s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-352
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel

Abstract This article assesses the legacy of Mario Draghi as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) from 2011 to 2019, with particular reference to the Greek’s sovereign debt crisis. Most macro-economic indicators improved over the course of Draghi’s tenure at the ECB, including inflation, budget deficits, yield spreads among euro-area borrowers and unemployment. Draghi played a decisive role in turning the tide on the crisis of confidence that afflicted the euro area and threatened the survival of Europe’s single currency in the wake of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis. Yet the ECB’s unconventional policies prompted sustained controversy and contributed to a low level of trust in the central bank among people in the euro-area member states. The focus of controversy has been on possible asset-price bubbles and ‘hidden’ transfers between euro-area member states. When and how to normalize its policies is a major challenge for the ECB, as it is for other major central banks that adapted similar policies in response to the global financial crisis.


Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.


2011 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. F13-F21
Author(s):  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Aurélie Delannoy ◽  
Tatiana Fic ◽  
Ian Hurst ◽  
Iana Liadze ◽  
...  

Global economic prospects have deteriorated markedly in recent months. Risks around our central forecast have shifted distinctly to the downside. Much of this is due to the heightened uncertainty surrounding Europe's sovereign debt crisis. There is widespread agreement among policymakers - ranging from the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank to individual heads of state both within and outside the Euro Area - that resolution to the crisis requires urgent, comprehensive and coordinated action. Yet 17 months after the first bail-out programme was introduced in Greece, policymakers have failed to deliver a strategy that promises a credible prospect of growth and an end to rising debt profiles. Solvency concerns in three relatively small peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), combined with weakening growth across the continent, raise the dangerous spectre of illiquidity beginning to affect solvency in the larger core economies with high debt ratios - notably Italy. Left unchecked, the consequences would be severe for the world economy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sviatlana Hlebik ◽  
Giovanni Verga

Abstract In 2008 the European Central Bank added a new quantitative policy strategy to its traditional control of the interest rates. This new policy, sometimes called “enhanced credit support”, consists of fully satisfying the demand for liquidity of banks, with the European Central Bank deciding only the timing and characteristics of its interventions. This study analyses the market conditions in which these measures have been taken and their consistency with the demand for liquidity by the banking system. Measures in favour of the sovereign debt of PIIGS countries are also considered.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach

Haircut of public creditors as next step in the escalation of the euro debt crisis? – Exploring the boundaries set by the EU Treaty on debt restructuring – Limitations imposed by no-bailout clause and prohibition of monetary state financing – Standards set inPringleandGauweiler– Haircut on nominal debt infringes no-bailout clause – Active involvement by European Central Bank violates ban on monetary state financing – Other forms of ‘soft haircuts’ may be compatible with EU law


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document