scholarly journals The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Gregory Kulacki
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
The Us

US Congress will leave Trump nuclear authority intact

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Us Congress ◽  
North East ◽  
The Us ◽  
Carry Over

Significance The standoff with North Korea has led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold a hearing on the president’s authority to order a nuclear first strike. This is the first such formal examination of the executive branch’s nuclear prerogatives and procedures by Congress since 1976. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s administration is planning on upgrades to the US arsenal to boost Washington’s ability to wage a nuclear war and has raised the spectre of nuclear conflict with North Korea in its public remarks. Impacts The probable US deployment of new tactical nuclear weapons will not carry over to delegating attack authority to commanders in a crisis. Chinese and Russian anti-access/area-denial systems may trigger more US reliance on nuclear deterrence in the Baltics and North-east Asia. Improved weapons technology convincing policymakers that first strikes are prudent pose greater risks than unbalanced political leadership.

Russia and the US: Conceptual Approaches to Nuclear Deterrence

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (003) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
O.Yu. AKSYONOV
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
The Us

scholarly journals Ethnicity Political Power in East Asia

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
M. Dahrin La Ode ◽  
Adnan Madjid ◽  
Ridwan Ridwan
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Analytical Techniques ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Defense System ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Us

The purpose of this study to analyze the strategy of the political power of ethnicity, political objectives ethnicity, and the US response to the political power of ethnicity East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China). This type of qualitative research, data collection techniques interviews, and literature, and data using the analytical techniques and models Miles Hubberman. The findings of this study the map of the political power of ethnicity in East Asia they are all on the Natives. Japan's defense system was originally “Self Defense” to “Collective Self Defence”, South Korea's defense system shifts from “Defense Ambrella” into the system “Extended Nuclear Deterrence”; China shifted from “Continental Defense” to “Opensive Defense”. Political objectives etnisistas East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China) to realize “Bonum Publicum”. US response to the political power of ethnicity in East Asia are routed through the strength of the economic, political, military and East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China), using a system of “persuading, the protection system and pressing system. However, in the light of “persuasion”, “protection” and “pressure” varies between countries. Map of the political power of ethnicity in East Asia “base on power” Yamato indigenous groups, Hangukin, and Chung Hua.

scholarly journals Quel droit de la guerre pour l’OTAN?

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-569
Author(s):  
Henri Meyrowitz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Common

The debate which has been going on for many years now among governments of the member countries of NATO on the ratification of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in 1977, focusses mainly on the effects of such an instrument on deterrence and nuclear strategy. It is the fear of these effects that France has used to justify her refusal to become part of Protocol I. At the time of the signing of Protocol I, the US and Great Britain made the declaration that the new regulations as introduced by Protocol I "are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". It appears that, for a reason which has nothing to do with atomic weapons, the Reagan administration intends not to ask the Senate for ratification of Protocol I. The governments of Italy and Belgium who ratified the Protocol in February and May 1986 respectively, have supplemented their ratification with a declaration similar to that of the two powers. As for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the answer must from now on rely on the combination of Protocol I and the "nuclear clause" from the declaration of the two powers and their allies. Hence the status of nuclear weapons in international law is comprised of three elements : a) The first use of nuclear weapons is not, in itself prohibited. - b) This use is subjected to the regulations of the common law of war, as has been "reaffirmed" by Protocol I, and which applies both to conventional and nuclear weapons. - c) The bans and restrictions, as provided for in these regulations, and which mark out the thin bounds which allow for the use of atomic weapons, pertain only to the use of these arms and not to nuclear deterrence.

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

2011 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 1401-1438 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID S. YOST
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
The Us

scholarly journals The US and Extended Deterrence

2020 ◽  
pp. 87-107
Author(s):  
Paul van Hooft
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Extended Deterrence ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
The One ◽  
The U.S

AbstractThe U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. The 2018 NPR signals several potentially destabilizing policies, including lowering the threshold for use and adding low-yield capabilities, and it emphasizes the need for nuclear superiority. This chapter argues that the U.S. is changing its nuclear posture to address the growing challenge to U.S. conventional superiority. Extended nuclear deterrence is inherently dubious and the asymmetry between the U.S. on the one hand, and its allies and adversaries on the other, makes it doubly so. In the coming decades, this will continue to generate problems for the U.S. as long as it maintains its alliance commitments.

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