Self-Defence and Collective Security

Author(s):  
Sir Michael Wood

This chapter examines the distinction between self-defence and collective security, the two principal exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. The exercise of the right of self-defence, which includes collective self-defence, is recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter, while collective security measures are authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Drawing on an article by Derek Bowett published in 1994, the chapter considers the academic debate and confusion in 1990–1 concerning the distinction between self-defence and collective security. In particular, it looks at the controversy regarding the legal basis of the use of force over Korea in 1950. It also outlines six differences identified by Bowett with regard to collective self-defence and collective measures under Chapter VII.

Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

This chapter examines the rules and principles that govern a naval or aerial blockade or some other form of interference with foreign vessels and aircraft in the absence of an explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. After clarifying the concept of blockade under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, it considers blockades authorized as military enforcement measures. It also discusses some unresolved or even contested issues regarding the legality of blockades, with reference to blockades in situations other than international armed conflict and the principle of proportionality in relation to humanity. The scope of interdiction operations and its legal bases under international treaties are analysed next, together with maritime interdiction operations and the applicability of prize law during non-international armed conflicts. Finally, the chapter explores the right of individual or collective self-defence as a basis for interdiction operations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Bill Gilmore

This chapter examines the doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ used by the state to exercise its coercive powers beyond national territory for law enforcement purposes. It discusses hot pursuit by sea, land, and air in the context of international law, particularly with respect to self-defence and reprisal. Whilst hot pursuit is well recognized in the customary international law of the sea, it has yet to achieve that form of normative recognition in relation to pursuit on land or by air. The chapter considers the debate over hot pursuit as a legal justification for cross-border military incursions independent of the right of self-defence and describes the concept of extended constructive presence before concluding with an analysis of hot pursuit in a use of force context.


Author(s):  
James Crawford

This chapter discusses international law governing the use or threat of force by states. The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for enforcement action to deal with breaches of the peace, threats to the peace, or acts of aggression. Individual member states have the right of individual or collective self-defence, but only ‘until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. However, the practice has evolved of authorizing peacekeeping operations that are contingent upon the consent of the state whose territory is the site of the operations.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-493
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

The legality of a forceful intervention by a state to protect its nationals has been the subject of a continuing controversy over the past 15 years. Many see it as an unlawful use of force prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations, others see it as a lawful exercice of a self-standing right recognized under contemporary international law, some finally claim it falls under the scope of self-defence. The author proposes not to restate that debate, but more to reassess it, examining and challenging some of the arguments raised on both sides of the question. Within that debate, it will be concluded that the international legal order does indeed recognize the validity of the use of force for such a purpose : if the avenue of self-defence is rejected, for conceptual as well as practical reasons, the right of intervention to protect nationals is indeed, for the author, part of the comtemporary international legal order. Then, the author wishes to broaden the debate and proposes another option, which has not been explored by scholars and publicists but which is found more satisfactory than any other approach : intervention to protect nationals can be justified under international law because of the existence, in a particular case, of a "state of necessity" as defined by the International Law Commission.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Summary The ban on the use of force in current international law is of mandatory character. The only exceptions are actions under the auspices of the UN Security Council and self-defence. The article addresses the issue of the use of force, with particular emphasis on cyberspace. As the nature of the conflicts has changed in recent years as well as the space where the individual operations have been moving, a number of fundamental questions arise in this context, which the authors will try to answer.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


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