15. The Use of Force, Collective Security and Peacekeeping

Author(s):  
Martin Dixon ◽  
Robert McCorquodale ◽  
Sarah Williams

International law aims to regulate the use of force in two ways. First, it stipulates that there is a paramount obligation not to use force to settle disputes, with only limited exceptions; and second, it has at its disposal a procedure whereby the international community itself may use force against those using violence. These are known respectively as the rules on the ‘unilateral use of force’ and the rules of ‘collective security’, both of which are discussed in this chapter.

Author(s):  
V. S. Rzhevska

The article investigates how the so-called perpetual peace projects contributed to the scholarly thought of international law. Such projects have been proposed for centuries and came to constitute a rather remarkable trend in human thought, many of them being created by people, prominent of history and representing various fields of activity. Although such projects may be considered an interdisciplinary invention, their contribution to the development of the concepts and ideas of international law can be esteemed as especially significant. The meaning of some famous examples of such projects is summarized. The conclusion is made that among the traces of the influence that the perpetual peace projects had upon the scholarly thought of international law are the preservation and propaganda of the idea of peace, the acknowledgment of law and its means as a valuable component of peace achievement, the investigation of the causes of peace-breaking and combating them, the formation of the principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes and of non-use of force or threat of force, the establishing of theoretical grounds for creating international organizations and elaborating the concept of collective security.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
Franchini Daniel ◽  
Tzanakopoulos Antonios

This contribution discusses the forcible intervention by NATO against Serbia in 1999 in response to the situation in Kosovo. It sets out the facts and background of the crisis, along with the legal positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of the international community. It then proceeds to survey the debates surrounding the legality of the intervention and to assess the soundness of the legal justifications put forward by states and authors. Finally, it discusses the precedential value of the intervention, especially in view of claims of the existence or emergence of a rule or principle of international law permitting the unilateral use of force in response to humanitarian crises. The contribution concludes that the NATO intervention has significant precedential value in that it confirms the unlawfulness of forcible unilateral humanitarian intervention.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
GREGOR NOLL

AbstractIn this article, I apply René Girard's theory of generative violence to the international law relating to the use of force. I argue that texts of international law make gestures of referral towards an immanent normativity on the fettering of divine violence. The means to this end is a form of sacrificial violence that seeks to promote the preservation and cohesion of the ‘international community’. The structuring of this violence through international law and its repeated staging reproduces the relationship of prophecy to miracle. Empirically, I draw mainly on excerpts from the 2006 US National Security Strategy.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Ruffert

The intensive debate about the legality of NATO air strikes from March to June 1999 in the context of use of force, Chapter VII competences and humanitarian intervention1 including their implication in the domestic constitutional law of NATO members,2 may be concealed another development the importance of which in modern Public International Law should not be underestimated: since the time when the Yugoslav/Serbian army left Kosovo, the province has been under direct administration by the international community.3 Only a little time later the same phenomenon of international administration came into being in East-Timor, a Portuguese colony until 1975 and claimed by Indonesia afterwards.4


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Triggs

AbstractThis paper by Professor Gillian Triggs seeks to explore whether the traditional principles of public international law are ‘fit for purpose’ in responding to such contemporary threats to collective security by reference to three issues: the regulation of the use of force; the need to balance the sovereign rights of states with humanitarian concerns; and the relationship between human rights and the orthodox rules applicable to prisoners of war and security detainees.


1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Schweigman

Is the concept of humanitarian intervention part and parcel of customary law? In order to answer this question the or gins of the concept, (alleged) pre- and post-Charter state practice and the relation with the principles of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction and the non-use of force will be considered. It will be concluded that the aforementioned question must be answered in the negative, notwithstanding the fact that genuine humanitarian interventions tend to be tolerated by the international community.


Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

This chapter addresses France’s foreign relations law in relation to the use of force. It presents both domestic rules (in particular constitutional rules) that are applicable in France to the use of force abroad and France’s legal position as regards the permissible use of force under international law. As a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as a nuclear-weapon state, as a military power involved in many UN or other collective peacekeeping or antiterrorism operations, and as a state specially affected by international terrorism, France is particularly interested in the identification and development of international rules related to the use of force and collective security and has developed over time domestic rules governing activities of its military forces abroad as well as some doctrine on the use of force in the international sphere. As the chapter shows in particular, the decision to use force or to participate in collective security is, as a matter of principle, a decision that has to be taken in France by the executive branch. This being said, the Parliament has recently been granted some powers on the use of force, which vary depending on the nature of the operations concerned. On the other hand, there is no judicial control of the decision to use force. Besides, there is still no clear doctrine as regards the circumstances in which French authorities consider that the use of force can be resorted to under international law.


Author(s):  
Sir Michael Wood

This chapter examines the distinction between self-defence and collective security, the two principal exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. The exercise of the right of self-defence, which includes collective self-defence, is recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter, while collective security measures are authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Drawing on an article by Derek Bowett published in 1994, the chapter considers the academic debate and confusion in 1990–1 concerning the distinction between self-defence and collective security. In particular, it looks at the controversy regarding the legal basis of the use of force over Korea in 1950. It also outlines six differences identified by Bowett with regard to collective self-defence and collective measures under Chapter VII.


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