Presidents held hostage: The rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan

Terrorism ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Winkler
Keyword(s):  
1990 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Korey

Despite conservative opposition, in the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter turned the tide in favor of the Helsinki Accord by taking a strong stand in fostering U.S. participation in it. Korey focuses on the U.S. delegation to the Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe and credits the success of the Helsinki Accord to U.S. adroit negotiation strategies, beginning with the Carter administration. By 1980, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came to embrace the “humanitarianism” of the treaty. The Vienna review conference's (1986–89) effort peaked when a milestone was reached in the human rights process, linking it directly to security issues equally pertinent to the East and the West. The author contends that the United States' ardent participation in the monitoring of compliance was particularly effective in putting pressure on the Soviet Union to uphold the agreement within its territory, yielding enormous progress in human rights


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-104
Author(s):  
Nihro Mohammed Abdulqader ◽  
Khaleel Ali Murad

Following the demise of the Shah regime, Saddam Hussein capitalized on the deteriorating situation of Iran to attack the country in a bid to achieve a set of goals. He never thought that the war would last eight years. Before Iraq kicked off the conflict, Saddam and other Iraqi leaders had apparently gathered with American officials in Jordan. It is highly likely that Saddam declared war on Iran with the consent of the USA, though both sides categorically have rejected such accusations. Saddam seized the fallout of Iran-US relations to introduce himself as the guard protecting America's interests. Even if the US was not responsible for the ignition of the war, it liked it as Iran at the time had American hostages behind its bars, a crisis which emerged in November 1979. In the meantime, the new Iran emerged to portrait itself as a major foe of the US. Though Jimmy Carter  chose neutrality amidst the conflict, it asked for an immediate pause. The equation, however, turned up side down soon after Washington started to assist Iraq. One indication is that, two months before the war started, Baghdad and the US had decided to normalize ties, but announcing it was delayed as the war had been looming in order to avoid miscalculations from other sides. Through the war, the US wanted to destroy the infrastructure of both sides in order to cripple them from emerging as two powerful regional states. Through third parties, Washington was selling arms to both sides. The US had even warned Iran of Iraq's military attack plan. The age of Carter's age came to an end shortly after the war began when he lost the elections to Ronald Reagan and that a new administration took office in January 1981.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (14) ◽  
pp. 218-249
Author(s):  
Gabriel Roberto Dauer

Este artigo busca verificar quais foram as estratégias transnacionais de denúncia das Mães da Praça de Maio na busca dos desaparecidos da ditadura civil-militar argentina de 1976-1983. A pesquisa foca na relação do grupo com a Embaixada dos Estados Unidos da América em Buenos Aires para obter apoio desse país. Num primeiro momento, discute-se como foi instaurada a ditadura na Argentina para depois introduzir a formação grupo e sua atuação do local ao global. Posteriormente, retoma-se a discussão da construção na década de 1970 de um regime internacional de direitos humanos. Por fim, são examinados os telegramas que constatam as relações políticas entre as Mães da Praça de Maio e a Embaixada dos Estados Unidos. Conclui-se que as estratégias transnacionais das Mães da Praça de Maio para chamar a atenção dos Estados Unidos da América ao caso dos desaparecidos obtiveram maiores resultados durante a administração de Jimmy Carter, apesar do redirecionamento de sua política externa devido a pressões internas. Entretanto, após a eleição de Ronald Reagan, as táticas do grupo para obter auxílio do governo estadunidense foram barradas pela diplomacia silenciosa da nova administração.


1982 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-712
Author(s):  
John Seiler

Peaceful resolution of the international conflict over Namibia has been a significant preoccupation of the United States and its four partners in the western contact group since April 1977, but neither the efforts led by the Administration of Jimmy Carter nor the very different approach taken by Ronald Reagan has succeeded. To the contrary, prospects for peaceful change in Namibia are ebbing. The present stalemate in negotiations is unlikely to be resolved before the end of Reagan's first term in January 1985. In the meantime, the territory's political, economic, and social circumstances will continue to stagnate, and the low-level and intermittent fighting in the northern operational areas will probably expand in scope and costs.


2009 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-253
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY RANDOLPH STANLEY

In 1980 Senator Edward Kennedy challenged incumbent President Jimmy Carter for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Kennedy's defeat has often been used as evidence of a philosophical realignment within the American electorate in the late 1970s away from Democratic liberalism, which culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan as President. However, Kennedy performed better than this interpretation suggests. His defeat was caused by historical accident: a poor campaign, international crises and Carter's use of the incumbency. The strengths of the Kennedy campaign cast doubt upon the theory of realignment and suggest that liberalism enjoyed greater support among the US electorate than has previously been considered.


The Forum ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary F. Cook

AbstractYounger voters today, defined as under the age of 30 and often labeled the Millennial Generation, have shown high support for Barack Obama and for certain statements about activist government. Are we witnessing some generational effect for a significant percentage of the Millennials, stemming from their growing up during impressionable years under first George W. Bush and then Obama? To study this question with a historical analogy, I use the ANES to compare under-30 cohorts under Jimmy Carter as a benchmark and then Ronald Reagan much more extensively. I find evidence consistent with categories advanced by Sears (1983). The Reagan years disproportionately shifted this age group’s symbolic attitudes, including partisanship, self-reported ideology, and approval of Reagan himself, but not most specific policy opinions. If this finding generalizes, recent events may leave a Democratic imprint on the Millennials, but their current measures of policy liberalism should not be attributed overmuch to Obama’s influence.


Author(s):  
Sean H. Vanatta

Under the auspices of the Credit Control Act of 1969, President Jimmy Carter sought to restrict inflationary forms of credit—especially the use of credit cards. These unpopular actions contributed significantly to his loss of the presidency to Ronald Reagan in the 1980 election. Other presidents in recent decades have instead encouraged Americans to make extensive use of credit cards.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This book explores the question of how policy makers gauge their adversaries’ intentions and the implications of such intentions assessment for international relations and world affairs. It advances a framework called the selective attention thesis and compares it to three well-known explanations of perceived intentions: the capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. All four theses are tested using three cases: British assessments of Nazi Germany’s intentions in the period leading to World War II; U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions under the administration of Jimmy Carter; and U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions in the years leading to the end of the Cold War during the second administration of Ronald Reagan. Drawing on these historical episodes, the book considers which indicators are used or ignored by decision makers and intelligence organizations when making intentions assessments.


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