scholarly journals Social coordination dynamics: Measuring human bonding

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Oullier ◽  
Gonzalo C. de Guzman ◽  
Kelly J. Jantzen ◽  
Julien Lagarde ◽  
J. A. Scott Kelso
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Dynamics ◽  
Social Coordination

scholarly journals Embodied economics: how bodily information shapes the social coordination dynamics of decision-making

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1538) ◽  
pp. 291-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Oullier ◽  
Frédéric Basso
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
The Body ◽  
Coordination Dynamics ◽  
Entire Body ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Economic Decisions ◽  
The Social ◽  
Physical Presence ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Abstract Level

To date, experiments in economics are restricted to situations in which individuals are not influenced by the physical presence of other people. In such contexts, interactions remain at an abstract level, agents guessing what another person is thinking or is about to decide based on money exchange. Physical presence and bodily signals are therefore left out of the picture. However, in real life, social interactions (involving economic decisions or not) are not solely determined by a person's inference about someone else's state-of-mind. In this essay, we argue for embodied economics : an approach to neuroeconomics that takes into account how information provided by the entire body and its coordination dynamics influences the way we make economic decisions. Considering the role of embodiment in economics—movements, posture, sensitivity to mimicry and every kind of information the body conveys—makes sense. This is what we claim in this essay which, to some extent, constitutes a plea to consider bodily interactions between agents in social (neuro)economics.

scholarly journals Third party stabilization of unstable coordination in systems of coupled oscillators

2021 ◽  
Vol 2090 (1) ◽  
pp. 012167
Author(s):  
Joseph McKinley ◽  
Mengsen Zhang ◽  
Alice Wead ◽  
Christine Williams ◽  
Emmanuelle Tognoli ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Coordination Dynamics ◽  
Older Individuals ◽  
Functional Connection ◽  
Neural Ensembles ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Coordination Behavior ◽  
Coupling Parameters ◽  
Rhythmic Coordination

Abstract The Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) system of equations is a well-developed model for dyadic rhythmic coordination in biological systems. It captures ubiquitous empirical observations of bistability – the coexistence of in-phase and antiphase motion – in neural, behavioral, and social coordination. Recent work by Zhang and colleagues has generalized HKB to many oscillators to account for new empirical phenomena observed in multiagent interaction. Utilising this generalization, the present work examines how the coordination dynamics of a pair of oscillators can be augmented by virtue of their coupling to a third oscillator. We show that stable antiphase coordination emerges in pairs of oscillators even when their coupling parameters would have prohibited such coordination in their dyadic relation. We envision two lines of application for this theoretical work. In the social sciences, our model points toward the development of intervention strategies to support coordination behavior in heterogeneous groups (for instance in gerontology, when younger and older individuals interact). In neuroscience, our model will advance our understanding of how the direct functional connection of mesoscale or microscale neural ensembles might be switched by their changing coupling to other neural ensembles. Our findings illuminate a crucial property of complex systems: how the whole is different than the system’s parts.

Myopic Stackelberg Equilibria and Social Coordination in a Share Contract Fishery

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo P. Hämäläinen ◽  
Jukka Ruusunen ◽  
Veijo Kaitala
Keyword(s):  
Social Coordination ◽  
A Share

scholarly journals The Dynamics of Musical Participation

2021 ◽  
pp. 102986492098831
Author(s):  
Andrea Schiavio ◽  
Pieter-Jan Maes ◽  
Dylan van der Schyff
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical System ◽  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Dynamical Systems Theory ◽  
Coordination Dynamics ◽  
Musical Experience ◽  
The Core ◽  
Interactive Dynamics ◽  
Interdisciplinary Scholarship ◽  
Core Features

In this paper we argue that our comprehension of musical participation—the complex network of interactive dynamics involved in collaborative musical experience—can benefit from an analysis inspired by the existing frameworks of dynamical systems theory and coordination dynamics. These approaches can offer novel theoretical tools to help music researchers describe a number of central aspects of joint musical experience in greater detail, such as prediction, adaptivity, social cohesion, reciprocity, and reward. While most musicians involved in collective forms of musicking already have some familiarity with these terms and their associated experiences, we currently lack an analytical vocabulary to approach them in a more targeted way. To fill this gap, we adopt insights from these frameworks to suggest that musical participation may be advantageously characterized as an open, non-equilibrium, dynamical system. In particular, we suggest that research informed by dynamical systems theory might stimulate new interdisciplinary scholarship at the crossroads of musicology, psychology, philosophy, and cognitive (neuro)science, pointing toward new understandings of the core features of musical participation.

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document