The judicial doctrine in Australia

2013 ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miranda Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Doctrine

Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and Canada

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-249
Author(s):  
Anna Esselment
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Judicial Doctrine ◽  
The One ◽  
Central Claim

Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and Canada, Gerald Baier, Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006, pp. 207.Is everything old new again? Gerald Baier's insightful book brings back into the mainstream a long neglected examination of federalism from the perspective of judicial review. His analysis of the courts' impact on the development of federalism involves a detailed study of division of powers jurisprudence in the United States, Australia, and Canada. In each of these countries, Baier argues, the decisions of the highest courts continue to affect the shape of federalism, but his central claim turns on how these decisions are made. For Baier, judicial doctrine plays a significant role in influencing the reasoning of the courts and must be considered an independent variable worthy of study in its own right. Many scholars have debated the significance of doctrine on judicial decision making. However, Baier takes issue with scholars who, on the one hand, have characterized doctrine as a tool of objectivity and certainty, and those, on the other hand, who view doctrine as entirely political in nature (27). For Baier, doctrine is neither of these but it is “distinctly legal in character” and it is this legal reasoning that shapes outcomes (27).

Las limitaciones jurisprudenciales del recurso indirecto contra reglamentos

2014 ◽  
pp. 1199-1215
Author(s):  
Gustavo Manuel DÍAZ GONZÁLEZ
Keyword(s):  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Judicial Doctrine

LABURPENA: Lan honetan iruzkin kritikoa egiten zaio Auzitegi Gorenaren jurisprudentziari; erregelamendu-xedapenen jurisdikzio-kontrolaren alorrean, inolako arrazoirik gabe baztertu du prozedura-edukia duten arauak zeharkako errekurtsoan auziperatzeko kanon gisa erabiltzeko aukera. Lan honetan, gainera, doktrina horren jatorria aztertzen da; 1978ko Konstituzioa baino lehenagokoa da, eta, beraz, egun indarrean ez dauden premisetan oinarritzen da. Laburbilduz, azterlanak proposatzen du gainditu egin behar dela jurisprudentziamuga hori, eta zorrozki aplikatu behar dela indarrean dagoen araudiak legez kanpoko erregelamenduari ezartzen dion baliogabetasun-zehapena. RESUMEN: El presente trabajo constituye un comentario crítico de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo que, en materia de control jurisdiccional de las disposiciones reglamentarias, ha excluido de forma injustificada la utilización de las normas de contenido procedimental como canon de enjuiciamiento en el recurso indirecto. En él se analiza, además, el origen de esta doctrina, anterior a la aprobación de la Constitución de 1978, y basada, por tanto, en presupuestos que hoy no se pueden considerar vigentes. El estudio propone, en síntesis, la superación de esta limitación jurisprudencial y la rigurosa aplicación de la sanción de nulidad que la normativa en vigor impone al reglamento ilegal. ABSTRACT: This paper aims to critically comment those Supreme Court’s rulings regarding the validity of governmental decrees in which the possibility of taking into account procedural rules in the indirect appealing has been excluded. In this paper, the origins of this judicial doctrine will also be analyzed. In fact, being developed before the approval of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, such doctrine is based upon legal propositions which have been, already, overcome. To sum up, the purpose of this work is to surpass the limitations of the current legal doctrine, while claiming for the strict application of the sanction of nullity imposed to illegal governmental decrees by the legislation currently in force.

El indulto ante la justicia administrativa

2014 ◽  
pp. 1217-1244
Author(s):  
Juan José DÍEZ SÁNCHEZ
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Control ◽  
Judicial Doctrine ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Right ◽  
Administrative Justice

LABURPENA: Grazia-eskubidearen kontrol judizialaren arloan, administrazioarekiko auzien jurisprudentzia aurkeztu eta baloratzen da. Haren eboluzioa gainbegiratzen da, bai indultuaren arloko Gobernuko erabakien izaera bai hura zenbateraino berrikusi den. Auzitegi Gorenaren 2013ko azaroaren 20ko epaia aztertzen da, ordura arteko doktrina judiziala, ahobatezkoa eta errepikatua, apurtzen delakoan. Izan ere, indultuen arrazoia exijitzen da, eta akordioan agertu behar duten arrazoietara zabaltzen da administrazio-justiziaren kontrola. Gai horiek eztabaidagarriak dira hainbat faktorerengatik, eta horren garrantziak piztu du gure arreta. RESUMEN: El trabajo tiene como objetivo esencial la exposición y valoración de la jurisprudencia contencioso-administrativa en torno al control judicial del ejercicio del derecho de gracia. Incluye un repaso analítico de su evolución tanto en relación a la naturaleza de las decisiones del Gobierno en materia de indulto como respecto al alcance de su revisión. Estudia en particular la STS de 20 de noviembre de 2013 al estimar que sus consideraciones comportan la ruptura de la doctrina judicial unánime y reiterada hasta entonces. Las causas que permiten apreciar esa ruptura cabe hallarlas, especialmente, al exigir la motivación de los indultos y al extender el alcance del control que corresponde a la justicia administrativa a las razones que han de constar en el acuerdo. Cuestiones discutibles y controvertidas por diversos factores cuya relevancia justifica la atención que se le dedica. ABSTRACT: The work has like essential aim the exhibition and assessment of the contentious jurisprudence-administrative around the judicial control of the exercise of the right of grace. It includes a review analytical of his evolution so much in relation to the nature of the decisions of the Government in matter of reprieve as with regard to the scope of his review. It studies in particular the STS of 20 November 2013 when estimating that his considerations comport the split of the unanimous judicial doctrine and reiterated until then. The causes that allow to appreciate this split fits to find them, especially, when demanding the motivation of the reprieves and when extending the scope of the control that corresponds to the administrative justice to the reasons that have to be recorded in the agreement. Debatable and controversial questions by diverse factors whose importance justifies the attention that devotes him.

Reply to Fisher's Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions

1958 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Kort
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
General Statement ◽  
Court Action ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions ◽  
Judicial Doctrine

We have had many reminders of the limits and risks of statistical predictions about human behavior. When I ventured last year to offer a formula describing Supreme Court action in the state “right to counsel” cases over a period of years, I was mainly concerned to show that, contrary to accepted judicial doctrine about decisions in unique cases, consistencies in the Court's collective judgments could be demonstrated in this area, and stated in quantitative terms. I did not suppose that the formula was more than a method of approximation. I did not offer it as the perfect formula, or the only one; and in particular I did not claim that it was capable of indefinite extension to other areas of constitutional law. An exploratory effort begins with what is available. But I did take into account, so far as the available data permitted, not only the Court's decisions, but also the votes of individual justices on each of the pivotal factors on which their positions could be identified or imputed. I did not claim more for the product than that, so far, it works. With this general statement, let me turn to Fisher's article.

Rosemont v. Random House and the Doctrine of Fair Use

1973 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanne Gross
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Fair Use ◽  
Judicial Doctrine

Ruling in case involving earlier Hughes biography broadened judicial doctrine of fair use to give greater weight to public interest and benefit.

scholarly journals The Russian Cohen doctrine: problems in calculating costs and deductions in the absence of proper documentation

2019 ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Zh. G. Popkova
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Corporate Income Tax ◽  
Tax Law ◽  
Court Case ◽  
The Us ◽  
Judicial Doctrine ◽  
Approximate Amount

The article provides information about a foreign judicial doctrine (the Cohen Rule) that originated in the court case of 1930 with the participation of George Cohen, Broadway Theater manager and producer. The doctrine under consideration that is still valid in the US tax law does not exclude the application of the approximate amount of taxpayer’s expenses when calculating income taxes in the absence of documents verifying expenses. It is concluded that the domestic regulatory framework applies a similar approach that envisages a fixed deduction for individual entrepreneurs under Article 221 of the Tax Code. It is proposed to introduce a similar regulatory framework for corporate income tax.

scholarly journals A Doutrina do Standing como um Elemento Essencial da Separação de Poderes

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonin Scalia
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
The Past ◽  
Judicial Doctrine

A DOUTRINA DO STANDING COMO UM ELEMENTO ESSENCIAL DA SEPARAÇÃO DE PODERES THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS                Antonin ScaliaRESUMO: Minha tese é de que a doutrina judicial do Standing é um elemento crucial e inseparável do princípio da separação de poderes, cujo desrespeito produzirá, inevitavelmente, - como o fez durante as últimas décadas – uma judicialização excessiva do processo de autogoverno. Especificamente, sugiro que os tribunais precisam conferir maior peso do que o concedido nos últimos tempos ao requisito tradicional de que o dano alegado pelo autor seja distinguível do dos demais, separando-o da cidadania em sentido amplo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Doutrina do Standing; Separação de Poderes; Lei do Processo Administrativo; Controle Judicial; Judicialização da Política. ABSTRACT: My thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of the principle of the separation of powers, whose disregard will inevitably produce – as it has during the past few decades – an overjudicialization of the process of self-governance. More specifically, I suggest that courts need to accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement that the plaintiff´s alleged injury be a particularized one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.KEY-WORDS: Standing Doctrine, Separation of Powers, Administrative Procedure Act – APA, Judicial Review, Courts converted into Political Forums.SUMÁRIO: Introdução do tradutor. Introdução de Antonin Scalia. I. A doutrina do Standing. II. Mudanças recentes na doutrina. III. Standing e a separação de poderes. IV. A separação de poderes e os direitos dos indivíduos. V. Retorno ao entendimento original. Referências. 

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document