10. The internal (or common, or single) market

2020 ◽  
pp. 269-293
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter describes what is interchangeably called the ‘common market’, the ‘single market’, or the ‘internal market’. These terms all refer to the same concept: a geographical area made up of the territories of the Member States, wherein there are (in theory) no barriers to trade, and which operate an identical external trade policy. The chapter looks at the completion of the single market, considering the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It also identifies what makes the single market unique, detailing the stages of economic integration and the key components of the EU's internal market. In light of the Withdrawal Agreement, it will be some time before the UK distances itself from the EU's internal market. The transition period created by the Withdrawal Agreement effectively results in a form of ongoing ‘EU membership’ without institutional representation. Both the positive regulations that make up the internal market and the EU's customs union rules will thus continue to apply to the UK until at least the end of 2020.

2019 ◽  
Vol 250 ◽  
pp. R22-R29
Author(s):  
David Vines ◽  
Paul Gretton ◽  
Anne Williamson

Executive SummaryThe UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.


Subject The package of reforms on a new EU-UK relationship. Significance The agreement between the United Kingdom and its EU partners sets the stage for the UK referendum on EU membership, which Prime Minister David Cameron has set for June 23. Cameron said he had negotiated new terms that would allow the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Impacts The deal bolsters the campaign to remain in the EU, but the referendum outcome is still highly uncertain. The deal will only come into effect if the outcome is for remaining, forestalling a second referendum for better terms. If the outcome is for leaving, a new relationship with the EU would have to be negotiated during a two-year transition period. It would also probably lead to a second Scottish independence referendum and UK break-up.


Significance The process has been plunged into further uncertainty by the outcome of the June 8 UK general election, which has sparked renewed debate about what kind of Brexit the United Kingdom wants and what kind of future economic relationship with the EU it should seek to negotiate. Impacts The UK government’s weakness is a cause for concern elsewhere in the EU, raising fears that it may not be able to compromise on key issues. Many businesses will begin implementing strategies for dealing with Brexit early next year, before knowing the outcome of the negotiations. Pressure for a lengthy transition period will continue to build. The political turmoil and slowing economic growth in the United Kingdom may increase support for EU membership elsewhere in the bloc.


2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Lyudmila Babynina ◽  

The United Kingdom left the European Union on January 31, 2020. On December 31, 2020, the transition period ended, during which all EU rules and regulations applied to Britain. The trade agreement was reached in record time, but it is too early to talk about long-term mutual benefits. The British case in the system of trade and economic agreements of the European Union is unique. On the one hand, at the time of the negotiations, the UK retained EU law, was a member of the EU Single Internal Market and Customs Union, subject to the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice. On the other hand, the EU for the first time found itself in a situation when a third country was determined to distance itself as much as possible from EU rules while concluding a trade agreement, despite the obvious economic losses. At the same time, both sides understood that the absence of an agreement threatened all interested actors with serious losses, and that it must be concluded. As a result, the compromise text of the TCA reflects the fundamentally different approaches of the parties to bilateral cooperation, and its provisions suggest a change of its format in the future.


Author(s):  
Stephen Wall

In 2016, the voters of the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union. The majority for ‘Leave’ was small. Yet, in more than forty years of EU membership, the British had never been wholeheartedly content. In the 1950s, governments preferred the Commonwealth to the Common Market. In the 1960s, successive Conservative and Labour administrations applied to join the European Community because it was a surprising success, whilst the UK’s post-war policies had failed. But the British were turned down by the French. When the UK did join, twelve years after first asking, it joined a club whose rules had been made by others and which it did not much like. At one time or another, Labour and Conservative were at war with each other and internally. In 1975, the Labour government held a referendum on whether the UK should stay in. Two thirds of the voters decided to do so. But the wounds did not heal. Europe remained ‘them’, not ‘us’. The UK was on the front foot in proposing reform and modernization and on the back foot as other EU members wanted to advance to ‘ever closer union’. This book tells the story of a relationship rooted in a thousand years of British history, and of our sense of national identity in conflict with our political and economic need for partnership with continental Europe.


Significance A ‘no deal’ outcome from the negotiations would have massively disruptive effects on both sides of the Channel. Impacts A ‘no deal’ outcome would create political bad will which would impede cooperation with remaining EU states across a range of issues. The short-term costs of adjustment and trade disruption will be additional to the costs of leaving the single market and customs union. The UK government could lose its reputation for competence.


2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (No. 10) ◽  
pp. 448-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Tomšík ◽  
E. Rosochatecká

Finnish agriculture changed radically with the EU joining in 1995. The commitment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) led to unprecedented changes in economic environment – in agriculture as in processing industry. Finland lost the possibility to regulate the original price level of agricultural products supported by the national border protection and export subsidies. Prices guaranteed by the EU are much lower today than before the EU-membership. Recently, Finland has evaluated ten years being an EU member. Despite its competitive disadvantage, given mostly by unfavourable production conditions, Finnish agriculture has not lost within the competitive environment of the single market and it has tried to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the CAP. The article recapitulates the ten year effort of Finnish agriculture to ensure the competitiveness within the EU single market.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones

Alison Jones looks at vertical agreements in Chapter 3. This chapter charts the development of UK competition law and policy towards vertical agreements over the 20 years since the Competition Act 1998 came into force. It traces how UK policy has evolved, before examining the UK jurisprudence that assesses the compatibility of vertical agreements with competition law. It notes that although many UK cases initially focused on resale price maintenance, more recently a number have analysed vertical restraints affecting online selling, which have proliferated since 2000 with the rapid growth of e-commerce. The chapter also considers how the law could, or should, develop in the future, especially now the transition period following the UK’s departure from the EU has ended. An important issue considered is whether, post-Brexit, the UK authorities should continue to follow EU competition law in this sphere, which has in significant respects been influenced by internal market considerations, or whether it should take a different course.


Author(s):  
R W Dean

The objective of the paper is to assess the overall structural and competitive implications for the UK pig industry of the EC Single Market; colloquially known as “1992”.Particular attention is paid both to the effect of those changes in the commercial environment which 1992 will introduce and, secondly, to those aspects which differentiate the UK pig industry from its continental competitors. Analysis of these aspects will assist in drawing conclusions as to the likely effect of the Single Market and in determining an appropriate strategy for addressing the new situation.A body of admittedly largely circumstantial evidence suggests that the UK pig producer believes the advent of the Single Market will have little relevance to the way in which he conducts his business. This view is buttressed by his perception of the agricultural world as governed by the workings of the Common Agricultural Policy which is regarded as the principle influence upon agriculture and its commercial fortunes.


Author(s):  
V.V. Pushkareva

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union with its overseas possessions returned to the political agenda the territorial dispute between Madrid and London over the Gibraltar semi-enclave. The opposite points of view have collided in the context of Brexit: the UK fundamentally defends its sovereignty over Gibraltar, Spain strives to regain the lost territory, the Gibraltarians want to maintain association with the Kingdom and not break with the European Union, the European Union is not eager to grant Gibraltar a special status, but at the same time is interested in maintaining a preferential financial zone in the South of the Iberian Peninsula. Separate issues of relations between the UK and Spain on the situation of Gibraltar for the transition period were agreed, they are set out in the “4 Memoranda”. The further fate of the territory depends on the UK's deal with the EU. The contracting parties guarantee that the interests of both Spain and Gibraltar are taken into account. Possible options: holding a referendum on the independence of Gibraltar; gaining control of Spain over the strategic objects of Gibraltar as a result of the deal; Gibraltar remains under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and continues to cooperate with the EU; dual Spanish-British sovereignty will be established over Gibraltar; at the end of Brexit Gibraltar will not cooperate with the EU. But each of the proposed solutions requires certain concessions from the disputing parties. They are not ready to compromise yet. The authorities of Gibraltar, however, are aware that without cooperation with the UK, Spain and the European Union, their further successful state and development is impossible. More favorable conditions, in our opinion, for the Gibraltarians will arise with the accession to the Schengen area and the Customs Union.


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