scholarly journals VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 120 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-144
Author(s):  
Philip Goff
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Liberal Naturalism ◽  
The Mind

Abstract There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level.

Body and Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Abstract Model ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Events ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Contemporary Approach

This chapter discusses the way in which Spinoza’s so-called identity theory addresses the mind–body problem and critically assesses several interpretations of his approach in contemporary philosophy of mind. The chapter takes Charles Jarrett’s and Michael Della Rocca’s interpretation of the attributes as opaque contexts as its point of departure. It argues that, rather than relating mental and bodily items to each other, Spinoza’s identity theory establishes an abstract model that allows for interpreting mental events as irreducible, yet completely intelligible, entities. This, it is further argued, distinguishes Spinoza’s position from the contemporary approach that comes closest to it: Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism. In contrast to Davidson—who, by rejecting the possibility of nomological reduction, relinquishes the expectation of granting third-person explainability to the mental—Spinoza assumes that, on the basis of his rationalism, mental events are not only no less real but also no less explainable than physical events.

scholarly journals Schelling and Peirce’s philosophy of mind

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
Stanko Vlaski
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

The crucial thesis of Schelling?s philosophy of nature, according to which the matter could be understood as the ?extinct mind?, Peirce understands as the only reasonable theory concerning the solution of the problem of the relation between mind and matter and considers it as the center of his synechism. American philosopher develops his synechistical standpoint within the series of articles which he wrote for the journal The Monist and defines synechism as the tendency to conceive every being as something continuous. The author interprets Peirce?s project as the part of the discussion about the mind-body problem which characterizes the so-called contemporary philosophy of mind, but by investigation of its Schellingian motives he tries to explain the comprehensive meaning of Peirce?s attempt. The last chapter of the paper aims to approach Schelling?s and Peirce?s consideration of the mind-body relation from the perspective which finds in them attempts of philosophical integration of the un-consciousness. Two idealistic strivings are implicitly demarcated with the regard to the mode of defining the place of the concept of self-consciousness.

The prospects for pluralism in contract theory

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Zhong Xing Tan
Keyword(s):  
Contract Theory ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Meso Level ◽  
Specific Performance ◽  
Micro Level

Abstract This paper explores the promise of pluralism in the realm of contract law. I begin by identifying and rejecting conceptual strategies adopted by monistic and dualistic approaches. Turning towards pluralism, I evaluate three versions in contemporary literature: pluralism across contracting spheres and types, pluralism through consensus and convergence, and pluralism through localised values-balancing and practical reasoning. I suggest embracing some pluralism about contract pluralism, by using these models to construct a framework of ‘meta-pluralism’, where at the macro-level, we are concerned with plural spheres of contracting activity; at the meso-level, a variety of trans-substantive interpretive concepts that receive some measure of juristic consensus; and at the micro-level, practical reasoning through particularistic analysis of case-specific considerations. I illustrate the meta-pluralistic framework through a case study on the varieties of specific performance, and explain how the proposed pluralistic framework enriches our understanding of the nature of contract.

Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology: Vantage Point from beyond Earth

2018 ◽  
pp. 351-376
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
Pulling Forces ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Why do we so stubbornly cling to the assumption of mind? Despite the so far presented empirical, ontological, and conceptual-logical evidence against mind, the philosopher may nevertheless reject the world-brain problem as counter-intuitive. She/he will argue that we need to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of the mind-body problem as it is more intuitive than the world-brain problem. Our strong adherence to mind is thus, at least in part, based on what philosophers describe as “intuition”, the “intuition of mind” as I say. How can we resist and escape the pulling forces of our “intuition of mind”? The main focus in this chapter and the whole final part is on the “intuition of mind” and how we can avoid and render it impossible. I will argue that we need to exclude the mind as possible epistemic option from our knowledge, i.e., the “logical space of knowledge”, as I say. The concept of “logical space of knowledge” concerns what we can access in our knowledge, i.e., our possible epistemic options that are included in the “logical space of knowledge”, as distinguished from what remains inaccessible to us, i.e., impossible epistemic options, as they are excluded from the “logical space of knowledge”. For instance, the “logical space of knowledge” presupposed in current philosophy of mind and specifically mind-body discussion includes mind as possible epistemic option while world-brain relation is excluded as impossible epistemic option. This, as I argue, provides the basis for our “intuition of mind” and the seemingly counterintuitive nature of world-brain relation. How can we modify and change the possible and impossible epistemic options in our “logical space of knowledge”? I argue that this is possible by shifting our vantage point or viewpoint - that is paradigmatically reflected in the Copernican revolution in cosmology and physics. Copernicus shifted the “vantage point from within earth” to a “vantage point beyond earth”; this enabled him to take into view that the earth (rather than the sun) moves by itself which provided the basis for his shift from a geo- to a helio-centric view of the universe. Hence, the shift in vantage point modified his epistemic options and thus expanded the presupposed “logical space of knowledge”. I conclude that we require an analogous shift in the vantage point we currently presuppose in philosophy of mind. This will expand our “logical space of knowledge” in such way that makes possible to include world-brain relation as possible epistemic option while, at the same time, excluding mind as impossible epistemic option. That, in turn, will render the world-brain problem more intuitive while the mind-body problem will then be rather counter-intuitive. Taken together, this amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy – that shall be the focus in next chapter.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows

On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

1998 ◽  
pp. 32-36
Author(s):  
Henrique de Morais Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Irreducible Elements ◽  
Framework Model ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Zygon® ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. M. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Editor's Introduction

2001 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
D. M. Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Great Promise ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
Royal Institute ◽  
Biological Phenomena ◽  
The Mind

The papers collected in this volume are the proceedings of the 1999 Royal Institute of Philosophy conference: the theme of the conference, the same as the title of this collection, Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. The essays collected here cover a wide array of disparate themes in philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology and the philosophy of science. They range in subject matter from the mind/body problem and the nature of philosophical naturalism, to the naturalization of psychological norms to the naturalization of phenomenal and intentional content, from the methodology cognitive ethology to issues in evolutionary psychology. They are united by the simple thought that the great promise of current naturalism in philosophy of mind resides in its potential to reveal mental phenomena as continuous with other phenomena of the natural world, particularly with other biological phenomena.

scholarly journals So You Want to Be a Rock'n'Roll Scholar — Well You Need to Get an MBA

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Rob Bowman
Keyword(s):  
Marxist Theory ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Rock And Roll ◽  
Record Industry ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Stax Records

Stax Records was a record label based in Memphis, Tennessee from the late 1950s through December 1975, when it was forced into involuntary bankruptcy. "So You Want to Be a Rock and Roll Scholar — Well You Need to Get an MBA" uses Stax Records as a case study to problematize what has often been a tendency within popular music scholarship to attempt to understand the political economy of the record industry primarily via the mechanical application of Marxist theory on a macro level. In looking in detail at the relationship between CBS Records and Stax from 1972 through 1975, the author concludes that to fully understand the nature of the distribution agreement between the two companies, its ramifications, and the consequent subsequent actions of the various principals involved, all of which eventually led to Stax's bankruptcy, one needs to take into account on a micro level the different modi operandi of independent and major labels, differences in the retail world of black and white America, and individual agency. Finally, all of the above needs to be considered very specifically within a temporal framework. The final conclusions prove to be significantly different from what would have resulted from solely from a Marxist analysis on a macro level.

scholarly journals Can Neuroscientists Test a New Physicalist Mind/Body View: DiCoToP (Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism)?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Multiple Realization ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Token Physicalism ◽  
The Mind

Given that disparate mind/body views have interfered with interdisciplinary research in psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the mind/body problem itself is explored here. Adding a philosophy of mind framework, problems for both dualists and physicalists are presented, along with essential concepts including: independent mental causation, emergence, and multiple realization. To address some of these issues in a new light, this article advances an original mind/body account—Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP). Next, puzzles DiCoTop reveals, psychoanalytic problems it solves, and some empirical evidence accrued for views consistent with DiCoToP are presented. In closing, this piece challenges/appeals for neuroscience research to gain evidence for (or against) the DiCoToP view.

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