Publicising Malfeasance: When the Local Media Structure Facilitates Electoral Accountability in Mexico

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (631) ◽  
pp. 2291-2327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horacio Larreguy ◽  
John Marshall ◽  
James M Snyder

Abstract Malfeasance in local governments is common in developing democracies. Electoral accountability could mitigate such malfeasance, but may require media market structures that incentivise profit-maximising local media to report on incumbent malfeasance. We test this claim in Mexico, leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the pre-election release of municipal audits revealing misallocated spending and access to broadcast media. We find that each additional local media station amplifies voter punishment (rewards) of high (zero) malfeasance by up to 1 percentage point. Local media’s accountability-enhancing effects are greater when there are fewer non-local competitors and where local outlets’ audiences principally reside within their municipality.

1978 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 927-929 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deva N. Pattanayak ◽  
Joseph L. Birman

Pramana ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun-Zhou Sun ◽  
Qin Wu ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Jing-Yan Li

2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Kisić

For over a decade media legislation, controversial as it was, has been a matter of controversy in Serbia. It was only in 2011 that a newly adopted media strategy developed by European Union and Council of Europe criteria hinted at change for the better as it envisaged the amendment of the entire media legislation (about 18 laws). Consequently, three new laws were passed in 2014: on public information and the media; on broadcast media; and, on public broadcasting service. Ten laws are still pending – either to be amended or adopted. After the change of the regime in 2000, the media legislation was changed but not in line with a democratic value system. This specially refers to media freedoms. Repression against the media characteristic of the 1990s was replaced by “soft censorship” and self-censorship. Serbia’s media market is small and underdeveloped, and under strong influence of the government. The adopted strategy provides against state ownership of the media except in the case of the two public broadcasting services. Media outlets, especially electronic, are too many for such a limited media market; the state has a hand in media businesses in many ways, including subsidies and paid advertisements for large public enterprises. Non-transparent media ownership and money flow are among key problems of media transition.


Author(s):  
Giuseppe Failla ◽  
Massimiliano Zingales

Fractional calculus is now a well-established tool in engineering science, with very promising applications in materials modelling. Indeed, several studies have shown that fractional operators can successfully describe complex long-memory and multiscale phenomena in materials, which can hardly be captured by standard mathematical approaches as, for instance, classical differential calculus. Furthermore, fractional calculus has recently proved to be an excellent framework for modelling non-conventional fractal and non-local media, opening valuable prospects on future engineered materials. The theme issue gathers cutting-edge theoretical, computational and experimental studies on advanced materials modelling via fractional calculus, with a focus on complex phenomena and non-conventional media. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Advanced materials modelling via fractional calculus: challenges and perspectives’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kinal

The media market consists of: media (media, ie television, radio and printed press, as well as new media in the domain), their recipcom and filter, and so-called. regulators, that is organizations and institutions that control media activities (note: Internet content is not a regulation format). The National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television controls the content of television broadcasting and analyzing programs as well as receiving and receiving concessions. The Office of Electronic Communications assigns and controls the subject of technical possibilities of broadcasting radio and television programs. Citizens' organizations that oversee media activities. These include industry organizations, e.g. journalistic associations. The media are businesses. To the fact that in their activity they are guided not only by interest, openness or mission, but also by financial profit. There are three basic ways to fund the media. Public media owned by the public is financed from the subscription and advertising. The money from the subscription is spent on the so-called mission, advertising revenue - for other purposes (eg entertainment programs). Commercial media is financed from private capital and advertising. Social media (do not mistake them for social networking sites). Setting up and running a television or radio station for a very expensive investment. The media market 1 is available only to you. To, that the value of the collection program along with its popularity. Therefore, more people watched the video, the more you have to pay for advertising during this broadcast. To make as much money as possible, senders need to care about the attractiveness of the program. To do it in various ways, e.g. to decide to profile the program. Universal programs are suitable for various types of programs: entertainment, educational, information etc. Thematic programs such as: culture, sport or motorization.Keywords: media, labor market, local media, Poland, open market


2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 1274-1311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Ferraz ◽  
Frederico Finan

We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)


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