East Asia and Foreign Policy

Author(s):  
Enyu Zhang ◽  
Qingmin Zhang

The study of East Asian foreign policies has progressed in sync with mainstream international relations (IR) theories: (1) from perhaps an inadvertent or unconscious coincidence with realism during the Cold War to consciously using different theoretical tools to study the various aspects of East Asian foreign policies; and (2) from the dominance of realism to a diversity of theories in studying East Asian foreign policies. Nonetheless, the old issues from the Cold War have not been resolved; the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait remain two flashpoints in the region, with new twists that can derail regional stability and prosperity. New issues also have emerged and made East Asia most volatile. One issue is concerned with restructuring the balance of power in East Asia, particularly the dynamics among the major players, i.e. Japan, China, and the United States. Regionalism is another new topic in the study of East Asian foreign policies. A review of the current state of the field suggests that two complementary issues be given priority in the future. First, the foreign policy interests and strategies of individual small states vis-à-vis great powers in the region, particularly those in Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. Second, what could really elevate the study of East Asian foreign policies in the general field of IR and foreign policy analysis is to continue exploring innovative analytical frameworks that can expand the boundaries of existing metatheories and paradigms.

Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

During the cold war, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a middle-sized power pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy and a defence strategy based on massive armed forces, obligatory conscription, and a doctrine of ‘Total National Defence’. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in the creation of several small states. Ever since, their defence policies and armed forces have been undergoing a thorough transformation. This chapter provides an analysis of the defence transformation of the two biggest post-Yugoslav states—Serbia and Croatia—since the end of the cold war. During the 1990s, defence transformation in both states was shaped by the undemocratic nature of their regimes and war. Ever since they started democratic transition in 2000, and in spite of their diverging foreign policies, both states have pivoted towards building modern, professional, interoperable, and democratically controlled armed forces capable of tackling both traditional and emerging threats.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-95
Author(s):  
Christian Nuenlist ◽  
Anna Locher ◽  
Garret Martin

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1169-1170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis

Among the many issues raised by James Lebovic's perceptive review are two that strike me as crucial: the relationships between intelligence and social science and those between intelligence and policymaking. The first itself has two parts, one being how scholars can study intelligence. Both access and methods are difficult. For years, diplomatic historians referred to intelligence as the “hidden dimension” of their subject. Now it is much more open, and Great Britain, generally more secretive than the United States, has just issued the authorized history of MI5 (see Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, the CIA has released extensive, if incomplete, records, and the bright side (for us) of intelligence failures is that they lead to the release of treasure troves of documents, which can often be supplemented by memoirs and interviews. But even more than in other aspects of foreign policy analysis, we are stuck with evidence that is fragmentary. In this way, we resemble scholars of ancient societies, who forever lament the loss of most of the material they want to study.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


Author(s):  
Brian Schmidt

This chapter examines some of the competing theories that have been advanced to explain U.S. foreign policy. In trying to explain the foreign policy of the United States, a number of competing theories have been developed by International Relations scholars. Some theories focus on the role of the international system in shaping American foreign policy while others argue that various domestic factors are the driving force. The chapter first considers some of the obstacles to constructing a theory of foreign policy before discussing some of the competing theories of American foreign policy, including defensive realism, offensive realism, liberalism, Marxism, neoclassical realism, and constructivism. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the theoretical debate over the origins of the Cold War and the debate over the most appropriate grand strategy that the United States should follow in the post-Cold War era.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-341
Author(s):  
Yan Xuetong

Abstract The year 2019 saw the curtain rise on a US–China bipolar rivalry quite different from the Cold War US–Soviet bipolarity. The fundamental difference between the current bipolar rivalry and that during the Cold War is that ideology is no longer the main engine driving international competition, but rather the new digital dimension of strategic competition that is emerging between the United States and China. Technological advancement over the past 15 years has led world history’s entry into the early digital age. The development of digital technology has created new ways of protecting national security, of accumulating national wealth, and of obtaining international support. Cybersecurity is becoming the core of national security and the share of digital economy in major powers’ gross domestic product dramatically increases. For the leading powers, strategic competition in cyberspace in this early digital age outstrips to a crucial extent that within physical geographic boundaries. This article observes that Cold War mentality and digital mentality will have mixed impact on foreign policy-making in the digital age, and that interactions between the nations whose foreign policy is simultaneously influenced by both mentalities will shape the emerging international order into one of uneasy peace, where there is no direct war and few proxy wars. It will rather be a scenario reflecting the dark side of globalization and downside of global governance, evident in the violation of agreements, double dealing, cyber-attacks, and technology decoupling between states. Although further digital advancement will indeed change international politics in ever more aspects, US–China bipolar configuration will nevertheless remain in place for at least for two decades, or perhaps longer.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moravcsik

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.


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