An Empiricist Critique of Constructive Empiricism: The Aim of Science

Author(s):  
Philip Percival
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57
Author(s):  
Arto Mutanen

Constructive methods and constructivity have been under extensive discussion in the philosophy of science. In mathematics and experimental sciences, constructive methods have a long tradition. From experimental sciences, constructive methods broadened to empirical sciences, as constructive empiricism demonstrates. For the last few decades, scientists from social sciences have been discussing social constructionism, which is a new direction in this multidimensional tradition of constructive methods. In economics, mathematical methods such as game theory are generally used. The mathematisation of science can be done in the spirit of the pedagogic-scientific mode or technocratic-scientific mode, which both are present in economics. Mathematical and other constructive methods may allow us to find out scientific understanding for particular phenomena. However, there is a real danger that the whole of science becomes technocratic. The question is not about constructions, but the whole aim of science – whether it is pedagogical or not.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 774-783
Author(s):  
Güzin Özyılmaz ◽  

The aim of science education is to enable children to become “science-literate.” Science literacy is defined as taking responsibility for and making decisions about situations requiring scientific understanding and having sufficient knowledge, skills, attitudes and understanding of values to put their decisions into practice. Revealing teachers’ beliefs can help to understand the types of experiences presented by teachers in their classrooms. Inadequate understandings and misbeliefs of teachers shape the first perceptions of children about the NOS when they are formally introduced with science education in their early childhood. Most of the studies were also performed with science teachers and there have been few studies conducted with preschool teachers. Therefore, the present study was directed towards determining NOS beliefs of preschool teacher candidates. To achieve this aim, Nature of Science Beliefs Scale (NOSBS), developed by Özcan and Turgut (2014), was administered to the preschool teacher candidates studying in Preschool Education Department of Buca Education Faculty at Dokuz Eylül University in the spring semester of the 2018-2019 academic year. In the study, the NOS beliefs of the teacher candidates were found to be acceptable in general. While the findings of this study are consistent with those revealed in several relevant studies in the literature


Erkenntnis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-65
Author(s):  
Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda

Author(s):  
Jordi Vallverdú

AI is a multidisciplinary activity that involves specialists from several fields, and we can say that the aim of science, and AI science, is solving problems. AI and computer sciences are been creating a new kind of making science, that we can call in silico science. Both models top-eown and bottomup are useful for e-scientific research. There is no a real controversy between them. Besides, the extended mind model of human cognition, involves human-machine interactions. Huge amount of data requires new ways to make and organize scientific practices: supercomputers, grids, distributed computing, specific software and middleware and, basically, more efficient and visual ways to interact with information. This is one of the key points to understand contemporary relationships between humans and machines: usability of scientific data.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Wiesław Banyś

The text deals with one of the challenges of linguistics, which is to effectively combine description and explanation in linguistics.It is necessary that linguistic theories are not only capable of adequately describing their object of study within their framework, but they must also have a suitable explanatory power.Linguistics centred around the explanation of the why of the system is called here ‘explanatory’ or ‘non-autonomous’, in contrast to ‘descriptive’ or ‘autonomous’ linguistics, which is focused on the description of the system, the distinction being based on the difference in the objects of study, the goals and the descriptive and explanatory possibilities of the theories.From the point of view presented here, a comprehensive study of language has three main components: a general theory of what language is, a resulting theory and description, which is a function of this theory, of how language is organised, functions and has evolved in the human brain, and an explanation of the properties of language found.The explanatory value of a general linguistic theory is a function of various elements, among others, the quantity of the primitive elements of the theory adopted and the effectiveness of Ockham’s razor principle of simplicity. It is also a function of the quality of those elements which can be drawn not only from within the system, but also from outside the system becoming in this situation logically prior to the object under study.In science, in linguistics, one naturally needs two types of approach, two types of linguistics, descriptive/autonomous and explanatory/non-autonomous, one must first describe reality in order to explain it. But it is also certain that since the aim of science is to explain in order to reach that higher level of scientificity above pure description, it is necessary that this aim be realized in different linguistic theories within different research programs, uniting descriptivist and explanatory approaches.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.


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