scholarly journals Translating the armed struggle: Alfonso Sastre and Sean O’Casey in Spain

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-65
Author(s):  
Catherine O'Leary
Asian Survey ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-220
Author(s):  
K. S. Nathan
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julius M. Gathogo

The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), otherwise known as Mau-Mau revolutionary movement was formed after returnees of the Second World War (1939–1945) ignited the African populace to militarily fight for land and freedom (wiyathi nai thaka). John Walton’s theory of reluctant rebels informs this article theoretically, as it is indeed the political elites who inspired this armed struggle. To do this, they held several meetings in the capital city of Nairobi, drew the war structures from the national level to the sub-location level, especially in the central region of Kenya, and tasked locals with filling in the leadership vacuums that were created. In view of this, the article seeks to unveil the revolutionary history of the Mau-Mau medical Doctor, also known as Major Judge Munene Gachau (born in 1935), whose contribution in the Kenyan war of independence (1952–1960) remains unique. This uniqueness can be attested to by considering various factors. First, he is one of the few surviving leaders who joined the guerrilla forest war while he was relatively young. Normally, the Mau-Mau War Council did not encourage people below the age of 25 to join the rebels in the forest of Mt. Kenya, Aberdare Mountains and/or other places. Nor did they encourage adults past the age of 35 to join as combatants in the forest fight. Second, he is the only known Mau-Mau rebel in Kirinyaga county of Kenya to have gone back to school after the war had ended, traveled abroad, and studied up to a Masters degree level. Third, Munene Gachau belongs in the category that joined the rebels while still relatively educated and eventually got promoted to the rank of Major, upon being confirmed as the Mau-Mau Doctor.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilberto Conde

The ideological struggle deployed between the Syrian opposition groups and the government during the first year of the Syrian popular uprising is examined in this paper. Force alone was not enough for the regime to crush the revolt, at least during its first twelve months, while protesters were unable to bring down the government. The battle for cultural hegemony had to be won by one of the two sides. Protesters and the regime alike had to deploy their discourses along frames that resonated with the values, hopes and fears of Syrians. The effectiveness of the regime in securing the support of large sections of urban dwellers and its systematic violent repression led to frustration on the part of demonstrators, who ended up supporting at least morally the armed struggle. A stalemate was reached. This led to divergent framing activity within the opposition, which in turn led to its division.Spanish El artículo examina la lucha ideológica que se dio entre los grupos sirios de oposición y el gobierno durante el primer año del levantamiento popular en Siria. Durante los primeros 12 meses a partir de marzo de 2011, al régimen no le bastó con la fuerza bruta para aplastar la revuelta, aunque los manifestantes tampoco lograron tumbar al gobierno. Se dio un combate por la hegemonía cultural y uno de los bandos necesitaba ganarla. Tanto los opositores como el régimen frasearon sus discursos alrededor de aristas conceptuales (frames) en armonía con los valores, esperanzas y temores de la población siria. La e ficacia del régimen en obtener el apoyo de amplios sectores de los habitantes de las principales ciudades y la represión violenta sistemática condujeron a un sentimiento de frustración entre los manifestantes, que terminaron ofreciendo un apoyo al menos moral a la lucha armada. Se llegó a un impasse. Esto a su vez llevó a que diferentes grupos de oposición reconstruyeran su discurso en torno de aristas distintas, lo que generó división.French L'article étudie la lu e idéologique menée entre les groupes d'opposition et le gouvernement pendant la première année du soulèvement populaire en Syrie. Pendant les douze premiers mois, à dater du mois de mars de 2011, la force brute n'a pas suffiau régime pour écraser le mouvement, bien que les manifestants à leur tour n'aient pas réussi à faire tomber le gouvernement. Une lu e pour l'hégémonie culturelle s'est développée et un des deux côtés devait la gagner. L'opposition ainsi que le régime ont encadré (frame) leurs discours de sorte à qu'ils parlent aux valeurs, espoirs et peurs des syriens. Le succès du régime à gagner l'appui (ou le recul) de grands secteurs de la population des villes principales et la répression violente systématique ont produit un sentiment de frustration parmi les manifestants, qui ont fini par soutenir la lu e armée au moins moralement. La situation est arrivée à une impasse. Dans cet état, différents groupes d'opposition ont reformulé leurs discours au tour d'encadrements divergents, ce qui a mené à leur division.


1980 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Emile-Jean Dumay
Keyword(s):  

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Mohamed Karbal

During the last two decades, the politics of certain Arab countrieshave been influenced by various Islamic groups. Some of these groupshave expressed their dissatisfaction with the performances of theirgovernments by Using the available political channels to seek change;others have resorted to violence. Armed protests have taken the form ofbombings, assassinations, and mass demonstrations.Suicide attacks and armed struggle took place against Israeli, American,and French forces in Lebanon (1982-83). President Sadat of Egyptwas assassinated in 1981 by Egyptian military pemnnel who were membersof an Islamic movement. Another armed struggle against the Syrianregime was initiated by the Syrian Islamic Front in 1976-82. Numerousdemonsttations against the governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisiatook place during the 1980s.Other Muslim groups attempted to participate in the decision-makingprocess in their countries. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt encouragedits prominent members to run for election to the Egyptian Parliament.However, the Society was not considered a legal party accordingto Egyptian law. The Wafd, a legitimate party, allowed the Society ofMuslim Brothers to campaign under their banner. As a result, membersof the Society voted in accordance with their ideological and political beliefsrather than the Wafd party line. In Jordan, the Society of MuslimBrothem campaigned as an independent party during the 1988 electionsand won twenty percent of the seats.Due to the Arab countries’ economic and strategic importance, variousgovemments, scholars, and private and public organizations have paid closeattention to these incidents. In an attempt to understand this phenomenon,academic conventions have been held, books and articles have been published,and gmnts have been awarded for research. Western and Arabscholars have described it with such labels as Islamic fundamentalism,revivalism, awakening, reformism, resurgence , renewal, militancy, or simply ...


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (002) ◽  
pp. 54-63
Author(s):  
V.V. KRUGLOV
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Shakoor Ahmad Wani

Since the early 2000, Balochistan is yet again embroiled in a cobweb of violence after a hiatus of more than two decades. The Baloch nationalist militancy began to reinvigorate after the seizure of power by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Musharraf marginalised the moderate Baloch nationalists and repressed dissident voices. The differences over power and resource sharing escalated quickly into a full-blown armed struggle once Musharraf used indiscriminate force to subdue opposition against his regime. This article examines the proximate and long-term structural factors that led to the resurgence of armed militancy at the turn of the twenty-first century. It analyses the new drivers and dynamics of the present conflict that make it more virulent and lend it a distinctive character.


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