Re Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7, Supreme Court

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Re Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7, UK Supreme Court. This case concerns first, the law relating to legitimate expectations, and second the requirements to establish an Article 2-compliant investigation into a death. The facts of the case are connected to the murder of Patrick Finucane by loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R (on the application of Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, Supreme Court. This case examined the circumstances under which the Upper Tribunal would be subject to judicial review. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter considers the grounds on which public decisions may be challenged before the courts. It begins with an overview of two cases—Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn (1948) and Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985). The importance of these two cases is their distillation of the general principles. The discussion then covers the different grounds for judicial review: illegality, relevant/irrelevant considerations, fiduciary duty, fettering of a discretion, improper purpose, bad faith, irrationality, proportionality, procedural impropriety, natural justice, legitimate expectations, the right to a fair hearing, reasons, and the rule against bias. It is noted that principles often overlap, so that a challenge to a public law decision may be based on different principles.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 577-587
Author(s):  
Samuel Ruiz-Tagle

Abstract This analysis explores new developments in judicial review of planning policy interpretation. It shows how the nature of policy, often contextual and judgment-dependent, has led the UK Supreme Court to rethink the standard of review applicable to this issue. By considering the recent decision in Samuel Smith as part of a trilogy of cases—including Tesco Stores and Hopkins Homes—this analysis reveals a change in judicial attitudes, away from the expansive judicial supervision upheld in Tesco Stores. Furthermore, this study reflects on how this change is related to two wider ideas. The first is the Court’s understanding of the law and policy divide in the planning field, whilst the second is to do with a pragmatic stance regarding the purpose of the planning system and the institutional role of the courts in it. Finally, this analysis shows how the new approach emphasises the distinctive character of policy in the planning context.


Author(s):  
Ariel L Bendor

Abstract The article argues that over the years a series of gradual developments has taken place in the judicial review policies of Israel’s Supreme Court, whereby the Court expanded its ad hoc discretion in determining the constitutional limits that apply to primary legislation. Israeli constitutionalism has become judiciary-centered. The article suggests that judicial discretion that the Israeli Supreme Court tends to exercise in constitutional matters is of two types: substantive judicial discretion, which concerns the interpretation or application of the law; and adjudicative discretion, which includes both the discretion to deny in limine petitions in which the Court does not deem it necessary to grant relief according to considerations such as standing or delay; and the Court’s discretion in the manner of the hearing. The article suggests three illuminations of Israeli judiciary-centered constitutionalism: expenditure of the justices’ awareness of their discretion; the decline of the rules structuring judicial discretion; and a re-rise of the justices’ recognition of legitimacy of adjudicative discretion due to the expansion of substantive judicial discretion.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (01) ◽  
pp. 67-97
Author(s):  
Simon BUTT

AbstractThis article describes and critiques the judicial reasoning of Indonesia’s Supreme Court, through the lens of the Court’s reviews of subnational laws during 2011–17. The resulting picture is a negative one. Most of the Court’s decisions were critically flawed, with either very little or no reasoning, and inconsistencies with past decisions. Worse, the Court appears keen to avoid hearing important cases that raise difficult political issues, even though the law governing those issues is clear and easy to apply. These inadequacies are perpetuated by genuine uncertainty about the precise jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review cases. However, the Court has not sought to resolve this uncertainty. Indeed, these decisions appear to reflect a court paying little regard to judicial transparency and accountability, and unwilling or unable to act as an effective check on government power.


2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-174
Author(s):  
NORMAN OTTO STOCKMEYER

ABSTRACT Imagine a world where courts stopped enforcing contracts. There would be a complete breakdown in commerce. Yet courts do not enforce all contracts. Contracts that are the product of fraud or duress, for example, are voidable. The law must strike a balance between protecting legitimate expectations and policing against contract wrongdoing. What if a contract is the product of a mistake? No one was at fault, yet the contract is not what the parties supposed. Should a court enforce it? Sherwood v. Walker (1887) is a landmark case in which the Michigan Supreme Court established the defense of mutual mistake, refusing to enforce a contract that was the product of the parties' erroneous assumption. Sherwood v Walker is still taught in law schools today, and has been cited as authority by courts across the country. But since it was decided, Michigan's high court has twice repudiated the case, only to later embrace it again. This paper explores the convoluted history of the defense of mutual mistake in Michigan contract law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Endri Ismail

Penelitian ini berupaya memaparkan legalitas Qanun Aceh Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Hukum Jinayat (Qanun Jinayah) dalam konstruksi hukum tata negara Indonesia. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penelitian ini akan meninjau legalitas Qanun Jinayah dari dua sudut pandang, yaitu formalitas pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan dan konsep negara kesatuan. Qanun Jinayah menuai banyak perdebatan disebabkan kedudukannya sebagai peraturan daerah (perda) namun bermateri muatan pidana Islam (jinayah) yang sama sekali belum diatur dalam peraturan perundang-undangan di level nasional. Tahun 2015, Qanun Jinayah dilakukan uji materiil ke Mahkamah Agung oleh Perkumpulan Masyarakat Pembaharuan Peradilan Pidana (ICJR) namun permohonan uji materiil ini dinyatakan tidak dapat diterima dengan alasan prematur (belum waktunya). Analisis yuridis dari perspektif hukum ketatanegaraan ini penting dilakukan mengingat legalitas sebuah peraturan perundang-undangan menentukan validitas dan kekuatan berlakunya. Yuridical Analysis of the Legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law This research attempts to describe the legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law (Qanun Jinayah) in the construction of Indonesian constitutional law. To analyze it, this study will examine the legality of Qanun Jinayah from two perspectives, those are the formality of the formulation of legislation and the concept of a unitary state. Qanun Jinayah gets  a lot of debate because of its position as a Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah), but the material of Islamic criminal content (Jinayah) which has not been regulated in national legislation. In 2015, Qanun Jinayat is subjected to a judicial review to the Supreme Court by the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), but this petition is declared unacceptable on a premature reason (unspecified). Judicial analysis from the perspective of constitutional law is important to do due to the legality of a legislation determines the validity and strenght of the law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.


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