scholarly journals For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything

2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1451) ◽  
pp. 1775-1785 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zeki ◽  
O. R. Goodenough ◽  
Joshua Greene ◽  
Jonathan Cohen

The rapidly growing field of cognitive neuroscience holds the promise of explaining the operations of the mind in terms of the physical operations of the brain. Some suggest that our emerging understanding of the physical causes of human (mis)behaviour will have a transformative effect on the law. Others argue that new neuroscience will provide only new details and that existing legal doctrine can accommodate whatever new information neuroscience will provide. We argue that neuroscience will probably have a transformative effect on the law, despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can, in principle, accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us. New neuroscience will change the law, not by undermining its current assumptions, but by transforming people's moral intuitions about free will and responsibility. This change in moral outlook will result not from the discovery of crucial new facts or clever new arguments, but from a new appreciation of old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations provided by cognitive neuroscience. We foresee, and recommend, a shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favour of a more progressive, consequentialist approach to the criminal law.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Nomological determinism does not mean everything is predictable. It just means everything follows the law of nature. And the most important thing Is that the brain and consciousness follow the law of nature. In other words, there is no free will. Without life, brain and consciousness, the world follows law of nature, that is clear. The life and brain are also part of nature, and they follow the law of nature. This is due to scientific findings. There are not enough scientific findings for consciousness yet. But I think that the consciousness is a nature phenomenon, and it also follows the law of nature.


Author(s):  
Anne C. Dailey

This chapter describes the contribution contemporary psychoanalysis has to make in three specific areas: legal theory, legal doctrine, and adjudication in the courtroom. Psychoanalysis improves the law’s theoretical foundations by modifying its foundational presumption of rationality. Psychoanalysis also helps to reform legal doctrine by identifying those particular subject matter areas, primarily family law and criminal law, where the law’s presumption of rationality leads to unjust legal rules. With domestic violence as its example, this chapter shows how psychoanalysis offers a body of practical knowledge that humanizes the law by bringing legal rules into line with actual, everyday lived experience. And finally, psychoanalysis reveals the deep tension between the law’s focus on individual moral responsibility for behavior and the law’s objective methods of proof in the courtroom. Psychoanalytic insights into the art of proving what really happened in a case can move law in the direction of a more empathic and forgiving model of judging. Overall, the psychoanalytic study of the law unveils the damaging consequences of the law’s rationalist assumptions about who we are as human beings, and offers an alternative, humanistic perspective in line with law’s foundational ideals of individual freedom and systemic justice.


Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Jennifer Cole Wright

In Chapter 15, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Jennifer Cole Wright investigate the relationship between free will beliefs (or the lack thereof) and existential anxiety. In an attempt to shed light on this relationship, they set out to test whether trait humility can serve as a “buffer” between the two—that is, are people who are high in dispositional humility less likely to experience existential anxiety in the face of skepticism about free will? Given the perspectival and attitudinal nature of humility, Nadelhoffer and Wright predict that humble people will be less anxious in the face of stories about the purported death of free will (or the reduction of the mind to the brain). In a series of four studies, they test their hypothesis, with mixed results.,The findings, however, tell us something important about the current use of primes in studies designed to manipulate people’s belief in free will (usually to measure their pro- or antisocial effects).


The author intends the present paper as a continuation of his in­quiries into the relations subsisting between the nervous and muscu­lar systems, which form the subject of his former papers, but which would be incomplete without the consideration of their condition during sleep. With this view he proposes to determine the particular organs, on the condition of which this peculiar state of the system depends; the laws by which it is governed ; and the influence it has upon other parts of the system. The necessity of intervals of repose applies only to those functions which are the medium of intercourse with the external world, and which are not directly concerned in the maintenance of life. The organs subservient to these two classes of functions may be viewed as in a great degree distinct from one an­ other. The brain and spinal marrow constitute alone the active por­tions of the nervous system. The law of excitement, which regulates the parts connected with the sensorial functions, including sensation, volition, and other intellectual operations, and the actions of the vo­luntary muscles, is uniform excitement, followed by a proportional exhaustion; which, when occurring in such a degree as to suspend their usual functions, constitutes sleep j all degrees of exhaustion which do not extend beyond the parts connected with the sensorial functions being consistent with health. On the other hand, the law of excitement of those parts of the brain and spinal marrow which are associated with the vital nerves, and are subservient to the vital func­tions, is also uniform excitement; but it is only when this excitement is excessive that it is followed by any exhaustion; and no degree of this exhaustion is consistent with health. The law of excitement of the muscular fibre, with which both the vital and sensitive parts of the brain and spinal marrow are associated, namely, the muscles of respi­ration, is interrupted excitement, which, like the excitement of the vital parts of these organs, is, only when excessive, followed by any degree of exhaustion. The author conceives that the nature of the muscular fibre is everywhere the same; the apparent differences in the nature of the muscles of voluntary and involuntary motion de­pending on the differences of their functions, and on the circumstances in which they are placed: and he concludes, that, during sleep, the vital, partaking in no degree of the exhaustion of the sensitive system, appears to do so simply in consequence of the influence of the latter on the function of respiration, the only vital function in which these systems co-operate. The author proceeds to make some observations on the cause of dreaming, the phenomena of which he conceives to be a natural consequence of the preceding proposition. In ordinary sleep, the sensitive parts of the brain, with which the powers of the mind are associated, are not in a state of such complete exhaustion as to preclude their being excited by slight causes of irritation, such as those which accompany the internal processes going on in the system. The sensorium is the more sensible to the impressions made by these internal causes, inasmuch as all the avenues to external impressions are closed, and the mind is deprived of the control it exercises, during its waking hours, over the train of its thoughts, by the help of the perceptions derived from the senses, and the employment of words for detaining its ideas, and rendering them objects of steady attention, and subjects of comparison.


Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Dena Gromet ◽  
Geoffrey Goodwin ◽  
Eddy Nahmias ◽  
Chandra Sripada ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  
The Mind ◽  

Author(s):  
Svetlana V. Polubinskaya

Modern neuroscience has long expanded beyond the framework of traditional biological and medical sciences that study the central nervous system and human brain. Nowadays researchers aim at exploring the links between the biological processes in the brain and human behavior. There is a growing number of research on social neuroscience investigating the neural basis of social behavior. The progress of such studies is facilitated by application of non-invasive neuroimaging techniques (magnetic resonance imaging, functional magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography, etc.), which provide the data on brain structure and activity in the form of visual images. The task of criminal law is to conceptualize the results of brain studies used as evidence in criminal courts in a number of countries that have also revived discussions about free will and criminal responsibility. According to foreign authors, neurobiological evidence, including the results of brain imaging, is used in courts at various stages of the process, in particular when determining the defendant’s competency to stand trial and in insanity defense. However, more often they appear in criminal cases of serious violent and sexual crimes in order to confirm the diagnosis of a mental or neurological disorder and/ or brain damage of the defendant and thereby justify the mitigation of punishment. Such evidence is often combined with results of other expert examinations and appear to be a part of a wider picture describing the defendant. International studies also show that the courts are cautious in decisions concerning admissibility of brain scan evidence because of uncertainty about its scientific validity, reliability and relevance to the case. Moreover, the very practice of the presence of such evidence in courts is considered as ambiguous. The opponents refer to insufficient validity and reliability of such evidence and the subjectivity of experts while interpreting the results of brain imaging. There are also problems of reliability of expert conclusions when the group data is applied to the individual case considered in court. The opponents also refer to the complexity and interconnectedness of the human brain, the inability to link complex human behavior to a specific brain area not to mention a causal relationship between specific brain area and specific behavior. The progress of neuroscience has also given an impulse to a new wave of discussions on key issues of legal philosophy and criminal law doctrine. The results of some studies are interpreted as evidence on lack of voluntary nature of human actions and the illusion of free will, since the brain sends a signal to act before a person realizes it. In combination with findings concerning links between specific brain structures and aggression, impulsiveness and the ability to control one’s behavior, these data are used as the ground to justify the revision of traditional doctrinal ideas about guilt and criminal responsibility. However, majority of experts who analyze the use of the results of neurobiological studies in criminal law doctrine and practice disagree with these claims. They acknowledge that such research can contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of human behavior and influence the doctrinal understanding of legal categories, such as guilt and insanity, but they do object against identification of the mind with the brain. The concepts of free will and responsibility are social constructs, and neurosciences are not able to convince society to abandon them.


2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1451) ◽  
pp. 1805-1809 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zeki ◽  
O. R. Goodenough ◽  
Oliver R. Goodenough

Cognitive neuroscience is challenging the Anglo-American approach to criminal responsibility. Critiques, in this issue and elsewhere, are pointing out the deeply flawed psychological assumptions underlying the legal tests for mental incapacity. The critiques themselves, however, may be flawed in looking, as the tests do, at the psychology of the offender. Introducing the strategic structure of punishment into the analysis leads us to consider the psychology of the punisher as the critical locus of cognition informing the responsibility rules. Such an approach both helps to make sense of the counterfactual assumptions about offender psychology embodied in the law and provides a possible explanation for the human conviction of the existence of free will, at least in others.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250
Author(s):  
Eduardo Giannetti

Abstract Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and subvert our intuitive, mentalist understanding of the mind-body relationship. Recent findings in neuroscience seem to support the notions that (i) mental events are a subclass of neurophysiological events, and (ii) they are devoid of causal efficacy upon the workings of the brain. If physicalism is true then the belief in the causal potency of conscious thoughts and free will are bound to join company with countless other imaginary causalities exploded by the progress of science.


Author(s):  
Emad H. Atiq

Do recent results in neuroscience and psychology that portray our choices as predetermined threaten to undermine the assumptions about “free will” that drive criminal law? This article answers in the affirmative, and offers a novel argument for the transformative import of modern science. It also explains why a revision in the law’s assumptions is morally desirable. Problematic assumptions about free will have a role to play in criminal law not because they underlie substantive legal doctrine or retributive theory, but because everyday actors in the sentencing process are authorized to make irreducibly moral determinations outside of the ordinary doctrinal framework. Jurors, judges, and legislators are each required, at key points in the sentencing process, to make moral judgments that cannot be reached without reference to the person’s own understanding of free will. As a result, sentencing actors give legal effect to widely held folk beliefs about free will—beliefs that the evidence suggests are both scientifically suspect and morally distorting. The relevant beliefs make adjudicators less likely to attend to the underlying causes of crime, such as social deprivation—a tendency that biases adjudicators against relevant arguments for mitigation in sentencing. Modern science could have an important corrective effect in this context.


Philosophia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Smit

AbstractComte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte’s challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholtz on unconscious inferences and argued that we can resolve Comte’s problem by reformulating it in terms of the brain. Since the brain consists of different parts having different functions, it is possible that some parts are involved in observing (they unconsciously process information) while other parts integrate the received information resulting in conscious experiences to which we have access. Dehaene’s answer is criticized and the alternative neo-Aristotelian resolution of Comte’s challenge is discussed. Explanations of blindsight are used to illustrate the differences between the two responses to Comte’s challenge.


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