English Royal Forests under the Angevin Kings

1972 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Charles R. Young
Keyword(s):  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Wild Animals ◽  
Essential Point ◽  
Forest Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Royal Forest ◽  
Definition Of

Historians have never been properly grateful for that perpetually inquisitive student in medieval dialogues whose chief claim to fame is that he elicited bursts of wisdom from the ever-patient master. To him we owe this rather curious definition of the English royal forest as formulated by the master in Richard fitz Nigel's Dialogue of the Exchequer written about 1178:The King's forest is a safe abode for wild animals, not all of them but only the woodland ones, and not everywhere, but in particular places suitable for the purpose. That is why it is called “forest” (foresta), as though the e of feresta (i.e. a haunt of wild animals, ferarum statio), were changed into o.Fortunately, the master had already discussed the essential point that the forest was an area of special jurisdiction subject to a special law:The whole organization of the forests, the punishment, pecuniary or corporal, of forest offences, is outside the jurisdiction of the other courts, and solely dependent on the decision of the King, or of some officer specially appointed by him. The forest has its own laws, based, it is said, not on the Common Law of the realm, but on the arbitrary legislation of the King; so that what is done in accordance with forest law is not called “just” without qualification, but “just, according to forest law.”Although modern scholarship suggests that the arbitrary nature of forest law in the thirteenth century was exaggerated, there can be no question that it had a bad reputation among contemporaries, who raised the cry that it placed the protection of wild beasts above that of men.

Common Lawà l'americaine

1966 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Apelbom
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
British Occupation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Two Generations ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
Considerable Body ◽  
Clear Line

Eighteen years after attaining independence Israel remains essentially a common law country. Introduced by the British Mandatory administration to supplement the Ottoman legislation in force at the time of the British occupation of Palestine, the common law has been retained by the Israeli legislator, so far as not modified or replaced by local legislation. But this common law, far from being residual only, also embraces a considerable body of interstitial law developed by two generations of judges, British, Palestinian and Israeli, in the process of applying and interpreting statute law—whether Ottoman, Mandatory or Israeli—according to common law methods. On the other hand the importation of common law institutions was neither wholesale nor systematic and in a number of fields no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between domestic and English law.

scholarly journals GOOD FAITH IN FRANCHISE CONTRACT

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Law System ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Term Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.

Duty Not To Accept Benefits From Third Parties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamlyn Lloyd ◽  
Haywood Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Common ◽  
Breach Of Duty

One of the consequences of the common law principle that a director must avoid conflicts of interest was that a director could not have an interest in a transaction with the company unless he had disclosed all material facts about the interest to the members and they had approved or authorized his having the interest. Authorization by the board was not sufficient. If the other party to the transaction had notice of the irregularity, the company might rescind the contract. The director might also be liable for breach of duty and under a duty to account for profits obtained by reason of such dealings.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Freedom Of The Press ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
James Madison ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
The Press ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?

Part III The right To Terminate, 5 Breach of Condition

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stannard John E ◽  
Capper David
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right

This chapter focuses on breach of condition. The first situation in which termination will be available is where the other party has broken a ‘condition’. A condition is a stipulation in a contract, be it a contract of sale or some other contract, the breach of which gives rise to the right to ‘treat the contract as repudiated’. When is a term a ‘condition’? A term can be made a condition either by express stipulation or by implication. The chapter then distinguishes condition from various other concepts with which it may appear to have similarities, but which work in different ways. It also looks at time stipulations and the divergent approaches of the common law and equity to time stipulations.

Part II Formation, 6 Consideration

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrews Neil
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Modern Development ◽  
The Common

If the contract has not been formalized as a deed, the agreement will be recognized as legally effective only if the party suing has provided something at the other party’s request as a bargained element. The doctrine continues to apply, but some of its extensions have been either abandoned or diluted. The doctrine of consideration applies not just to initial agreements but to agreements to vary contracts. In the variation context, a notable modern development is that a promise to pay more for performance can be enforced if the court can identify that the promise of extra remuneration is underpinned by a commercial advantage to the person expecting performance. This is the ‘practical benefit’ aspect of variation agreements. Also in the context of variations, the Common Law continues to refuse to recognize a gratuitous promise to extinguish or reduce a debt which has accrued under the contract. It remains controversial whether there is any equitable qualification on this last proposition if the debtor has acted in reliance on the promised and favourable variation made by the creditor.

RECONCEPTUALISING THE EXPRESS TRUST

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Parkinson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Specific Subject ◽  
Core Content ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
The Common ◽  
Trust Property ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Irreducible Core ◽  
Traditional Understanding

This article argues that the express trust should be understood as a species of obligation rather than as a means of organising the ownership of property. Two propositions seem fundamental to the traditional understanding of the trust as an aspect of property law. Firstly, in the nature of the trust, there must be a separation of legal and beneficial ownership. Secondly, there must be trust property. Neither is necessarily true. With many discretionary trusts and other recognised types of express trust it is impossible to locate the beneficial estate. Furthermore, the requirement for there to be trust property is, on closer analysis, a requirement of certainty of obligation in relation to specific subject-matter within which the trust property can be located.The article explores the implications of understanding the trust as a species of obligation. It allows all express trusts, including charitable trusts, to be explained as resting on the same fundamental concepts. The trust in the common law world may still be distinguished from contract and from the civil law forms of the trust. This new conceptualisation also illuminates what is the irreducible core content of the trust. The article concludes with a new definition of the express trust.

Is the Prisoner's Character Indivisible?

1953 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sexual Morality ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
A Charge

“There is no such thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner's character in issue and leaving out the other half.” This observation fell from Humphreys J. in delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Winfield (1939). The purpose of this article is to suggest that at common law this statement is not borne out by principle or by authority. The effect on the common law where the prisoner elects to go into the witness-box in exercise of the statutory opportunity created by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, will also be considered. The type of situation that arises is illustrated by Winfield's Case, where the facts, in brief, were that on a charge of indecent assault, W. put in issue his good character for sexual morality, and the prosecution in cross-examination proved his previous convictions for offences involving dishonesty. The court held that such cross-examination was proper. The question is whether the evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner must be confined to the trait or traits relevant to the type of crime charged. It will be submitted that the evidence must be so confined. On an indictment for murder, evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner for honesty will be inadmissible. Not only the crime charged but also the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed must be considered. If the murder is committed with a hammer, character for peace and quiet on the one hand and for violence on the other will be admissible, but not if it is a case of slow poisoning.

Developments in Pledges of Land in Ghanaian Customary Law

1967 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon R. Woodman
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
The Common

There are two principal methods whereby land may be used as security for a loan in Ghana. One is the customary law transaction called a mortgage by Sarbah.2 The other is the common law mortgage. It will be convenient to refer to the customary law transaction as a “pledge”, because the creditor obtains possession of the land, and the present article is not concerned with the use of chattels as security. Accordingly, “mortgage” will always mean a common law mortgage.

scholarly journals Lies, Collateral Lies and Insurance Claims: The Changing Landscape in Insurance Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-265
Author(s):  
Baris Soyer
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Insurance Fraud ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Insurance Law ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utmost Good Faith ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of

Determining the scope of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law has posed a significant challenge for the courts, particularly in the last two decades. In the shadow of the doctrine of utmost good faith, the law in this area has developed in an uncompromising fashion introducing draconian remedies against an assured who submits a fraudulent claim. The Supreme Court's most recent intervention has provided much needed guidance on the state of the law. This article, taking into account the fact that in other areas of law more proportionate remedies have gradually been introduced, discusses the boundaries of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law as it applies in England and Wales and Scotland. Considering that the insurers might be tempted to introduce fraudulent claims clauses into their contracts to expand the common law definition of insurance fraud at the claims stage, this article also evaluates the wording of such clauses often used in practice and concludes that they lack the desired clarity.

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