When will we ever learn ?

This paper puts forward the argument that Performance Measurement Systems (PMSs) foster rational, self-interested behaviour and vested values at all levels within organisations, which weakens moral barriers preventing fraud, fabrication of data and bribery. It argues that the longer a PMS is in operation, the greater the probability that rational self-interested behaviour in conflict with fundamental values and goals will be consolidated, aggravated and disseminated within organisations that operate within public welfare policy. If implemented, common incentives aimed at counteracting undesirable behaviour aggravate and speed up this process rather than reversing it. In a worst-case scenario, PMSs are the first step toward corruption, even though PMSs have been implemented with the good intention of improving public policy and strengthening accountability.

THE BIOLOGICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN LIVING IN DISADVANTAGED REGIONS OF HUNGARY

SummaryThe aim of this study was to find out whether differences exist in the physical development, nutritional status and psychosomatic status of children living in deprived regions of Hungary compared with the Hungarian national reference values. The Hungarian government’s decree No. 24/2003 created a complex indicator of social and economic conditions by which the country’s regions were graded into deprived and non-deprived regions. This study examined 3128 children (aged 3–18 years) living in the deprived regions and their biological status was compared with the national reference values (2nd Hungarian National Growth Study). Children’s body development was assessed via some absolute body dimensions. Nutritional status was estimated by BMI with children being divided into ‘underweight’, ‘normal’, ‘overweight’ and ‘obese’ categories. For children aged 7–18 years a standard symptoms list was used to characterize psychosomatic status. The subjects were asked to rate their health status as excellent, good, fair or poor. The body development of children living in these deprived regions was significantly retarded compared with the national references in the age groups 7–9 years and 14–17 years for boys and in the age groups 4–6 and 14–17 for girls. The prevalence of underweight was significantly higher in children and adolescents living in deprived regions (boys: 4.8%; girls: 5.9%) than the national references (boys: 2.9%; girls: 4.0%), while the prevalence of overweight and obese children did not differ between deprived regions (boys: 20.2%; girls: 19.8%) and the national references (boys: 21.5%; girls: 19.1%). Children and adolescents living in the deprived regions rated their health status worse, and experienced more psychosomatic complaints (abdominal discomfort and fear), than the national references. Although the majority of body dimensions of children in deprived regions were close to the 50th centile of the Hungarian national references, a sizeable minority (31%) were 0.20SD or more away from the median value, which has implications as to how social, medical and public welfare policy can be shaped.

Kant on Welfare

Contemporary debate over public welfare policy is often cast in Kantian terms. It is argued, for example, that respect for the dignity of the poor requires public aid, or that respect for their autonomy forbids it. In some recent political discourse, the views of Kant himself have been invoked in defense of public welfare provision. Some have argued that his moral theory mandates welfare as an expression of our duty to be beneficent, or that Kant's commitments to freedom require public provision of aid to those in need. These implications are thought to be reflected in his political theory in a variety of ways.However, at no point in his political works does Kant explicitly argue for the public provision of welfare on the basis of either beneficence or freedom. These omissions are the more striking because he does explicitly endorse the public provision of welfare. But the rationale for welfare he offers is that it is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. This approach is very different from one grounded in moral duties of beneficence or respect for freedom, and may perhaps be disappointing to those who would like to establish some more hortatory moral rationale for welfare. But if Kant is to be enlisted in the cause of public welfare provision for the sake of beneficence or freedom, then an explanation is required why he offers no argument to that effect.