The Mind, the Brain, and the Law

Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Dena Gromet ◽  
Geoffrey Goodwin ◽  
Eddy Nahmias ◽  
Chandra Sripada ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  
The Mind ◽  

The author intends the present paper as a continuation of his in­quiries into the relations subsisting between the nervous and muscu­lar systems, which form the subject of his former papers, but which would be incomplete without the consideration of their condition during sleep. With this view he proposes to determine the particular organs, on the condition of which this peculiar state of the system depends; the laws by which it is governed ; and the influence it has upon other parts of the system. The necessity of intervals of repose applies only to those functions which are the medium of intercourse with the external world, and which are not directly concerned in the maintenance of life. The organs subservient to these two classes of functions may be viewed as in a great degree distinct from one an­ other. The brain and spinal marrow constitute alone the active por­tions of the nervous system. The law of excitement, which regulates the parts connected with the sensorial functions, including sensation, volition, and other intellectual operations, and the actions of the vo­luntary muscles, is uniform excitement, followed by a proportional exhaustion; which, when occurring in such a degree as to suspend their usual functions, constitutes sleep j all degrees of exhaustion which do not extend beyond the parts connected with the sensorial functions being consistent with health. On the other hand, the law of excitement of those parts of the brain and spinal marrow which are associated with the vital nerves, and are subservient to the vital func­tions, is also uniform excitement; but it is only when this excitement is excessive that it is followed by any exhaustion; and no degree of this exhaustion is consistent with health. The law of excitement of the muscular fibre, with which both the vital and sensitive parts of the brain and spinal marrow are associated, namely, the muscles of respi­ration, is interrupted excitement, which, like the excitement of the vital parts of these organs, is, only when excessive, followed by any degree of exhaustion. The author conceives that the nature of the muscular fibre is everywhere the same; the apparent differences in the nature of the muscles of voluntary and involuntary motion de­pending on the differences of their functions, and on the circumstances in which they are placed: and he concludes, that, during sleep, the vital, partaking in no degree of the exhaustion of the sensitive system, appears to do so simply in consequence of the influence of the latter on the function of respiration, the only vital function in which these systems co-operate. The author proceeds to make some observations on the cause of dreaming, the phenomena of which he conceives to be a natural consequence of the preceding proposition. In ordinary sleep, the sensitive parts of the brain, with which the powers of the mind are associated, are not in a state of such complete exhaustion as to preclude their being excited by slight causes of irritation, such as those which accompany the internal processes going on in the system. The sensorium is the more sensible to the impressions made by these internal causes, inasmuch as all the avenues to external impressions are closed, and the mind is deprived of the control it exercises, during its waking hours, over the train of its thoughts, by the help of the perceptions derived from the senses, and the employment of words for detaining its ideas, and rendering them objects of steady attention, and subjects of comparison.


2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1451) ◽  
pp. 1775-1785 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zeki ◽  
O. R. Goodenough ◽  
Joshua Greene ◽  
Jonathan Cohen

The rapidly growing field of cognitive neuroscience holds the promise of explaining the operations of the mind in terms of the physical operations of the brain. Some suggest that our emerging understanding of the physical causes of human (mis)behaviour will have a transformative effect on the law. Others argue that new neuroscience will provide only new details and that existing legal doctrine can accommodate whatever new information neuroscience will provide. We argue that neuroscience will probably have a transformative effect on the law, despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can, in principle, accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us. New neuroscience will change the law, not by undermining its current assumptions, but by transforming people's moral intuitions about free will and responsibility. This change in moral outlook will result not from the discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but from a new appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations provided by cognitive neuroscience. We foresee, and recommend, a shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favour of a more progressive, consequentialist approach to the criminal law.


Author(s):  
Alexander Kluge

This chapter focuses on fantasy and reaches back to Alexander Kluge's days as an honorary professor lecturing on film and television at Goethe University Frankfurt in 1973. Kluge explains that fantasy is a divided product in the society. He then looks at what Karl Marx has to say about the original concept of labor. Marx mentions it twice, for example, when he explains that a craftsman, when making something like a chair, first forms an image of the chair in his mind and makes a plan before then setting to work with his hands to make this plan a reality. This is an example of the unified path of labor between the activity of the mind and the activity of the hands. Kluge also discusses the imaginative capacity. Sigmund Freud described this imaginative capacity not only in terms of psychoanalytic theory or out of a specific therapeutic interest. Rather, Freud described it and pursued it on account of a general theoretical interest. Freud said that the law of this imaginative capacity exists in people. It is the law of the human mind. Freud said not only that it is influenced by libidinal control and the negotiation of reality, but also that the brain triggers the perception of actual circumstance and then remembers something from the past, a conflict, a desired situation, or a wish. From there, a projection of a concrete action is cast onto the future.


2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 713-716
Author(s):  
Ellen S. Berscheid
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (32) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Was
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Nomological determinism does not mean everything is predictable. It just means everything follows the law of nature. And the most important thing Is that the brain and consciousness follow the law of nature. In other words, there is no free will. Without life, brain and consciousness, the world follows law of nature, that is clear. The life and brain are also part of nature, and they follow the law of nature. This is due to scientific findings. There are not enough scientific findings for consciousness yet. But I think that the consciousness is a nature phenomenon, and it also follows the law of nature.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
vernon thornton

A description of of the mind and its relationship to the brain, set in an evolutionary context. Introduction of a correct version of 'language-of-thought' called 'thinkish'.


Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.


Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.


Cortex ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 904-905
Author(s):  
Zhicheng Lin
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

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