scholarly journals COLLECTIVE LABOUR RIGHTS AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR LAW

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union



2020 ◽  
pp. 470-506
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the provisions of European Union (EU) law concerning economic rights provided by Articles 45, 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), concerning workers, establishment and services respectively. It discusses the Court of Justice’s (CJ) interpretation and its impact on Member States’ ability to regulate the right to trade within their own territory, as well as regulatory competition between Member States. The chapter discusses the harmonization of qualifications (including the Qualifications Directive), the free movement of lawyers and the Services Directive.



2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-361
Author(s):  
Adam Sagan

The paper discusses the concept of the term worker in European labour law, focusing on the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Matzak case. First, the facts that are essential to Mr Matzak’s qualification as a worker are presented. In a second step, the part of the Court’s decision which refers to the concept of ‘worker’ is analysed. The third and main part deals in detail with the current discussion of the concept of the term ‘worker’ in EU law. This analysis should make it possible to systemise the decisions of the Court. Finally, an attempt is made to classify the decision of the Court in the Matzak within its own case law and to assess its consequences for future decisions.



2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 15-38
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to leave the European Union (EU). The consequences of Brexit are wide-ranging, but, from a legal perspective, it will entail the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. The UK government does not intend to repeal EU law which is in existence on exit day, but, in terms of the interpretation of retained law, decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will no longer be binding after Brexit. Nevertheless, s. 6(2) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 does allow the UK courts to continue to pay regard to EU law and decisions of the CJEU ‘so far as it is relevant to any matter before the court’. This article will consider the meaning of the phrase ‘ may have regard to anything…so far as it is relevant’. In empowering the courts to consider post-Brexit CJEU authority subject to the undefined criterion of relevancy, how is this power likely to be exercised? A comparison will be drawn with the treatment of Privy Council and the UK case law in Commonwealth courts following the abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy Council, with particular reference to the example of Australia. It will be argued that guidance may be obtained from the common law legal family which can help us predict the future relevance and persuasiveness of CJEU case law in the interpretation of retained EU private law.



2018 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 413-429
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SUBJECTED TO REGLAMENTATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EXEMPLIFIED BY CONDUCTING GAMBLINGIn EU law, conducting gambling is classified as the exercise of the freedoms of the internal market, regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Conducting gambling is not currently regulated or harmonized at EU level, and therefore the regulation of gambling is the competence of Member States. EU law defining acceptable ways of regulating gambling in the Member States is now a judge-made law and the result of the creative jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. So far, the Court has issued dozens of judgments in which it interpreted Treaty provisions proclaiming the freedoms of the internal market in the context of conducting gambling. These judgments provide a direct or indirect assessment of whether national law complies with EU law.



Author(s):  
Filip Dorssemont ◽  
Klaus Lörcher ◽  
Mélanie Schmitt

Abstract In this article, the authors assess the decision of the European Commission, in March 2018, not to implement a European Framework agreement concluded at sectoral level (the Hairdressers Agreement), despite a joint request to do so from the signatory parties. They argue that the decision was not consistent with the criteria relied on by the Commission to make it. In particular, the Commission’s refusal was contrary to the formal obligation enshrined in Article 155(2) Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to table a proposal to turn an Agreement of this kind into a Directive. Their analysis is based on, among other things, the duty to respect the autonomy of the social partners in Article 152 TFEU, and the recognition of the right to collective bargaining in Article 28 CFREU.



Author(s):  
Monika Domańska ◽  
Dawid Miąsik ◽  
Monika Szwarc

The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.



2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-358
Author(s):  
Eleni Karageorgiou

Because of the scale of global displacement, in particular from Syria, the European Union (EU) has stressed the need to work on an effective asylum and immigration policy through more robust forms of cooperation internally, between Member States, and externally, with third countries. This contribution investigates the extent to which the EU rules for distributing asylum responsibilities genuinely address the requirement of solidarity set out in EU law. It focuses on the Dublin system, which forms the main intra-EU responsibility allocation mechanism, and on the EU–Turkey partnership as an external mechanism. It suggests that instead of relieving countries that have disproportionate protection responsibilities and guaranteeing protection for every individual in need, such practices achieve the opposite. They ensure that overburdened countries remain the main protection providers and that the movement of refugees is strictly managed. This leads to the debasement of the right to asylum contrary to international and European law.



2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.



2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Femke Laagland

The author assesses the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) in which the European business freedoms collide with national labour law. The approach of the Court will be scrutinised with the aim of discovering the extent to which the Court encroaches upon the Member States’ autonomy in the field of labour law. This topic became popular directly after the landmark decisions in Viking and Laval of December 2007. Both cases addressed conflicts that were related to socio-economic diversity in the European Union following the enlargements. In the end, the Court decided where the balance between the conflicting economic and social values had to be struck and, by doing so, did not grant any room of discretion to the Member States. Since then, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services have obtruded themselves into the sphere of national labour law. The Court has broadened its jurisdiction in the socio-economic field not only in cross-border situations but also in internal situations via its interpretation of social policy Directives by virtue of Article 16 CFREU. The research shows that the Court is assessing the legitimacy of restrictions imposed by national labour law in seemingly different distinguishable ways since 2007. Although the Court does not seem to aspire to a uniform labour law system throughout the European Union, its approach applied in Viking and Laval cannot be considered a thing of the past. Due to poor reasoning, it is not clear when and where the Court draws the line. Since its rulings cannot readily (or even at all) be subject to political review, the ensuing legal uncertainty leads to anxiety about the Court being the ultimate decider in the socio-economic field.



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