The Perfectionist Turn

This chapter argues against the claim advanced by Daniel Haybron, Daniel C. Russell, and Mark LeBar that human self-perfection is ultimately based on notions of well-being and human flourishing that we bring to our understanding of human nature and in favor of the idea that it is human nature itself that ultimately grounds our understanding of human well-being or human flourishing. In doing so, the question of whether there is some gap between (a) what it is to be a good human being and (b) what is good for a human being is addressed. It is shown that the arguments on behalf of a such a gap fail and that the version of perfectionism that is advanced—that is, individualistic perfectionism—is ideally suited to not only avoid such a gap but also to display their unity, especially when perfection is understood as a process of living things and not as some cosmic or metaphysical process.

The Entrepreneur as Moral Hero

This final chapter argues that there is an analogy between entrepreneurship and ethical conduct. Just as it is fundamental not to confuse entrepreneurial insight with an optimization process in a market setting, so too is ethical insight not primarily an optimization process. Perfecting or flourishing is not a passive state but an activity, and it requires virtually a constant reassessment of the adequacy and appropriateness of the means chosen and an openness and alertness to new opportunities amidst changing circumstances. Discontinuity, discovery, opportunity, risk, and disappointment are present for the ideal ethical actor just as we for the ideal entrepreneur. Overall, this chapter is not about the social benefits of entrepreneurship, but rather how the very activity of entrepreneurship is analogous to practical wisdom, which is central to individualistic perfectionism.

An Overview of Individualistic Perfectionism

This chapter provides an overview of the essentials of individualistic perfection—specifically, the view of human good and ethical obligation. Not only are the notions of objectivity, inclusivity, agent-relativity, individuality, self-directedness, and sociality vital to this understanding of human good—which is called “human flourishing”—but further human flourishing is described as “the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom.” The insights of practical wisdom are crucial to both the creation of an integrated self and the determination of ethical obligation. Finally, this chapter notes that self-perfection is a matter of continual disclosure (and thus must be considered an open-ended process) and is not passive or static.

Introduction: What Is Ethics?

Ethics is a concern for all of us. Though this is evident, what is it that constitutes this concern? There are two basic pre-theoretical approaches to theorizing about ethics: what are called “the template of respect,” which results from the necessarily interpersonal character of human life, and “the template of responsibility,” which results from the existential fact that we must make something of our lives. These templates describe the basic orientations of ethical theorists as they approach their thinking about ethics. As pre-theoretical orientations, they represent divergent paths in how to begin reflection on ethics. This chapter outlines these templates and discusses the insights behind each and how utilitarianism and deontology seem to fall within the template of respect and so-called virtue ethics within the template of responsibility. It is then shown how a turn to the template of responsibility and a form of perfectionist theory in ethics can provide both completeness and stability in ethics.

Tethering I

This chapter starts by considering what the authors call the “Nussbaum Problem”—that is, “Why do we need a comprehensive approach to politics (and indeed ethics)?” Here the views of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and (to a lesser extent) Hilary Putnam are considered. Overall, it is argued that so-called non-comprehensive political doctrines have the most difficulty in appreciating the points made about universality in chapter two—thus creating a tendency to conflate the ethical and the political. They do so because their theories fail to recognize any basis for discriminating forms of universalism, which in turn makes it difficult to see any alternative approach to ethics, such as the one the authors advocate. As a result, there is a tendency to truncate ethics to a narrower band of concerns than is appropriate or desirable. The opening pretense of independence from comprehensive foundations results in a kind of dogmatism, where only one type of approach to defending liberalism is permitted.

Afterword: Big Morality

This Afterword considers whether individualistic perfectionism is sufficiently robust theoretically for dealing with the kind of evil or good that transcends particular circumstances and times and places? It is argued that individualistic perfectionism is up to the task of dealing with either global evil or goodness, because it is personal responsibility that best explains both phenomena.

Tethering II

Not all approaches to liberalism are equally so insistent about avoiding comprehensive foundations. This chapter examines two prominent examples: Gerald Gaus and Steven Darwall. Their chief problem is the direct politicization of ethics. Where with Nussbaum, Rawls, and Sen the tendency was to lose ethics in liberalism, here there is a tendency to lose liberalism in ethics. The result is the same, but it is necessary to do battle in both directions. Overall, the argument is that foundations matter, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen are working from, and offering one, that provides a viable alternative to standard models employed by Gaus and Darwall and others. Individualistic perfectionism is an alternative that does not require sacrificing either liberalism or ethics.

Toward the Primacy of Responsibility

This chapter contrasts individualistic perfectionism with constructivism. Each section of this chapter considers a version of constructivism as developed by a prominent contemporary thinker: (1) Deontologist—Stephen Darwall; and (2) Virtue ethicist—Mark LeBar. Though each of these thinkers is considered in some detail, it is noted that they share a common assumption that constitutes the chief appeal of constructivism. This assumption is that we must be authors of our own moral universe in order to preserve the reality of human agency or self-direction. But it is argued that a commitment to the reality of human agency or self-direction does not require the adoption of a constructivist point of view—be it conceived in terms of the second-person perspective or the judgments of practical reason—and that it is possible for human agency or self-direction to be real and nonetheless have a natural telos or ergon. The truth or falsity of a normative judgment can be grounded in reality apart from moral thought without destroying human freedom.

Because

This chapter responds to J. L. Mackie’s challenge to show just what there is in reality that supports claims about what is valuable and obligatory. It seeks to explain the relationship between a moral fact and a non-moral one and to consider the charge that perfectionism of any form commits the so-called naturalistic fallacy. In so doing, five ways of understanding the supposed gap between what is and what is valuable—that is, the ontological, logical, semantic, epistemological, and motivational gaps—are considered (along with some of the views of David Hume, G. E. Moore, Simon Blackburn, and Stephen Darwall). It is argued that individualistic perfectionism, which is grounded in a life-based, non-reductionist naturalistic account of teleology (which is in certain ways like that of Philippa Foot’s), does not commit any fallacy and that it can meet Mackie’s challenge.

The Search for Universal Principles in Ethics and Politics

This chapter discusses the difficulties and limitations in finding universal ethical and political principles. Its central concern is to point out the underlying problems in Kantian-inspired ethical theorizing regarding the nature of ethical principles. These problems have to do with a failure to appreciate not only that ethical knowledge is not the same as theoretical knowledge but also that universality is neither necessary for objectivity nor a replacement for it. Finally, it is argued that ethics is not essentially legislative, but a tool for successful living. Once this insight is achieved, then the importance of a liberal order whose fundamental structural principles are individual basic negative rights (which are described as “metanorms”) is readily discernible.