5. Inconsistencies about madness

2018 ◽  
pp. 56-63
Author(s):  
Michael Dunn ◽  
Tony Hope
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Life Saving

‘Inconsistencies about madness’ examines the different standards used in enforcing treatment and secure accommodation for those with and without mental disorder and considers the links with criminal acts. It is argued that those with mental disorder are subject to a double injustice. Under legislation such as the UK’s Mental Health Act, they are discriminated against not only for the protection of others but also for the protection of themselves. It may be right or wrong to impose life-saving treatment on a patient who has the capacity to refuse treatment, but what is not right is to change the answer depending on whether or not the person has a mental disorder.

The Use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in a Family of Rural English Police Forces

2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Greenberg ◽  
Niki Haines
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
Hospital Admissions ◽  
Rural Setting ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Act Assessment ◽  
Police Forces

Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is used by police officers to detain persons who they feel might be suffering with mental disorder until a formal Mental Health Act assessment can be undertaken. Previous studies have shown that the outcomes of these assessments result in remarkably different rates of subsequent hospital admissions. Within a rural setting it has also been shown that the rate of use of Section 136 varies considerably. This study examines the use of Section 136 within a family of eight police forces that have been matched to ensure that they cover similar populations. The results show that there are considerable variations in the use of Section 136, with the Devon and Cornwall region using the section over two and a half times the mean for the group. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed.

scholarly journals The case for removing intellectual disability and autism from the Mental Health Act

2019 ◽  
Vol 215 (5) ◽  
pp. 633-635
Author(s):  
Sheila Hollins ◽  
Keri-Michèle Lodge ◽  
Paul Lomax
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Intellectual Disability ◽  
Health Services ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Learning Disability ◽  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Serious Mental Illnesses

SummaryIntellectual disability (also known as learning disability in UK health services) and autism are distinct from the serious mental illnesses for which the Mental Health Act is designed to be used. Their inclusion in the definition of mental disorder is discriminatory, resulting in unjust deprivations of liberty. Intellectual disability and autism should be excluded from the Mental Health Act.Declaration of interestNone.

scholarly journals Definitions and criteria: the 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983

2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Branton ◽  
Guy Brookes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Psychological Treatment ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Code Of Practice ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Sexual Deviancy ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Mental Capacity Act

SummaryThis article deals with the provisions for the lawful detention and compulsory treatment of patients in England and Wales. The 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983 redefine ‘mental disorder’ and ‘medical treatment’ and remove the classifications required for longer-term detention, abolishing the so-called ‘treatability test’ and introducing a new appropriate-treatment test. ‘Learning disability’ is brought within the definition of mental disorder but only if ‘associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’. The exclusion for promiscuity, other immoral conduct or sexual deviancy is repealed; the exclusion for dependence on alcohol and drugs is retained. The revised definition of ‘medical treatment’ includes psychological treatment and removes the requirement that treatment is under medical supervision. The basic structure of the 1983 Act is retained. Use of the powers is discretionary. The principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are imported into the decision-making framework through the wording of the Mental Health ActCode of Practice.

scholarly journals The new Mental Disorder Tribunal

2014 ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Mark Mullins
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Green Paper ◽  
Final Report ◽  
Expert Committee ◽  
Committee Report ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Government

<p>In its final report the Expert Committee on reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 chaired by Professor Genevra Richardson proposed a new Mental Disorder Tribunal. This tribunal would have fundamentally different functions, composition, procedure and powers to the present Mental Health Review Tribunals (MHRTs). The Committee’s objective was not merely to repair the failings of the present MHRT system but to replace it with a new structure promoting the principles of patient autonomy and non-discrimination. Reading the Committee report and the Government’s Green Paper proposals in response together it soon becomes clear that the Government has rejected the recommendation that the new mental health law should be based on principles of autonomy and nondiscrimination. In their place the Green Paper puts “safety” and “risk”. While it will incorporate safeguards to ensure compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998, the “dual aims” of the new Mental Health Act are to be to ensure the health and safety of patients and safety of the public. Whereas the Committee saw the new tribunal as an active guarantor and promoter of individual rights the Green Paper recasts it as a body preoccupied with risk and safety, stating as a fundamental “principle” that: “Issues relating to the safety of the individual patient and of the public are of key importance in determining the question of whether compulsory powers should be imposed”</p>

scholarly journals Consent to Treatment: Legal and Ethical Aspects

1981 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 207-209
Author(s):  
Paul Bowden
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Medical Officer ◽  
Working Party ◽  
Ethical Aspects ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Consent To Treatment ◽  
Patient’S Will ◽  
Policy Committee

In anticipating the consultative paper A Review of the Mental Health Act, 1959 the College's Public Policy Committee prepared a report in 1974 (News and Notes, October, November 1974). The second of six points covered in the report related to compulsory detention and treatment. It reads:The Working Party are firmly of the view that compulsory powers should include the power to treat patients compulsorily for any form of mental disorder, but has doubts as to how far certain types of treatment should be applied on the sole authority of the Responsible Medical Officer against the patient's will or when he is incapable of giving consent.

scholarly journals A new Mental Health Act for Malta

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-69
Author(s):  
Anthony Zahra ◽  
Miriam Camilleri ◽  
John Cachia
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Mental Health Legislation ◽  
Health Legislation

Until recently, the care of persons with mental disorder in Malta was regulated by mental health legislation enacted in 1976. This was closely modelled on the 1959 British Mental Health Act. Now, the Mental Health Act 2012 is being implemented in two steps, in 2013 and 2014. The paper reviews its provisions.

scholarly journals Safeguards for informal patients

2014 ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Aswini Weereratne
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Residential Care ◽  
Elderly Person ◽  
Mental Capacity ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ◽  
Mental Capacity Act

<p>In light of the plethora of new provisions safeguarding patients who might previously have been cared for and treated informally, it may be instructive to consider who may now be considered a truly informal patient, i.e. one for whom neither process nor formality is needed. When applied to an incapacitated<br />patient requiring treatment for mental disorder, the word “informal” may now seem oxymoronic and possibly redundant. Can such a patient ever be truly informal? Part IV of the model statute suggests that an informal patient is one who lacks capacity and does not object to proposed treatment which is in their best interests, or a patient who may be treated without the use of compulsory powers; but even such a patient must now be subject to some formality if their care or treatment is to be long term or they are to be deprived of their liberty in order to ensure proper safeguards are in place.</p><p>Currently the boundary between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”) and Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) is essentially one determined by whether the patient objects to treatment and is defined with formidable complexity in schedule 1A to the MCA. A patient eligible for MCA deprivation of liberty (“DOL”) safeguards, who could be an elderly person in long term residential care, is now subject to formal<br />processes. There is little true informality for a patient lacking treatment capacity. It is questionable whether even a capacitated patient with mental disorder, who is by definition vulnerable, may be treated informally under the MHA4 if they feel suborned into consenting by the possibility of coercion. The terminology offers a slightly deceptive impression of a benign approach with concomitant levels of<br />autonomy, but while it is appropriate to highlight a difference from compulsory process and keep formality to a minimum for the sake of informality, it is also important not to overplay formality in the name of safeguards. The latter appears to be the vice in which the MCA and MHA is now arguably gripped.</p>

scholarly journals The Law Society’s Response to the Draft Mental Health Bill

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (12) ◽  
pp. 70
Author(s):  
Law Society
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Law

<p>The Law Society has long campaigned for reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (‘the 1983 Act’), which is widely recognised as out of date and not fully compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. However the Law Society believes that the proposals contained in the Draft Mental Health Bill 2004 (‘the Bill’) are misconceived and fail to provide adequate safeguards to protect the rights of people with a mental disorder.</p>

scholarly journals Why it’s time to stop saying “mental illness”:  A commentary on the revision of the Irish Mental Health Act

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Malcolm MacLachlan ◽  
Rebecca Murphy ◽  
Michael Daly ◽  
Philip Hyland
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Illness ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Mental Health Problems ◽  
World Health ◽  
Persons With Disabilities ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The United Nations

The Irish Mental Health Act (2001) is undergoing revision.  In 2014 an Expert Review Group recommended that the term currently used in the act “mental disorder”, should be replaced with the term “mental illness”.  We argue that the proposed change, while well intentioned, contradicts the internationally adopted terminology of “mental disorder” used by the United Nations, World Health Organisation and European Commission. The term “mental illness” is atavistic, it implies an unsupported cause, it contravenes the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), and it is associated with concerns regarding stigma and reduced self-efficacy.  Furthermore, the term “mental illness” is not used in any internationally accepted diagnostic or classification system in the mental health field. While any term used to describe mental health problems, may be contested, Ireland should not revert to using archaic terminology.  In accordance with international best practice, and perhaps in lieu of a willingness to accept more progressive alternatives, Ireland should continue to use cause-neutral terminology, such as “mental disorder”, in the revised Mental Health Act.

scholarly journals Masterman-Lister and the Capacity to Manage One’s Property and Affairs

2014 ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Denzil Lush
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Important Decision ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
English Law

<p>The judgment of Mr. Justice Wright in Masterman-Lister v Jewell and Home Counties Dairies and Masterman-Lister v Brutton &amp; Co., [2002] EWHC 417 (QB), which was handed down on 15 March 2002, is the most important decision so far in English law on the meaning of the term ‘patient’. This, of course, is one of the two disabilities recognized in CPR Part 21. It is also the cornerstone of the Court of Protection’s jurisdiction under the Mental Health Act 1983.<br /><br />Section 94(2) of that Act defines a ‘patient’ as someone who is ‘incapable, by reason of mental disorder, of managing and administering his property and affairs.’ There are two prerequisites. A person must (a) have a mental disorder, and (b) as a consequence, be incapable of managing and administering his property and affairs.<br /><br />‘Mental disorder’ is defined in the legislation, but the incapacity to manage one’s property and affairs is not, and this is where Sir Michael Wright’s decision has filled a void, and possibly opened a debate. In fact, he said nothing startlingly new, but the significance of his judgment is that it will be widely reported, whereas previous decisions on the meaning of incapacity to manage one’s property and affairs have been inaccessible, either because they were unreported, or because they emanated from other common law jurisdictions, whose reports are only available in a few very specialist libraries.</p>

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