Challenging US Foreign Policy: America and the World in the Long Twentieth Century

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-597
Author(s):  
Alan P. Dobson
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Geyer

Even for readers of Central European History, it is easy to forget that there is more than one country in the middle of Europe and that there is more than one solution to the geopolitical problem associated with the perception of being in the “middle.” That problem is so overwhelmingly claimed by Germany and its interpreters, and it is so weighed down by reflections on the (ab)uses of state power, articulated in the long-running debate on the “primacy of foreign policy,” that it is somewhat jarring to encounter a book with the title In the Middle of Europe—André Holenstein's Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte—that is not at all concerned with Germany. It has Switzerland as its subject and Verschweizerung as its substance and subtext. I leave the term untranslated because it means nothing to most of the world and an English translation would surely not capture the partly facetious, partly scandalized, partly admiring undertones that the German conveys: “Die Welt wird entweder untergehen oder verschweizern,” in the words of Friedrich Dürenmatt. Even if not taken in jest, it still sounds better than: “Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen.” But if horror in the latter case makes sense when looking back at the twentieth century, why is there so much mockery in response to the former?


2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ned Lebow ◽  
Robert Kelly

Fifth century Greeks distinguished between hegemonia (legitimated leadership) and arkhe (control). Thucydides employed this distinction to track the changing nature of the Athenian Empire during the Peloponnesian War, and the ways in which a diminishing concern for balancing self-interest against justice corroded Athenian authority, made survival of the empire increasingly problematic and encouraged the disastrous expedition to Sicily. The Melian Dialogue—often cited by realists to justify a power-based approach to foreign policy—is intended to symbolize this decay. Building on our analysis of Thucydides, we examine the British, Soviet and American experiences with hegemony. A striking feature of the contemporary American situation is the extent to which American leaders claim hegemonia but deny any interest in arkhe. Rightly or wrongly, much of the rest of the world has the reverse perception. This seeming contradiction has important implications for US foreign policy and world politics more generally.


Author(s):  
João Mota ◽  
◽  

This paper is an analysis of the consequences of US foreign policy since the beginning of Trump term. To do so, it initially uses concepts and theoretical notions that do not come in shock with the basic realist premises, we intend to highlight the necessary and singular conditions that allow to explain the unipolar moment. Then one analyses Trump’s foreign policy towards American allies and, taking the theoretical concepts from the first part of the paper, analyses the consequences.


Author(s):  
David Hastings Dunn

Commencing from an observation by Freedman that Donald Rumsfeld’s legacy as US Secretary for Defense was comparable with that of Robert McNamara, and that where the latter begat the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ , the former would leave behind the ‘Iraq syndrome’. Analysis of discourse under President Obama reveals that the effects of Iraq are more profound than Freedman indicated. In the Obama era the use of force itself was ever more in doubt. In limiting US commitment to fighting for core interests and formal allies, the Obama administration broke with the main post-war tradition of US foreign policy. This made the use or threat of force more difficult, as the appetite for risk was blunted by its experience in Iraq. Obama’s position was unhelpful in embracing the implications of the limitations of American power. US ‘risk aversion’ risked failing both the US and the world.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengxin Pan ◽  
Oliver Turner

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from its perceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace its discursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses of the American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce a particular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to better appreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we need to pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discourses about the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principles conventionally associated with neoconservatism.


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