Shorter notice. Reading the Book of Nature. The Other Side of the Scientific Revolution. AG Debus, MT Walton

1999 ◽  
Vol 114 (459) ◽  
pp. 1307-1308
Author(s):  
S. Johnston
1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 616
Author(s):  
Robin B. Barnes ◽  
Allen G. Debus ◽  
Michael T. Walton

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson

The ArgumentThis paper focuses on several Italian Jewish philosophers in the second half of the sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth century. It argues that their writings share a certain theology of nature. Because of it, the interest of Jews in the study of nature was not a proto-scientific but a hermeneutical activity based on the essential correspondence between God, Torah, and Israel. While the theology of nature analyzed in the paper did not prevent Jews from being informed about and selectively endorsing the first phase of the scientific revolution, it did render the Jews marginal to it. So long as Jewish thinkers adhered to this theology of nature, Jews could not adopt the scientific mentality that presupposed a qualitative distinction between the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-96
Author(s):  
Robert L. Bernstein

Reading C.P. Snow’s 1959 lecture, ‘Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution’ in 2017, I was struck by the ways in which the essay, written over half a century ago, addresses issues that I’ve been engaged with for most of my life. Snow defined a world of cultures split between: ‘Literary intellectuals at one pole, at the other scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension, sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding.’ I’ve encountered this lack of understanding in my own profession and in public life. But it was Snow’s closing argument that really grabbed my attention: he proposed to his Cambridge audience that they had ‘better look at education with a fresh eye’ and that there was a ‘good deal to learn from the Russians’. Not really. If, as Snow proposed, ‘Scientists have the future in their bones’, we’d all do better to respond to the cool reason of dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and Anatol Sharansky and to recognize the ultimate power of free speech, which only exists in a free society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hewson

Abstract Baumard's new explanation of the Industrial Revolution shows that Life History Theory holds great potential. Here, I suggest two related hypotheses for examination. One is that there are long-term roots of slow life traits and preferences. The other is that Life History Theory can explain other aspects of economic modernity such as the Scientific Revolution and bureaucratic states. If so, then Life History Theory offers a way to reconcile several bodies of evidence and lines of explanation into a coherent general account of economic modernity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-412
Author(s):  
Jacob Emery

This article describes the metaphorical identification of genealogy and language that is central to Danilo Kiš’s overarching project. In The Family Cycle and “The Encyclopedia of the Dead,” the documentation of history and the continuity of generations are worked into a single figurative system. This system has three major functions. First, children and texts complexly interact in the larger endeavor to preserve traces of the fragile past into an uncertain future. Second, the compulsion to identify with dead generations dramatizes the attractions and dangers inherent in fiction—overidentification with a character that overwhelms the reader’s or writer’s personality on the one hand, promiscuous dissolution into a world of metaphor on the other. Finally, genealogical figures form a metapoetic level that mirrors and focuses interpretation of the literary text. Notably, the dialectic between narrative and genealogy illuminates the hermeneutic circle in which finite texts appear as fragmented miniatures of some universal text, a book of nature or a “whole life.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
L. V. Shipovalova ◽  
E. Y. Sivertsev

The article problematizes the concept of scientific innovation. The authors focus their attention on an ambiguous understanding of the conditions for its emergence and its completion. They use two terms — conflict and solidarity — to define these conditions. In their extreme forms, behavior in conflict situations and solidarity practices oppose each other in two ways: there is contention and rejection of a different position, on the one hand, and “mechanical solidarity” (Durkheim), on the other. However, the intersection and even the coincidence of these practices are possible and actually realized, when described in terms of cooperation, on the one hand, and “organic solidarity” associated with the division of labor, on the other. The article aims, firstly, to describe the possibility of opposing conflict and solidarity in the processes of producing scientific innovation; secondly, to demonstrate the importance of intersecting and even combining these practices to produce and complete novelty in science. In their research, the authors address contemporary works from the fields of historiography and epistemology of science, revealing the concept of the Scientific Revolution, which refers to the emergence of a new science, as well as the concept of modernity, that defines the era in which scientific innovation sets the rhythm and the acceleration of social development. It is in the context of various interpretations of the concepts Scientific Revolution and modernity the concept of innovation is being clarified. The latter not only describes the event and the era of the emergence of modern European science, but also suggests possible contemporary scientific practices.


1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel A. Almond ◽  
Stephen J. Genco

In its eagerness to become scientific, political science has in recent decades tended to lose contact with its ontological base. It has tended to treat political events and phenomena as natural events lending themselves to the same explanatory logic as is found in physics and the other hard sciences. This tendency may be understood in part as a phase in the scientific revolution, as a diffusion, in two steps, of ontological and methodological assumptions from the strikingly successful hard sciences: first to psychology and economics, and then from these bellwether human sciences to sociology, anthropology, political science, and even history. In adopting the agenda of hard science, the social sciences, and political science in particular, were encouraged by the neopositivist school of the philosophy of science which legitimated this assumption of ontological and meta-methodological homogeneity. More recently, some philosophers of science and some psychologists and economists have had second thoughts about the applicability to human subject matters of strategy used in hard science.


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