The Limited Role of the Japanese Military: The 2003 Iraq War and the War on the Islamic State

What determines Japan's willingness to flex its limited military muscle abroad? While analysts and scholars closely watched Japanese "militarization" under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012-2020), Japan had already deployed its military overseas over a decade ago in support of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By contrast, in 2014, Japan was unwilling to support U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria. This presents a puzzle, as the fight against ISIL offered the kind of international legitimacy that the 2003 Iraq invasion lacked, and Japan traditionally seeks. Moreover, ISIL had killed Japanese citizens. This paper explains Japan's varying policies in Iraq in 2003 and 2014, thereby shedding light on the determinants of Japanese national security policy more generally. Our argument focuses on domestic political factors (especially the pluralist foreign policymaking) and strategic thinking rooted in realism. We argue that Japanese policies are driven by domestic politics, profound suspicions about the utility of military force and fears of becoming entangled in a seemingly never-ending conflict. While Koizumi may have had more room to manoeuvre despite long-standing public opposition to overseas military deployments when he dispatched the SDF to Iraq in 2003, it is precisely such deeply-entrenched popular anathema that many blame for the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) historic and devastating loss in the 2009 election. Abe was unwilling to repeat such a risky venture in 2014. We also highlight the role of realist calculations on both Japanese elites and the public, who by 2014 had come to see China rather than state or non-state actors in the Middle East as a primary security threat. We thus confirm Midford's finding that "defensive realism" tends to drive Japanese foreign policy thinking. Japanese citizens are not pacifists, as conventional wisdom might hold. Instead, Japanese public opinion supports the use of minimum military force when and if Japan is attacked to defend Japan's national sovereignty and territory but is much more suspicious of such power when it comes to deployments and the pursuit of other foreign policy goals.

3. Realism

This chapter examines the realist tradition in international relations (IR), which is best seen as a research programme with several approaches using a common starting point. It highlights an important dichotomy in realist thought between classical realism and contemporary realism, including strategic and structural approaches. After describing the elements of realism, the chapter discusses the international thought of three outstanding classical realists of the past: Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. It then analyses the classical realist thought of Hans J. Morgenthau, along with strategic realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. Special attention is devoted to the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz and the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the recent theoretical debate among realist IR scholars concerning the relevance of the balance of power concept and it shows that realists often disagree among themselves. The chapter concludes with an overview of how the different realist theories treat international and domestic factors.

Defensive Realism and Chinese Maritime Strategy

<p>The development and recent operations of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is one of the most pressing issues in the security structure of Asia. Discussions of both the Chinese Navy and China’s rise generally continue to be dominated by offensive realist thinking. This theory sees China as a state seeking power, and eventually hegemony, in its region. However, defensive realism is a more nuanced explanation of China’s rise and the operations of its navy. Defensive realism sees states as seeking security rather than power, valuing what they have more than what they desire. The PLAN itself was founded in 1949 and has evolved in its focus throughout its existence. First the PLAN was focused on defending against attacks from Taiwan, then defending against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. After the cementing of the US-Sino relationship towards the end of the Cold War, and the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his economic liberalisation, the PLAN lost much of its purpose and funding which had always been minimal. The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995, along with other conflicts like the first Gulf War and the Kosovo War, reprioritised the navy and the need to defend against possible US intervention. This turn to the navy was heightened by economic, resource, energy and regime motivations. This has lead to an effort to modernise a PLAN fleet which was aging and incapable of what was now required of it. This modernisation is ongoing, and it is still to produce a navy which is an entirely modern and near the capability of other comparable forces. The development of para-military maritime forces is one of the most telling aspects of China’s maritime development. China’s navy has engaged in two operations overseas in the past decade; anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since 2005, and assisting in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2012. These two operations are not indicative of a new global role, and are instead born of the unique circumstances of the two situations. More telling are the exercises that the PLAN has engaged in since 2010, these show the PLAN’s developing ability to defend territorial claims, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. There have also been a series of incidents at sea between China and other disputant states over maritime territory. These incidents take a different shape based on the military capabilities of the other state. South Korea and Japan can monitor these areas with large militaries, and so actions by China are low key. In comparison, claimant states in the South China Sea have ships harassed, primarily by the ships of paramilitary maritime organisations. This harassment is a strategy by China to ensure a secure claim to these areas under international law by asserting jurisdiction. Such a strategy serves to defend China’s claim and prevent a negotiated settlement on anything but its own terms. Thus China’s maritime strategy is based on defensive realist principles of defending territory and ensuring security, rather than seeking power.</p>

Defensive Realism and Chinese Maritime Strategy

<p>The development and recent operations of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is one of the most pressing issues in the security structure of Asia. Discussions of both the Chinese Navy and China’s rise generally continue to be dominated by offensive realist thinking. This theory sees China as a state seeking power, and eventually hegemony, in its region. However, defensive realism is a more nuanced explanation of China’s rise and the operations of its navy. Defensive realism sees states as seeking security rather than power, valuing what they have more than what they desire. The PLAN itself was founded in 1949 and has evolved in its focus throughout its existence. First the PLAN was focused on defending against attacks from Taiwan, then defending against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. After the cementing of the US-Sino relationship towards the end of the Cold War, and the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his economic liberalisation, the PLAN lost much of its purpose and funding which had always been minimal. The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995, along with other conflicts like the first Gulf War and the Kosovo War, reprioritised the navy and the need to defend against possible US intervention. This turn to the navy was heightened by economic, resource, energy and regime motivations. This has lead to an effort to modernise a PLAN fleet which was aging and incapable of what was now required of it. This modernisation is ongoing, and it is still to produce a navy which is an entirely modern and near the capability of other comparable forces. The development of para-military maritime forces is one of the most telling aspects of China’s maritime development. China’s navy has engaged in two operations overseas in the past decade; anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since 2005, and assisting in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2012. These two operations are not indicative of a new global role, and are instead born of the unique circumstances of the two situations. More telling are the exercises that the PLAN has engaged in since 2010, these show the PLAN’s developing ability to defend territorial claims, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. There have also been a series of incidents at sea between China and other disputant states over maritime territory. These incidents take a different shape based on the military capabilities of the other state. South Korea and Japan can monitor these areas with large militaries, and so actions by China are low key. In comparison, claimant states in the South China Sea have ships harassed, primarily by the ships of paramilitary maritime organisations. This harassment is a strategy by China to ensure a secure claim to these areas under international law by asserting jurisdiction. Such a strategy serves to defend China’s claim and prevent a negotiated settlement on anything but its own terms. Thus China’s maritime strategy is based on defensive realist principles of defending territory and ensuring security, rather than seeking power.</p>

Defensive Realism’s Perspective on Rising China’s Behavior as A Status Quo State

China’s rise through rapid development especially in the economic sector have prompted debates on whether it seeks to overtake the United States (U.S.) and strive for domination. However, China insists that it has no such intentions since it benefits from the current system and wishes to pursue peaceful development. This paper will analyze why China is not seeking to displace the U.S. and alter the international order despite claims from offensive realism that states are revisionist as they pursue domination to guarantee its survival under anarchy. This paper argues that defensive realism can better explain the case and that China is a status quo state unlike claims from offensive realism. The writer conducted the study with defensive realism’s perspective and utilized indicators from Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He to determine whether China is a status quo state. The results show that defensive realism can fill the gap left by offensive realism and that China is indeed a status quo state. Kebangkitan China yang ditandai dengan perkembangan pesat, terutama dalam bidang ekonomi, telah memicu perdebatan tentang apakah China berusaha untuk mengambil alih kekuasaan Amerika Serikat (A.S.) dan mendominasi tatanan global. Namun, China bersikeras dalam mengklaim bahwa tidak ada niat seperti itu karena mendapatkan keuntungan dari sistem saat ini dan lebih ingin mengejar pembangunan secara damai. Artikel ini akan menganalisis mengapa China tidak berusaha untuk menggantikan A.S. maupun mengubah tatanan global, meskipun ada klaim dari offensive realism bahwa setiap negara adalah revisionist karena mereka memperluas kekuasaannya untuk menjamin kelangsungan hidupnya di bawah sistem dunia yang anarki. Dalam artikel ini, penulis berpendapat bahwa defensive realism dapat menjelaskan kasus ini dengan lebih baik dan China adalah negara status quo tidak seperti klaim dari offensive realism. Penulis melakukan studi dengan perspektif defensive realism dan menggunakan indikator dari Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, dan Kai He untuk menentukan apakah China merupakan negara status quo. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa defensive realism dapat mengisi kekosongan yang ditinggalkan oleh offensive realism dan bahwa China memang negara status quo.

Russia and the Ukraine Crisis: An Analysis of Trade Expectations Theory

A debate between liberal and realist international relations theories centres on the influence of trade interdependence on state action. While liberal theorists tend to see interdependence as only a mechanism for peace, realists view trade dependency as a potential for state vulnerability. Dale Copeland’s trade expectations theory offers a bridge to this divide by arguing perception of future trade accounts for whether states perceive trade as a vulnerability or mechanism for cooperation. Copeland’s novel theory argues when states possess a positive expectation of future trade, they will continue to pursue trading relationships, as argued in liberal theory. However, once these expectations turn negative, states may face a trade-security crisis stemming from the trade vulnerabilities. This thesis applies Copeland’s theory the Russian experience leading up to the 2013 – 2014 Ukraine Crisis. The application of the theory addresses two key criticisms of trade expectations theory: first, the question of what constitutes “reasonableness” within the expectations of trade, and second, grounding the theory within the broader international relations literature. Copeland’s reliance on a “reasonable man” test of trade expectations lacks a nuanced understanding of what a reasonable perception of a state is. Through the addition of militarism as a state bias and belief, this thesis shows the theory’s logic developing within a defensive realist framework. The thesis applies the case study to a two-level security dilemma, grounding the theory’s core contribution, the trade-security dilemma, within defensive realism. Placing Copeland’s theory within this framework reveals trade expectations to be an intervening variable within a balance of power competition. Finally, the application of trade expectations theory to Russia and the Ukraine Crisis gives greater depth in understanding Moscow’s dilemma. Framing a trade-security dilemma within the broader balance of power dynamic exposes the Russian trade crisis which occurred as Kyiv shifted towards the West.

The Influence the Qatari-Israeli and the Qatari-American Relations on the Qatar's Arab Policy

As Qatar’s ambitions to become a regional player grew, it repeatedly offered to broker peace between Israel and the Arab states, and also tried to negotiate between conflicting parties. But Sunni Gulf States are irritated by this mediation and suppose that Doha tries to undermine stability of Arab countries. This is the reason for the tension in Doha&apos;s relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. They accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its own territory. Qatar tries to ease tensions with the Gulf States by using American lobbyists, Israeli interests, and the Jewish-American community. Qatar follows defensive realism in the combination with the “buck passing” strategy – transferring the responsibility to act to other States while remaining on the sidelines. This is transferring the responsibility to act to the U.S. Qatar&apos;s relations with Israel and the Jewish-American community should shift the U.S. position in favor of Qatar. The main conclusions are the following: 1) there is little chance of luck lobbying in the U.S. for any interests of any State that cooperates with Iran. But the development of Qatari-Israeli relations makes it difficult to accuse Qatar of supporting Iran; 2) the development of Qatari – Saudi crisis shows that attempt both rival parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is inefficient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US&apos;s clients.

3. Structural Realism

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.

Analisis Respon Vietnam dalam Menghadapi Kebijakan Illegal Fishing Indonesia di Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Perairan Natuna

This design/research on Vietnam's response to the IUU Fishing Indonesia "Sink the Vessels" policy which has sunk 272 Vietnamese vessels from 2014-2018, with the aim of providing an understanding of Vietnam's strategy in maintaining its relationship with Indonesia and the reasons why Vietnam responded to the policy it is not aggressive. This study uses defensive realism approach through four assumptions from Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. The method used is a qualitative research model that is descriptive in nature with literature study data collection techniques through the collection of data and information and reliable sources. The results show that based on the four basic assumptions of Taliaferro realism, namely Vietnam experiences a security dilemma that is not focused on Indonesia, the existence of complex water conflicts in the region, Vietnam's military capabilities under Indonesia and Vietnam's domestic politics which have a tendency to maintain good relations with Indonesia.