Reformation Contributions to the Development of Public Welfare Policy in Hesse

1977 ◽  
Vol 49 (S2) ◽  
pp. D1145-D1179 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Wright

2005 ◽  
Vol 115 (502) ◽  
pp. C62-C81 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Banks ◽  
Richard Disney ◽  
Alan Duncan ◽  
John Van Reenen


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark LeBar

Contemporary debate over public welfare policy is often cast in Kantian terms. It is argued, for example, that respect for the dignity of the poor requires public aid, or that respect for their autonomy forbids it. In some recent political discourse, the views of Kant himself have been invoked in defense of public welfare provision. Some have argued that his moral theory mandates welfare as an expression of our duty to be beneficent, or that Kant's commitments to freedom require public provision of aid to those in need. These implications are thought to be reflected in his political theory in a variety of ways.However, at no point in his political works does Kant explicitly argue for the public provision of welfare on the basis of either beneficence or freedom. These omissions are the more striking because he does explicitly endorse the public provision of welfare. But the rationale for welfare he offers is that it is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. This approach is very different from one grounded in moral duties of beneficence or respect for freedom, and may perhaps be disappointing to those who would like to establish some more hortatory moral rationale for welfare. But if Kant is to be enlisted in the cause of public welfare provision for the sake of beneficence or freedom, then an explanation is required why he offers no argument to that effect.



2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicki Johansson

Abstract This paper puts forward the argument that Performance Measurement Systems (PMSs) foster rational, self-interested behaviour and vested values at all levels within organisations, which weakens moral barriers preventing fraud, fabrication of data and bribery. It argues that the longer a PMS is in operation, the greater the probability that rational self-interested behaviour in conflict with fundamental values and goals will be consolidated, aggravated and disseminated within organisations that operate within public welfare policy. If implemented, common incentives aimed at counteracting undesirable behaviour aggravate and speed up this process rather than reversing it. In a worst-case scenario, PMSs are the first step toward corruption, even though PMSs have been implemented with the good intention of improving public policy and strengthening accountability.



2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Kasza

The pacific war (1937–45) marked the most innovative period in the development of public welfare in Japan, comparable to the 1880s in Germany, the 1908–14 era in Britain, and the 1930s in the United States. Wartime welfare policy set precedents that shape many aspects of welfare provision in Japan to this day. It is a cruel paradox, but war, despite its immediate, catastrophic effects on human well-being, has played a major role in the evolution of the welfare state.



2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Xu

By using American state-level data from 1999 to 2008, this article explores how the recent immigrant influx has influenced public welfare spending in the American states. By integrating the race/ethnicity and globalization compensation theory, I hypothesize that immigration will increase welfare spending in states with a bleak job market and exclusive state immigrant welfare policy; in contrast, immigration will decrease welfare spending in states with a good job market and inclusive state immigrant welfare policy. Empirical tests show evidence for both hypotheses, suggesting that the applicability of general political science theories depends on a combination of state policy and economic contexts.





2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy K. Young ◽  
Denise Churchill ◽  
Sam Gillespie ◽  
Peter Panzarella


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