Public Outreach, Executive Orders, and the Unilateral Presidency

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam L. Warber
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy N. Tenhula ◽  
Sonja V. Batten ◽  
Kacie A. Kelly ◽  
Koby L. South ◽  
Rhett A. Herrera ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes ◽  
Frank Keil ◽  
Yarrow Dunham

Institutions make new forms of acting possible: Signing executive orders, scoring goals, and officiating weddings are only possible because of the U.S. government, the rules of soccer, and the institution of marriage. Thus, when an individual occupies a particular social role (President, soccer player, and officiator) they acquire new ways of acting on the world. The present studies investigated children’s beliefs about institutional actions, and in particular whether children understand that individuals can only perform institutional actions when their community recognizes them as occupying the appropriate social role. Two studies (Study 1, N = 120 children, 4-11; Study 2, N = 90 children, 4-9) compared institutional actions to standard actions that do not depend on institutional recognition. In both studies, 4- to 5-year-old children believed all actions were possible regardless of whether an individual was recognized as occupying the social role. In contrast, 8- to 9-year-old children robustly distinguished between institutional and standard actions; they understood that institutional actions depend on collective recognition by a community.


2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 84-88
Author(s):  
Darlene E. Kilpatrick ◽  
Lawrence S. Finegold ◽  
David Sykes
Keyword(s):  

Public Voices ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 124
Author(s):  
B. J. Reed
Keyword(s):  

By Tom Clancy.Reviewed by B.J. Reed


Author(s):  
John L. Campbell

Chapter 7 explains that the financial crisis and Barack Obama’s presidency pushed political polarization into extreme political gridlock in Washington. Americans became disgusted. The 2008 financial crisis exacerbated America’s economic woes and made people angry. The fact that Obama was America’s first African American president made things worse. So did his moves to handle the financial crisis and Great Recession, and reform the national health care system. Trump tapped the public’s anger, turning it to his electoral advantage. He promised that because as a billionaire he wasn’t beholden to anyone, he would unify the country and cut through the gridlock by “draining the swamp” in Washington. And if Congress didn’t cooperate, he said that he would move unilaterally by issuing executive orders that would get the job done. It worked and he was elected president.


Author(s):  
Eric K. Yamamoto

The concise Epilogue describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s late-2017 vacation of the courts of appeals rulings in the International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump cases (determining that the litigated controversy over the president’s January and March 2017 exclusionary executive orders was moot). It incorporates Justice Sotomayor’s dissent and notes that the lower court rulings “may be persuasive and cited as guidance, but not as binding precedent.” It observes therefore that the Korematsu conundrum persists at the heart of these and future liberty and security controversies: careful judicial scrutiny or near unconditional deference, judicial independence or court passivity.


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