The Method of Cases in Context

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-608
Author(s):  
Alison Springle
Keyword(s):  
Method Of Cases

Acquiring “Knowledge”—An Alternative Model

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
First Language ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
First Language Acquisition ◽  
Method Of Cases ◽  
Striking Fact

The chapter argues that empirical studies of first-language acquisition lend support to the Wittgensteinian-Merleau-Pontian conception of language as against the prevailing conception that underwrites the method of cases in either its armchair or experimental version. It offers a non-representationalist model, inspired by the work of Michael Tomasello, for the acquisition of “knowledge,” with the aim of showing that we could fully account for the acquisition of this and other philosophically troublesome words without positing independently existing “items” to which these words refer. The chapter also aims at bringing out and underscoring the striking fact that, whereas many in contemporary analytic philosophy regard and present themselves as open and attentive to empirical science, they have often relied on a conception of language that has been supported by no empirical evidence.

Internal Difficulties in Defending the Method of Cases, and the Claim of Continuity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Method Of Cases

The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of cases in its traditional, “armchair” form, against the “cognitive diversity” and “calibration” objections. The aim of the chapter is to continue the work of Chapter One of exposing the internal difficulties that have presented themselves for those wishing to defend the method, and to begin to work toward establishing the book’s basic contention that the method of cases rests on substantive and (therefore) challengeable presuppositions about language. More specifically, the chapter argues that Williamson’s and Cappelen’s defense of the method rests entirely on the claim of continuity between our employment of words outside philosophy and what we do with them when we ask the theorist’s questions and give our answers to them.

Modal Ignorance and the Limits of Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Theoretical Virtues ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 6 examines the implications of Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism for modally immodest philosophizing (that is, philosophizing that requires knowledge of metaphysical necessities): Modally immodest issues should be dismissed and philosophy reoriented. Alternatives to the method of cases are critically examined: We cannot gain the required modal knowledge by relying on intuition, by analyzing the meaning of philosophically significant words, and by appealing to alleged theoretical virtues like simplicity, generality, and elegance to choose between philosophical views. Alternative conceptions of philosophy are too deflationary to be satisfying, particularly because there is much philosophizing left once philosophy is reoriented.

Conceptual Analysis Rebooted

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Method ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Traditional Use ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Conceptual Engineering ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.

Fooled by Cognitive Artifacts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Artifacts ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 3 examines one of the two concerns often brought up against the method of cases: The judgments elicited by cases seem epistemically deficient. This concern is captured by the first argument against the method of cases, which I call “Unreliability”: Cases currently used in philosophy as well as those cases that would be particularly useful for some central philosophical purposes are likely to elicit unreliable judgments. Judgments elicited by typical philosophical cases are similar to experimental artifacts—outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not due to the phenomena experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them. That is, they often are “cognitive artifacts.” Chapter 3 concludes that we ought to suspend judgment when confronted with a philosophical case.

Ordinary Language Philosophy

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Method Of Cases

The article presents, clarifies, defends, and shows the contemporary relevance of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as a general approach to the understanding and dissolution of at least very many traditional and contemporary philosophical difficulties. The first section broadly characterizes OLP, points out its anticipation in Immanuel Kant’s dissolution of metaphysical impasses in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, and then shows its contemporary relevance by bringing its perspective to bear on the recent debates concerning the philosophical ‘method of cases’. The second section responds to a series of common objections to, and misunderstandings of, OLP.

scholarly journals Influence of the fuzzy implication operator on the method-of-cases inference rule

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruan Da ◽  
E.E. Kerre ◽  
G. De Cooman ◽  
B. Cappelle ◽  
F. Vanmassenhove
Keyword(s):  
Inference Rule ◽  
Implication Operator ◽  
Fuzzy Implication ◽  
Fuzzy Implication Operator ◽  
Method Of Cases

scholarly journals Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Schindler ◽  
Pierre Saint-Germier
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Method Of Cases

Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even given up. Here we put one of the main proponent’s account of why philosophical cases may cause the unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly “disturbing characteristics” of philosophical cases.

scholarly journals FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL THINKING AMONG MEDICAL STUDENTS AS A STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF THEIR SUBJECT POSITION

2020 ◽  
pp. 143-145
Author(s):  
I.R. Yusupov ◽  
F.Kh. Galimov ◽  
V.A. Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
Medical Students ◽  
Physical Education ◽  
Structural Component ◽  
Educational Process ◽  
Subject Position ◽  
Educational Technologies ◽  
Combined Use ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Method Of Cases

The article deals with the problem of the formation of professional thinking of medical students. It describes and substantiates the possibility of the combined use of modern educational technologies — the method of cases and edutainment in the framework of physical education in order to form the subject position of students and improve the quality of the educational process.

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