scholarly journals Kin Selection, Group Selection, and the Varieties of Population Structure

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Birch
Author(s):  
Neema Parvini

This chapter adapts Thomas Sowell’s concept of the constrained (or “tragic”) and unconstrained (or “utopian) visions of humanity in its consideration of evolutionary ethics as a lens through which to approach Shakespeare’s plays. The first half summarises and explains the two visions, while the second traces the development of evolutionary ethics from Adam Smith and Charles Darwin to the work of E.O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, and Jonathan Haidt. Along the way, it considers the so-called “Darwin Wars” over the competing evolutionary theories of kin selection, group selection and species selection. Ultimately, the study aligns itself with the constrained vision and supports the emergent view in evolutionary literature of “group selection” following the work of Wilson, Sloan Wilson, and Haidt.


Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

‘Levels of selection’ examines the levels-of-selection question, which asks whether natural selection acts on individuals, genes, or groups. This question is one of the most fundamental in evolutionary biology, and the subject of much controversy. Traditionally, biologists have mostly been concerned with selection and adaptation at the individual level. But, in theory, there are other possibilities, including selection on sub-individual units such as genes and cells, and on supra-individual units such as groups and colonies. Group selection, altruistic behaviour, kin selection, the gene-centric view of evolution, and the major transitions in evolution are all discussed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 104 (16) ◽  
pp. 6736-6739 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Lehmann ◽  
L. Keller ◽  
S. West ◽  
D. Roze

F1000Research ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jos Kramer ◽  
Joël Meunier

Kin selection and multilevel selection are two major frameworks in evolutionary biology that aim at explaining the evolution of social behaviors. However, the relationship between these two theories has been plagued by controversy for almost half a century and debates about their relevance and usefulness in explaining social evolution seem to rekindle at regular intervals. Here, we first provide a concise introduction into the kin selection and multilevel selection theories and shed light onto the roots of the controversy surrounding them. We then review two major aspects of the current debate: the presumed formal equivalency of the two theories and the question whether group selection can lead to group adaptation. We conclude by arguing that the two theories can offer complementary approaches to the study of social evolution: kin selection approaches usually focus on the identification of optimal phenotypes and thus on the endresult of a selection process, whereas multilevel selection approaches focus on the ongoing selection process itself. The two theories thus provide different perspectives that might be fruitfully combined to promote our understanding of the evolution in group-structured populations.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 64 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Queller

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence C. Burnham ◽  
Dominic D. P. Johnson

AbstractHuman cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neelesh Dahanukar ◽  
Milind Watve

The question how Darwinian mechanisms lead to the evolution of individually costly cooperative behavior has given rise to a number of hypotheses. However, attempts to build a synthesis where different types of mechanisms coexist and interact at different levels of selections are still scarce. Here we derive simple game theoretical models where the group level conflicts are resolved by group selection while simultaneously within group competition is resolved by kin selection and reciprocity. We show that none of the mechanisms, when alone, is as robust in evolving and maintaining cooperation as a synthesis of all. Furthermore, we show that initially within group conflicts can be overcome only by kin selection and not reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reciprocities can maintain high levels of cooperation even if average relatedness among individuals is lowered, groups become large, and the benefits of cooperation are reduced. Based on the synthesis we also propose a possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial systems.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document