scholarly journals Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village India

2019 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Morten
2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus K. Brunnermeier ◽  
Yuliy Sannikov

This article studies the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with financial frictions. Due to highly nonlinear amplification effects, the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile crisis episodes. Endogenous risk, driven by asset illiquidity, persists in crisis even for very low levels of exogenous risk. This phenomenon, which we call the volatility paradox, resolves the Kocherlakota ( 2000) critique. Endogenous leverage determines the distance to crisis. Securitization and derivatives contracts that improve risk sharing may lead to higher leverage and more frequent crises. (JEL E13, E32, E44, E52, G01, G12, G20)


Author(s):  
Jozefien De Bock

Historically, those societies that have the longest tradition in multicultural policies are settler societies. The question of how to deal with temporary migrants has only recently aroused their interest. In Europe, temporary migration programmes have a much longer history. In the period after WWII, a wide range of legal frameworks were set up to import temporary workers, who came to be known as guest workers. In the end, many of these ‘guests’ settled in Europe permanently. Their presence lay at the basis of European multicultural policies. However, when these policies were drafted, the former mobility of guest workers had been forgotten. This chapter will focus on this mobility of initially temporary workers, comparing the period of economic growth 1945-1974 with the years after the 1974 economic crisis. Further, it will look at the kind of policies that were developed towards guest workers in the era before multiculturalism. This way, it shows how their consideration as temporary residents had far-reaching consequences for the immigrants, their descendants and the receiving societies involved. The chapter will finish by suggesting a number of lessons from the past. If the mobility-gap between guest workers and present-day migrants is not as big as generally assumed, then the consequences of previous neglect should serve as a warning for future policy making.


Author(s):  
Truman Packard ◽  
Ugo Gentilini ◽  
Margaret Grosh ◽  
Philip O’Keefe ◽  
Robert Palacios ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document