scholarly journals Design optimisation of a nanofluid injection system for LOCA events in a nuclear power plant

2016 ◽  
Vol 145 (7) ◽  
pp. 072005
Author(s):  
I Călimănescu ◽  
L C Stan ◽  
D D Velcea
2014 ◽  
Vol 541-542 ◽  
pp. 916-921 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Xu ◽  
Ru Chao Deng ◽  
Chu Xu ◽  
Di Zhang ◽  
Chen Xing Sheng

For evaluate the risk of civil marine nuclear power plant, through the searching related standards for ship, external environmental parameters that the nuclear ship should be suited was found. Based on the characteristics of power plant of civil nuclear-powered ship, the hierarchy system of primary loop system was established and corresponding indicator marking criteria were formulated for the risk assessment. The result shows that the Reactor Safety Injection System (RIS), the Reactor Boron and the Water Supply System (REA), the Control Rods and the Hull of Fuel Canning are the key risk factors in the primary loop system. Finally, the comprehensive evaluation was carried out for collision, stranding and swing of multi-degree of freedom, and put forward relative countermeasures to cope with the possible risks based on the comprehensive evaluation and combined with the literatures.


Author(s):  
Ladislav Vesely ◽  
Vaclav Dostal

Accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant significantly affected the nuclear industry at time when everybody was expecting the so called nuclear renaissance. There is no question that the accident has at least slowed it down. Research into this accident is taking place all over the world. In this paper we present the findings of research on Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in relation to the Czech Republic. The paper focuses on the analysis of human performance during the accident. Lessons learned from the accident and main human errors are presented. First the brief factors affecting the human performance are discussed. They are followed by the short description of activities on units 1–3. The key human errors in the accident mitigation are then identified. On unit 1 the main error is wrong understanding and operation of isolation condenser. On unit 2 the main errors were unsuccessful depressurization with subsequent delay of coolant injection. On unit 3 the main error is the shutdown of high pressure cooling injection system without first confirming that different means of cooling are available. These errors lead to fuel damage. On unit 1 the fuel damage was probably impossible to prevent, however on unit 2 and 3 it could be probably prevented. The lessons learned for the Czech Republic were presented. They can be summarizes as follows: be sure that plant personnel can and knows how to monitor and operate the crucial plant components, be sure that the procedures on how to fulfill the critical safety functions are available in the symptomatic manner for situations when there is no power available at the plant, train personnel for these situations and have sufficient human resource available for these situations.


Author(s):  
Wang Ziguan ◽  
Lu Fang ◽  
Yang Benlin ◽  
Chen Shi ◽  
Hu Lingsheng

Abstract Risk-informed design approaches are comprehensively implemented in the design and verification process of HPR1000 nuclear power plant. Particularly, Level 2 PSA is applied in the optimization of severe accident prevention and mitigation measures to avoid the extravagant redundancy of system configurations. HPR1000 preliminary level 2 PSA practices consider internal events of the reactor in the context of at-power condition. Severe accidents mitigation and prevention system and its impact on the overall large release frequency (LRF) level are evaluated. The results showed that severe accident prevention and mitigation systems, such as fast depressurization system, the cavity injection system and the passive containment heat removal system perform well in reducing LRF and overall risk level of HPR1000 NPP. Bypass events, reactor rapture events, and the containment bottom melt-through induced by MCCI are among the dominant factors of the LRF. The level 2 PSA analysis results indicate that HPR1000 design is reliable with no major weaknesses.


Author(s):  
Wentao Zhu ◽  
Wenjing Li

After Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, severe accident is getting more and more concerns all over the world. In order to mitigate severe accident and improve the safety of nuclear power plant, two different strategies are applied in different plants. One is in-vessel melt retention strategy, and the other is ex-vessel melt retention strategy. Tianwan nuclear power plant is an improved Gen II nuclear power plant and in-vessel melt retention strategy is adopted in the plant. In order to achieve this strategy, cavity injection system is designed for the plant. Probabilistic Safety Analysis is the most commonly used quantitative risk assessment tool for decision-making in selecting the optimal design among alternative options. For this plant, in order to optimize the design of cavity injection system, improve the safety level of nuclear power plant, and meanwhile, improve the engineering implementation and economization, Level 2 PSA was used for this decision-making process. In this paper, the Level 2 PSA for this plant and the application for the design of cavity injection system are introduced.


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