“Honeymoon” of the Russian Empire and the United States during WWI

The article focuses on the debatable issues of Russian-American relations from 1914 until the fall of Tsarism, such as the degree of the two countries’ rapprochement, ethnic questions, the positive dynamics of mutual images and the intensified process of Russians and Americans studying each other. Based on primary and secondary sources, this work intends to emphasize that the conflict element in bilateral relations did not hamper cooperation between the two states. The author’s multipronged and interdisciplinary approach allowed her to conclude that the United Sates was ready to engage in wide-ranging interaction with the Russian Empire regardless of their ideological differences. From the author’s point of view, it was the pragmatic agenda that aided the states’ mutual interest in destroying the stereotypes of their counterpart and stimulated Russian Studies in the US and American Studies in Russia. Therefore, the “honeymoon” between the two states had started long before the 1917 February Revolution. However, Wilson strove to turn Russia not so much into an object of US’ “dollar diplomacy”, but into a destination of its “crusade” for democracy. The collapse of the monarchy provided an additional impetus for liberal internationalism by integrating the Russian “Other” into US foreign policy. Ultimately, an ideological (value-based) approach emerged as a stable trend in structuring America’s attitude toward Russia (be it the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Russia).

US security provision under Joe Biden: A preliminary reconstruction of national strategy

The article proposes a new understanding of the phenomenon of security as the desire of the state to achieve the most favourable trajectory of development under existing constraints. The concept of a favourable trajectory depends on objective factors and its subjective interpretations that are fixed in strategies and programs. In order to make these interpretations systematic and form a holistic model consisting of them, a new algorithm for strategical and program documents has been developed. According to the algorithm, every priority should be marked by code (or its combination) which corresponds to one of the subsystems of the global system and its component to create a database. The analysis of the database makes it possible to isolate problems whose relevance was artificially overestimated prior to elections, to forecast the directions of sequestration of their priorities, to determine the degree of continuity, to rank areas of the policy, to identify probable interconnections among them and to predict the foundations of a promising strategy. In regard to Biden’s program, the algorithm made it possible to achieve the following results. It was revealed that the program is more a succession to Trump’s strategy than innovative. The priority of the economic, social and financial spheres was artificially overestimated and the degree of their importance will be reduced after Biden’s inauguration. Economic, energy and legal spheres will be the cornerstones of Biden’s future strategy. Cyber, raw materials and technological subsystems will be assigned the role of drivers of development. Their successful functioning will be dependent on the dynamics of the military and agricultural sectors. In turn, demographic, trade, financial and credit, civil, humanitarian and cultural subsystems will acquire a more subordinate position and their role will be determined by the solution of specific issues. At the same time, it is difficult to determine the concrete positions and roles of future social and ecological policies because they had been overdeveloped or unclearly prioritized in the electoral program.

Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European states within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and the ‘17+1’ mechanism

The Belt and Road initiative (BRI) is a large-scale geo-economic project which is an integral part of China’s contemporary foreign policy. The foundation of this project is the vast network of trade and transport communications by land and sea that encompasses countries of the Eurasian continent as well as Africa. The European destination is a key link of the project: most of the transit ways of the BRI lead to the EU and European countries. The Central and Eastern Europe region (CEE) occupies a special place in China’s strategy of the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative: the countries of this region are located on the main trade routes from China to the most developed European countries. Moreover, the CEE countries are in dire need of investment and infrastructure development. In 2012 China launched a multilateral cooperation mechanism with 16 CEE countries (in 2019 the number of participants increased to 17 due to the accession of Greece). This article aims at analyzing the structure and functioning of the mechanism, key areas of activity within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative, and the problems and prospects of cooperation between China and the CEE countries. The main hypothesis of the work is that China uses the ‘17 + 1’ mechanism as a tool for establishing bilateral cooperation with selected countries of the region. Such an approach evokes criticism from the CEE states, as well as EU institutions. The current situation shows that China needs to make adjustments to its strategy for the implementation of the BRI initiative in the region. The authors used legislation and materials from official websites of EU institutions, China and the CEE countries’ government agencies, statistical data and analytical papers by international organizations, as well as material from news agencies.

American presidents in polarized D.C.: From Barack Obama to Joe Biden

In 1960 one of the leading researchers of the American Presidency, professor and an adviser to a number of US presidents Richard Neustadt formulated the iconic formula where presidential power needed to cooperate with the Congress — persuade, negotiate and compromise. But since political reality has changed so deeply, today only a God gifted negotiator is able to fulfill its power in polarized Washington, D.C. A modern day president should be a legislator and a showman rolled into one to succeed in his mission. According to the Constitution, the American legislative process is based on the consensus between all participants, while both the President and the Congress have the power of legislative initiative. It is the president who is responsible for gaining this consensus between all the initiators. In time of political polarization parties which traditionally had been the facilitators of this way to compromise became the main obstacles. From the presidential ticket to the Congress, they turned out to be the main headache of the president. Joe Biden came to White House with a reputation of being a skilled compromiser. But while it has been his advantage with the electorate, the left wing of his party strongly opposes his centrist ideology. Donald Trump named himself a brilliant deal maker, but his business experience of making deals appeared to be irrelevant in polarized D.C. Why has it turned out to be so hard to bring a consensus to today’s political process? Will Biden be able to change this trend and reunite the Nation as he promised during his inauguration?

The forgotten process: Information disarmament in the Soviet/US reproachment of the 1980s

This article contends that just as an excess of conventional arms requires a disarmament processes, so the weaponization of media should be met with an information disarmament process. The article examines elements of this work deployed to assist in the US — Soviet rapprochement of the 1980s. Cases discussed include a mutual textbook review project, citizento-citizen conferences mounted by the Chautauqua Society and a series of forums held via satellite television links called Spacebridges. The emergence of government-to-government information talks in which the United States Information Agency led by Charles Z.Wick engaged various elements of the Soviet state media apparatus is traced. The meetings from 1986 through 1989 are summarized, including the frank discussion of the challenge of disinformation and of mutual stereotyping. It is asserted that this process was more effective than is generally remembered, but success required a rough symmetry within the US/Soviet relationship. The internal crisis within the USSR repositioned the country as a junior partner and led the US to misperceive the end of the Cold War in terms of victory and defeat, with counterproductive results.

Strategic consulting and capacity building in US humanitarian policy

Strategic advising and capacity building are closely interconnected, as they involve the deployment to foreign countries of American advisers who will act by strengthening democratization, attracting military and police contingents, civil administrators, providing humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure development. All of these instruments are aimed at strengthening American influence everywhere and are used by Washington through the activities of American advisers dealing working in developing and post-conflict countries. The practice of the U.S. strategic advising and capacity building exists since the 1940s, during the Cold war it was aimed at confrontation with the socialist system. The role of advisers in advancing interests is enormous and ubiquitous: from Ukraine to Syria, from Somalia to Haiti. It is closely related to other instruments of American humanitarian policy: public diplomacy, educational exchanges, development assistance. The transplant of US civil society concepts to foreign countries is doubtful, but meets American goals. The author evaluates US system of strategic advising and capacity building analysing activities of federal ministries and agencies. The hypothesis of the article that Washington would use these instrumwnts more broadly, and theyvwould be oriented more explicitly towards national defence interests. The article includes SWOT analysis of the US system of strategic advising and capacity building.

Debating the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe: What Germany expects from Russia

The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing arrangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-makers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.

Nord Stream 2 in the mirror of German party discussions

Russian-German energy relations, which have been continuing for over half a century, are an important component of bilateral interactions. Since the 1960s of the last century, Russia and Germany have been strengthening their cooperation, carrying out a large number of joint projects, setting up enterprises and building gas pipelines. In this article, the author examines the German internal political discussion around the construction of the transnational project Nord Stream 2, which, despite the initial approval of both sides, has repeatedly been the subject of controversy both in the internal and external political arena of Germany. The project was opposed not only by the Bundestag parties, referring to environmental problems and political contradictions, but also by European neighbors, as well as the United States of America, which have their own economic interests in the field of energy cooperation with Germany. The article presents an analysis of the discourse on this issue, based on the statements of the main politicians in Germany, party members at meetings of the Bundestag, as well as on information published in the German-language electronic media in the context of political pressure through the institutions of the European community and sanctions policy from the United States. The author comes to the conclusion that, despite the polarity of opinions on the construction of the gas pipeline, not only in internal political discussions, but also at the international level, Germany, while maintaining obligations to implement this project, is guided by its own political and economic doctrine and is able to make decisions, contrary to pressure from states with their own interests in this area of interaction.

Foreign economic cooperation between St. Petersburg and Denmark in the 21st century: Main trends, problems, prospects

Russian-Danish economic cooperation has a long and rich history, in which St. Petersburg, due to its geographical location, has always played an important role. The study of the role of large megacities in national foreign economic policy is now of great scientific and practical importance. The authors of this article attempt to examine the economic sphere of paradiplomacy based on the example of St. Petersburg. The article analyzes the legal framework for economic cooperation between St. Petersburg and Denmark, trade and investment cooperation, determines the place of St. Petersburg in the total trade turnover of Russia with Denmark, and the importance of Danish exports and imports for St. Petersburg’s economy. Special attention is paid to the period 2014–2020, namely, the impact of the sanctions regime on Danish and St. Petersburg economic cooperation, as well as the new role of the Danish autonomous regions — the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The authors determine that there were no drastic changes in the economic interaction between St. Petersburg and Denmark after the introduction of sanctions. Although the counter-sanctions reduced the supply of Danish food products, the export of St. Petersburg goods to Denmark increased. The vacuum created by the reduction in the supply of Danish products was filled by enterprising residents of the Faroe Islands, who are not members of the European Union (EU). St. Petersburg has become one of the key centers of consumption of Faroese fish and seafood. The main obstacles to the development of economic cooperation between St. Petersburg and Denmark remain: value differences between the Russian Federation and the EU, the sanctions regime, an outdated regulatory framework, and a high degree of distrust between partners, which is beginning to affect the pragmatic sphere of the economy. The global economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic also has a negative impact on economic cooperation between St. Petersburg and Denmark. However, the epidemic opens up new opportunities for cooperation in areas that were on the periphery of Danish-Russian economic relations: digitalization of the economy and education, urbanism and the implementation of the ideas of a “smart city”, cooperation in the field of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies, and cybersecurity.

EU-Russian cross-border cooperation between (de-)securitization and paradiplomacy: In search of new approaches towards cross-border governance

For almost 30 years, cross-border cooperation between Russia and the European Union has been balancing between cooperation and control, geopolitics and paradiplomacy. In different periods of relations, the dominance of one or another logic of development is noticeable. In the “post-Crimean” period of international relations in Europe, cross-border cooperation remained one of the few spheres of interaction between Russia and the EU which showed somewhat positive dynamics, or at least had not degraded significantly. The Karelian section of the Russian state border attracted close attention from both Russian and Western researchers in the 1990s due to the rapid pace of institutionalization of cross-border cooperation. The creation of Euregio “Karelia” in 2000 and the launch of cross-border cooperation programs within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy helped to maintain research interest. In recent years, the negative dynamics of relations between Russia and the EU has led to a noticeable decrease in the research interest to some issues of EU-Russian cross-border cooperation. At the same time, cross-border cooperation projects continue to have a positive impact on the development of border communities, and the cross-border governance system continues to develop and transform. Thus, the study of the dynamics of cross-border cooperation in the Euregio “Karelia” is still of scientific interest. It makes it possible to answer specific questions about the peculiarities of interaction between Karelia and Finland, as well as more general questions related to EU-Russian relations. Based on the analysis of discursive cooperation practices inherent to different participants of the cross-border cooperation in the Euregio “Karelia”, the article shows why positive interaction of actors is still possible, and what vector of development can be expected for the regional cooperation between Russia and the EU in the medium-term perspective.