The Perfectionist Turn

Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

This chapter argues against the claim advanced by Daniel Haybron, Daniel C. Russell, and Mark LeBar that human self-perfection is ultimately based on notions of well-being and human flourishing that we bring to our understanding of human nature and in favor of the idea that it is human nature itself that ultimately grounds our understanding of human well-being or human flourishing. In doing so, the question of whether there is some gap between (a) what it is to be a good human being and (b) what is good for a human being is addressed. It is shown that the arguments on behalf of a such a gap fail and that the version of perfectionism that is advanced—that is, individualistic perfectionism—is ideally suited to not only avoid such a gap but also to display their unity, especially when perfection is understood as a process of living things and not as some cosmic or metaphysical process.

Author(s):  
Alan L. Mittleman

This chapter moves into the political and economic aspects of human nature. Given scarcity and interdependence, what sense has Judaism made of the material well-being necessary for human flourishing? What are Jewish attitudes toward prosperity, market relations, labor, and leisure? What has Judaism had to say about the political dimensions of human nature? If all humans are made in the image of God, what does that original equality imply for political order, authority, and justice? In what kinds of systems can human beings best flourish? It argues that Jewish tradition shows that we act in conformity with our nature when we elevate, improve, and sanctify it. As co-creators of the world with God, we are not just the sport of our biochemistry. We are persons who can select and choose among the traits that comprise our very own natures, cultivating some and weeding out others.


1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?


Author(s):  
May Sim

Aristotle’s phronimos and Mencius’s sage are the paragons of virtue. They exemplify practical wisdom, enabling them to perform virtuous actions called for in different situations, and are the concrete models of virtue for all human beings, without whom others would not be able to cultivate their virtues. Aristotle and Mencius are also alike in holding that the virtues of character are based on human nature, and cultivation is key to achieving them. Despite these similarities, they differ in their accounts of human nature, details on the virtues, and how they are cultivated. Whether being the phronimos or the sage is the highest good for a human being, the degree of effectiveness he has on fellow citizens and the rest of the cosmos are issues about which they would disagree. Exploring similarities and differences between the phronimos and the sage will shed light on nature and nurture in their virtue-oriented ethics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 633-657
Author(s):  
Aleksander Ostapiuk

The goal of this article is to show that instrumental rationality and utility that have been used in economics for many years does not work well. What is presented in the article is how significant the influence of utilitarianism has been on economics and why the economists get rid of humans? goals and motivations. It is shown in the article that the human who decides in present is absolutely different from the human who decides over time. Many economists neglected this problem because they wanted to have an effective and simple model. Becker?s economic method is presented as a dead end to which economics has been brought to. It is impossible to connect different selves of one human being by using the utility measure. The works of Schelling and Mill are used to explain this impossibility. The conclusion of this article is that instrumental rationality and utility have affected economics significantly. But, this simplified view on human nature is no longer valid. Hence, economics needs to think not only about the means but also about the human goals. Economics needs to rebuff relativism and show people how to achieve well-being. If we want to help people with their self-governance, we will have to choose reason over emotions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jernej Pisk

Sport: the Treasure of TemperanceThe modern lifestyle, with its emphasis on enjoyment and immoderation, could lead a human being to the point where he is not a master of himself anymore. Inner desires and outer pressures force a man to take those actions that are not in accordance with his rational human nature and that are not good for him. According to the classical philosophical view of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, this clearly shows the inner slavery of modern man. Temperance, moderation or asceticism today seem old fashioned and unnecessary virtues; nevertheless, it is obvious that many problems of modern societies have roots in the absence of these virtues. These problems include a high percentage of obese population, different addictions and other health problems concerning the immoderate life style. It seems that nowadays enjoyment is the highest imperative for the individual and for society as a whole. However, these days it is possible to recognize the revival of these virtues. This paper points out the case of sport where these virtues are still cultivated and highly appreciated. At first this may seem somehow strange, because many times sport is perceived as connected with pleasure, fun and excess, but in reality sport demands much of participants. It could be even said that professional athletes are modern ascetics, and a big part of recreational sport is all but not enjoyment. In conclusion we can assert that virtues acquired in the field of sport can indeed help a human being to live a better life in general.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Joseph

Both positive psychology and the person-centered approach share a common aim to promote human flourishing. In this article I will discuss how the person-centered approach is a form of positive psychology, but positive psychology is not necessarily person-centered. I will show how the person-centered approach offers a distinctive view of human nature that leads the person-centered psychologist to understand that if people are to change, it is not the person that we must try to change but their social environment. Centrally, the paper suggests that respecting the humanistic image of the human being and, consequently, influencing people's social environment to facilitate personal growth would mean a step forward for positive psychology and would promote cross-fertilization between positive psychology and the person-centered approach instead of widening their gap.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001946622199862
Author(s):  
G G Sajith ◽  
K. Malathi

The tracking of gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of well-being of the society or human-being has been debated by many researchers and economists (Elizabeth, 2007; Abhinav, 2014; Deb, 2015 ) There are many deficiencies in tracking GDP as the economic development indicator, as it does not capture the inequality or true development of Human-being. Noted economist Mehbub ul Haq’s human development project defined a composite matrix which captures the life expectancy, education and per capita indicators in one matrix. This was developed to track as a development indicator of human welfare. In the previous studies, the GDP or GDP per capita was regressed with the Human Development Index (HDI) composite index and indicated a direct correlation between the two variables. However, this article examines the contribution of the income component in the HDI index by recalculating the composite matrix. This article also qualitatively examines the ability of HDI index to measure the human development parameters. JEL Classification Codes: E01, I12, O1


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.


Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.


2014 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer A. Herdt

AbstractRecent scholarship has done much to uncover a continuous tradition of distinctively Reformed natural law reflection, according to which knowledge of the natural moral law, though not saving knowledge, is universally available to humanity in its fallen state and makes a stable secular order possible. A close look at Calvin's understanding of natural law, and in particular of conscience and natural human instincts, shows that Calvin himself did not expect the natural law to serve as a source of substantive action-guiding moral norms. First, Calvin held that conscience delivers information concerning the moral quality even of individual actions. But he also thought that we often blind ourselves to the deliverances of conscience. Second, he argued that our natural instincts predispose us to civic order and fair dealing insofar as these are necessary for the natural well-being or advantage of creatures such as ourselves. But he also carefully distinguished the good of advantage from the good of justice or virtue. The modern natural lawyers eroded Calvin's careful distinction between conscience as revealing our duty as duty, and instinct as guiding us towards natural advantage. They also turned away from Calvin's insistence on the moral incapacity of unredeemed humanity. The modern natural lawyers saw their task as one of developing an empirical science of human nature to guide legislation and shape international law, bracketing questions of whether this nature was fallen and in need of redemption. When Scottish Presbyterian Reformed thinkers, such as Gershom Carmichael and John Witherspoon, tried in diverse ways to restore eroded Reformed commitments to the science of human nature, about which they were otherwise so enthusiastic, they were not particularly successful. A science which could derive moral norms from an examination of human instincts, and a conscience which could deliver universal moral knowledge, proved too attractive to decline simply because of the transcendence of God or the fallenness of humankind. Those who wished to preserve an account of natural law which remained faithful to a fully robust set of Reformed theological commitments could do so only by refusing to regard the natural law as a positive source of moral knowledge.


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