Introduction

Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This book explores the question of how policy makers gauge their adversaries’ intentions and the implications of such intentions assessment for international relations and world affairs. It advances a framework called the selective attention thesis and compares it to three well-known explanations of perceived intentions: the capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. All four theses are tested using three cases: British assessments of Nazi Germany’s intentions in the period leading to World War II; U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions under the administration of Jimmy Carter; and U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions in the years leading to the end of the Cold War during the second administration of Ronald Reagan. Drawing on these historical episodes, the book considers which indicators are used or ignored by decision makers and intelligence organizations when making intentions assessments.

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). In contrast, intelligence organizations typically prioritize the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory. Over time, these organizations develop substantial knowledge on these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. An examination of three cases based on 30,000 archival documents and intelligence reports shows strong support for the selective attention thesis and mixed support for two other approaches in international relations theory aimed at understanding how observers are likely to infer adversaries' political intentions: the behavior thesis and the capabilities thesis. The three cases are assessments by President Jimmy Carter and officials in his administration of Soviet intentions during the collapse of détente; assessments by President Ronald Reagan and administration officials of Soviet intentions during the end of the Cold War; and British assessments of Nazi Germany before World War II.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204
Author(s):  
Ozum Yesiltas

This study investigates the growing influence of Middle Eastern non-state actors as agents of foreign policy and their interactions with states through an analysis of the U.S.-Kurdish relationship. Incorporating archival data and interviews with Kurdish and American policy makers, the paper analyses the factors that have affected the U.S.-Kurdish relationship from World War II to the recent Syrian crisis in the context of the mainstream theoretical approaches within the discipline of International Relations. The article concludes that the failure to formulate a coherent Kurdish policy complicates the U.S.’ Middle East strategy and contributes to outcomes unfavourable to U.S. interests in the region.  Abstract in Kurmanji Hêza ji kenaran : Pêşniyara bo siyaseteke derveyî ya hevgirtî ya Dewletên Yekbûyî yên Amerîkayê li hemberî Kurdan Ev lêkolîn tesîra her ku diçe mezin dibe ya aktorên ne-dewletî li Rojhilata Navîn wek failên siyaseta derve, digel danûstandinên wan bi dewletan re, li ser hîma tehlîla têkiliya DYA û Kurdan vedikole. Bi vehewandina daneyên arşîvî û hevdîtinên li gel siyasetmedarên kurd û amerîkî, ev nivîsar nêrînên bîrdozî yên herî berbelav di  babetaTêkiliyên Navneteweyî de bi kar tîne, ji bo ku faktorên bandor li têkiliyên DYA-Kurd ji Şerê Cîhanê yê Duyem heta qeyrana surî ya dawîn  kirine, tehlîl bike. Nivîsar bi vê encamê digihîje ku têkçûna sazkirina siyaseteke kurd a hevgirtî ji bo stratejiya DYA ya li Rojhilata Navîn zehmetiyan derdixe û netîceyên neyînî bo berjewendiyên DYA jî bi xwe re tîne. Abstract in Sorani Hêzê Sînoran: Kurdan Reyde Mesela Sîyasetê Teberî yê DYA yê ‘Pêgirewteyî’ Pê analîzê têkilîya DYA û kurdan, no cigêrayîş Rojhelato Mîyanên de tesîrê averşîyayoxî yê aktoranê bêdewletanê sey ajananê sîyasetê teberî û dewletan reyde înteraksîyonanê nê aktoran tehqîq keno. Bi dayeyanê arşîvan û roportajanê qerardaranê sîyasetî reyde, no nuşte faktoranê ke Cengê Cîhanî yê II. ra heta krîzê Sûrîye yê nikayinî têkilîya DYA û kurdan ser o tesîr kerdo, ê faktoran çarçewaya teorîyanê bingeyênan yê beşê Têkilîya Mîyanneteweyî de analîz keno. Na meqale netîce de vana ke DYA besenêkerd polîtîkayêka kurdan a pêgirewtîye virazê, na kêmanîye kî Rojhelato Mîyanên de stratejîya DYA kena têmîyan û peynîye de faydeyê xo nêreseno menfeatanê DYA yê a herême. Abstract in Zazaki Destellat le kenarewe : keysêk derbarey hawrrayî le siyasetî derewey Emerîka da beramber be Kurdekan Em nûsîne le karîgerî geşesendinî hêzwektere bê-netewekan le ser siyasetî Rojhellatî Nawerrast da dekollêtewe, legell peywendiyan legell dewlletekan da le rêgayi şirovekirdinî peywendî nêwan wîlayete yekgirtwekanî Emerîka û Kurdekan da. Be têkellkirdinî datay erşîf û çawpêketin legell siyasetmedare emerîkî û Kurdekan da, em nûsîne şirovey ew fakterane dekat ke karîgeryan le ser peywendî nêwan wîlayete yekgrtwekanî emerîka û Kurdekan da hebuh le cengî cîhanî duwemewe heta qeyranî tazey Suriya, le çwarçêwey têore berbillawekan le zanistî peywendiye nîwdewlletiyekan da. Encamî wutareke eweye ke be hoy şikesthênan le dirustkirdinî siyasetêkî yekgirtû beramber Kurdekan, astengî bo planî Wîlayete Yekgrtwekanî Emerîka le Rojhellatî Nawerrast da dirust dekat û debête hoy dirustbûnî derencamî nerênî le qazancî Wîlayete Yekgirtwekanî Emerîka le nawçeke da.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.


Author(s):  
Richard Ellings ◽  
Joshua Ziemkowski

The United States’ experience with Asia goes back to 1784. Over the subsequent two-and-a-third centuries scholarly research grew in fits and starts, reflecting historical developments: the growth of US interests and interdependencies in the region; the wars in Asia in which the United States fought; the ascendance of the United States to international leadership; and the post–World War II resurgence of Asia led by Japan, then the four tigers, and most dramatically China. The definition of Asia evolved correspondingly. Today, due to strategic and economic interdependencies, scholars tend to view it as incorporating Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia and Russian Asia as well as relevant portions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The most recent US National Security Strategy (White House 2017, cited under Contemporary US-Asia Relations: General) reconceives the Asia-Pacific as the Indo-Pacific, stretching “from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States” and constituting “the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world” (pp. 45–46) The first Asia scholars came to prominence in the United States during World War II, and the Cold War strengthened the impetus for interdisciplinary area and regional studies. Through the middle and late Cold War years, social scientists and historians concentrated further, but they increasingly looked inward at the development of their separate disciplines, away from interdisciplinary area studies as conceived in the 1940s and 1950s. While area studies declined, barriers between academia and the policy world emerged. Many scholars disapproved of the Vietnam War. “Revisionists” in the international relations, foreign policy, and area studies fields held that US policy and the extension of global capitalism were conjoined, suppressing both economic development and indigenous political movements in Asia and elsewhere. Simultaneously, behavioral science and postmodernist movements in policy-relevant fields developed. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Theory and methodology overtook the old approach of area-specific research that tried to integrate knowledge of the history, culture, language, politics, and economics of particular nations or subregions. Theory and methodology prevailed in research, tenure, and promotion. Policy-relevant studies became viewed as “applied” science. Another factor was money. Already under pressure, area studies was dealt a major blow at the end of the Cold War with cutbacks. Research on policy issues related to the United States and Asia increasingly came from think tanks that housed scholars themselves and/or contracted with university-based specialists. In recent years due to the rapid development of China and the urgent challenges it presents, interest in policy-relevant topics has revived on campuses and in scholarly research, especially in the international relations and modern history of the Indo-Pacific and the politics, economics, environment, and foreign and military affairs of China. Interest has revived too in the subregions of Asia, much of it driven by Chinese activities abroad.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Katzenstein

This paper discusses area, regional, and international relations studies as seen from the vantage point of the United States. Part I situates the issue of regionalism in the current debate about conceptualizing international relations since the end of the Cold War and at the dawn of a new millennium. Against the historical backdrop of a powerful case for area studies made soon after the end of World War II, Part II focuses attention on the crosscurrents that are affecting area studies from three different directions: (1) disciplinary-based, scientific critics who value nomothetic approaches more than contextualization; (2) cultural critiques developed from the perspective of the humanities and, at times, post-modernism; and (3) the growing emphasis on cross-regional studies that seek to blend and incorporate elements from both scientific and humanistic perspectives. Part III concludes with some brief reflections on the relations, in the classroom, between areas, regional and international studies.


Author(s):  
Jennifer D. Kibbe

Covert action presents a potential policy for decision makers who want something quicker or more muscular than diplomacy but less expensive and obtrusive than military force. In contrast with intelligence, which entails collecting and analyzing information, covert action is an active instrument of foreign policy. The three main categories of covert action include propaganda, political action, and paramilitary action. Another separate category is economic action, which involves destabilizing the target state’s economy in some way. Because of the inherent secrecy of covert action, outside scholars have no way of knowing how much they do or do not know about the topic at hand and it also makes it hard to verify the information, since the information comes from a variety of sources. Covert action literature is particularly strong in case studies of particular operations. There is also a well-developed subsection within the field that focuses on covert action since the end of the Cold War, the role that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) played during World War II, and covert actions undertaken by other states. However, there are several issues in the covert action literature. These issues include the assessment of the success or failure of particular operations and of the policy instrument as a whole, the tangible and intangible costs incurred by covert action, the ethical questions raised by conducting covert actions as well as the particular methods used and its impact on democracy, the oversight of covert action, and the evolution of US law covering covert action.


Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter summarizes the book's empirical findings and explains their practical policy implications as well as their significance for international relations theory. The selective attention thesis is pitted against the capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis for each of the three historical episodes of intentions assessment. The selective attention thesis is more successful than the capabilities, strategic military doctrine, and behavior theses in accounting for the empirical patterns observed for the three cases. The evidence shows that when assessing intentions, decision makers rely on their personal impressions and are influenced by indicators that are consistent with their own theories about how the world operates as well as their preexisting stance toward an adversary. In contrast, intelligence organizations pay selective attention to those indicators that match their bureaucratic expertise. The chapter concludes by suggesting important avenues for further research.


Author(s):  
Patrick M. Morgan

Deterrence is an old practice, readily defined and described, widely employed but unevenly effective and of questionable reliability. Elevated to prominence after World War II and the arrival of nuclear weapons, deterrence became the central recourse for sustaining international and internal security and stability among and within states in an era of serious conflict. With regard to the presence of nuclear weapons in particular but also to deal with non-nuclear violent conflict, deterrence has been employed to prevent (or at least limit) the destruction of states, societies, and ultimately humanity. The greatest success has been that no nuclear weapons have been used for destructive purposes since the end of World War II in 1945. Deterrence has been widely used below the nuclear level but with very uneven results. Deterrence has been intensively studied and tested as to its use in terms of strategy in international relations, the maintenance of stability in international relations, the conduct of violence and warfare in both international and domestic contexts, and in political affairs. Since deterrence is the use of threats to block or reduce the inflicting of serious harm, the existence of capacities for inflicting harm are readily maintained and periodically applied, so available deterrence capabilities provide a degree of continuing concern and a regular desire to at least do away with nuclear weapons and threats. A brief period in the ending of the Cold War saw a serious effort to reduce the reliance on deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, in international politics but it was soon replaced by serious movement in the opposite direction. Yet efforts to reduce the need for and use of deterrence continue. Extensive efforts have been applied in the development of theories of deterrence, particularly to generate empirical theory in order to better understand and apply deterrence but without arriving at widely accepted results. This is the result of the considerable complexity of the subject, the activity involved, and the behavior of the practitioners. The conduct of deterrence is now broader and deeper than before. It is under greater pressure due to technological, political, and cultural developments, and operates in a much more elaborate overall environment including space, cyberspace, and oceanic environs. Thus the goal of developing effective empirical theory on deterrence remains, at various levels, still incompletely attained. The same is true of mastering deterrence in practice. Nevertheless, deterrence remains important and fascinating.


1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-97
Author(s):  
Tadashi Aruga

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan moved from isolation and pacifism towards a militarized foreign policy. It relumed to pacifism after its defeat in World War II. The United States discarded its pacifist stance as it entered World War II and reaffirmed its commitment to a militarized foreign policy at the onset of the Cold War. Because both Japan and the United States had been outside or at the periphery of international relations for such a long time, these shifts tended to be far more dramatic than those experienced by European nations, accustomed as they were to an international milieu where peace and war coexisted.


2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mona Siegel ◽  
Kirsten Harjes

On May 4, 2006, French and German cultural ministers announced the publication of Histoire/Geschichte, the world's first secondary school history textbook produced jointly by two countries. Authored by a team of French and German historians and published simultaneously in both languages, the book's release drew considerable public attention. French and German heads-of-state readily pointed to the joint history textbook as a shining example of the close and positive relations between their two countries, while their governments heralded the book for “symbolically sealing Franco-German reconciliation.” Beyond European shores, East Asian commentators in particular have taken note of Franco-German textbook collaboration, citing it as a possible model for how to work through their own region's often antagonistic past. Diplomatic praise is not mere hyperbole. From the Franco-Prussian War (1870) through World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945), France and Germany were widely perceived to be “hereditary enemies.” The publication of Histoire/Geschichte embodies one of the most crucial developments in modern international relations: the emergence of France and Germany as the “linchpin” of the New Europe.


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