Probing ‘operational coherence’ in Hasok Chang’s pragmatic realism

Hasok Chang is developing a new form of pragmatic scientific realism that aims to reorient the debate away from truth and towards practice. Central to his project is replacing truth as correspondence with his new notion of ‘operational coherence’, which is introduced as: 1) A success term with probative value to judge and guide epistemic activities. 2) A more useful alternative than truth as correspondence in guiding scientific practice. I argue that, given its current construal as neither necessary nor sufficient for success, operational coherence is too weak and fails to satisfy both 1) and 2). I offer a stronger construal of operational coherence which aims to improve on Chang’s account by tying it to systematic success. This makes operational coherence necessary and sufficient for (systematic) success. This new account, if successful, rescues 1) but not 2). I then take a step back and try to locate Chang’s pragmatic realism within the broader pragmatist tradition by comparing his views to the founding fathers Peirce, James and Dewey. I also assess to what extent we should consider Chang’s position ‘realist’, arguing that despite the many relativists threads running through it, Chang’s pragmatic realism is deserving of the realist label because its aims to maximize our learning from reality, even if it falls short of what many traditional realist are happy to accept as realism. I finish with comments on the epistemology of science pointing out that there is nothing intrinsic about a practice-based philosophy of science that precludes having both operational coherence and correspondence and highlighting that given a proper understanding these two notions could, in fact, be understood as complementary. I suggest one way this could be done.

Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Virtue

This chapter offers an overview of how virtue-based concepts have been used by philosophers of science to shed light on epistemic aspects of science. In the epistemology of science, the word virtue has referred to two different concepts. First, virtue can be understood as excellence, where excellence is a quality of a model, a theory, or a hypothesis. Second, virtue can be understood more narrowly as a stable character trait and/or disposition of scientists themselves. The first meaning is connected to the long-standing debate on the qualities that make a scientific theory a good scientific theory. The second meaning is connected to a much more recent conversation exploring the connections between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science. I explore how these two meanings of virtue have been developed, and I highlight underexplored areas that can advance our understanding of the relation between virtue theory and philosophy of science.

Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.

Tensions of Adam and Iblis in the Quran: The Imagology Approach

This study investigates the tensions between Adam and Iblis in the Quran by using imagology as the main approach. The main focus of the imagology approach reveals the interrelationship between text, intertext, and context altogether, by focusing on contextualizing them in the story. This approach does not intend to judge the truth of representations but to analyze their values important to build community weltanschauung (view of life) that leads them to a social change, a changing of meaning, and a new understanding. The findings demonstrate that a triangular conversation between Allah (henceforth, God), the angels and the satan on the creation of Adam showed the big scenario about Adam’s image as a noble creature. Adam’s noble image was because God teaches him names (asma’ or the epistemology of science) on earth where Adam was then symbolized as God’s representative on earth due to his creativity in revealing names which resembled God’s manner as a creator in making innovation and change. God then governed angels and satan to kneel down before Adam as a form of honor. All did it except the Iblis who refused to obey due to his feeling of superiority over Adam. A psycological tension between Iblis’s superiority which is not supported by the capacity of knowledge is defeated by Adam’s inferiority which is strengthened by knowledge. The word ‘kneel’ was actually a theological word applied to the relation between human and God, but the word was used in this context as a symbol of appreciation for science.

Cooperative Division of Cognitive Labour: The Social Epistemology of Photosynthesis Research

How do scientists generate knowledge in groups, and how have they done so in the past? How do epistemically motivated social interactions influence or even drive this process? These questions speak to core interests of both history and philosophy of science. Idealised models and formal arguments have been suggested to illuminate the social epistemology of science, but their conclusions are not directly applicable to scientific practice. This paper uses one of these models as a lens and historiographical tool in the examination of actual scientific collectives. It centres on the analysis of two episodes from the history of photosynthesis research of the late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth centuries, which display a wide and coordinated intellectual diversity similar to Kitcher’s “division of cognitive labour” (1990). The concept, I argue, captures important aspects of the photosynthesis research communities, but the underlying process unfolded in ways that differ from the model’s assumption in interesting ways. The paper unravels how the self-organised interplay of cooperation and competition, and the dynamics of individual and collective goals within scientific communities were influential factors in the generation of knowledge. From there, some thoughts are developed on how historical and philosophical approaches in the analysis of science can productively interact.

The Nature of Science and Technology in Teacher Education

This chapter is about the Nature of Science (NOS) and the Nature of Technology (NOT) in education. Science includes the systematic study of the structure and actions of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment, and technology is the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes. NOS and NOT have been used to refer to the epistemology of science, science as a way of knowing, or the values and beliefs inherent to the development of scientific knowledge. These characterizations, nevertheless, remain general, and philosophers of science, historians of science, and the same goes for NOT. Subsequently, an individual’s understanding that observations are constrained by our perceptual apparatus and are characteristically theory-laden is part of that individuals understanding of the NOS and NOT. In general, NOS and NOT refers to principles and ideas which provide a description of science and technology as a way of knowing, as well as characteristics of scientific knowledge. Many of these intrinsic ideas are lost in the everyday aspects of a science classroom, resulting in students learning misaligned ideas about how science is conducted. Understanding how technology relates with science and society is critical for individuals to make informed personal and societal decisions. Nevertheless, in most STEM education contexts, learning about technology typically only means learning how to be an efficient user or, perhaps, an informed competent designer of. A meaningful technology education stresses that science education efforts also teach students about NOT. Essential questions like what technology is, how it is related to, yet distinct from, science, how it shapes and is shaped by society, and perhaps most importantly, how technologies impact the way individuals think and act.

Introduction: The Philosophical Conjuncture

The Introduction argues that the mutually reinforcing relationship between speculation and critique depends upon sustaining a methodological tension between rationalism and empiricism. I explicate the stakes of this tension through engagements with Gaston Bachelard’s epistemology of science and Louis Althusser’s theory of the epistemological break. I frame the contemporary relevance of the “rationalist empiricist” approach developed by these thinkers through Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude, showing how tools from Bachelard and Althusser enable the construction of a more rigorous materialist epistemology than that offered by Meillassoux. I conclude with a critique of the “subjective dogmatism” of Kant’s theory of purposiveness and with a reflection upon Alfred North Whitehead’s definition of philosophy.

Aspectos da natureza da ciência nas pesquisas sobre controvérsias sociocientíficas

Resumo: A literatura aponta que as controvérsias sociocientíficas (CSC) podem ser utilizadas para facilitar a compreensão da natureza da ciência (NDC). Com base nesta premissa, o objetivo desta investigação é analisar se a NDC é contemplada e, quando presente, quais aspectos desta são mais abordados nas pesquisas que versam sobre as CSC. Para tal, realizou-se uma pesquisa qualitativa do tipo estado do conhecimento. Os dados foram constituídos no Catálogo de Teses e Dissertações da CAPES e interpretados por meio da Análise Textual Discursiva. Os resultados indicaram que a NDC é pouco contemplada em trabalhos sobre CSC. Entretanto, mesmo quando a NDC não faz parte do objetivo central das atividades envolvendo CSC, aspectos da ciência aparecem nas discussões, dentre eles, o mais comum é a influência de fatores externos na ciência. Tendo em vista estes resultados, argumentamos que o potencial das CSC para a compreensão da NDC precisa ser mais explorado.Palavras-chave: Questões Sociocientíficas; Epistemologia da Ciência; Educação Científica. Aspects of the nature of science in research on socioscientific issuesAbstract: The literature indicates that socioscientific issues (SSI) can facilitate the understanding of the nature of science (NOS). Based on that, the objective of this investigation is to analyze whether NOS is contemplated and, when present, which aspects of it are most addressed in the research that deals with SSI. For this end, a qualitative research of the state of knowledge type was carried out. The data was constituted in the CAPES Theses and Dissertations Catalog and interpreted through the Discursive Textual Analysis. The results indicated that the NOS is little considered in works on SSI. However, even when NOS is not part of the central objective of activities involving SSI, aspects of science appear in the discussions, among them, the most common is the influence of external factors in science. In view of these results, we argue that the potential of SSI for understanding NOS needs to be further explored.Keywords: Socioscientific Issues; Epistemology of Science; Science Education.