11. Hearsay Evidence

Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.

2021 ◽  
pp. 262-294
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.


2018 ◽  
pp. 595-610
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

This chapter discusses the hearsay rule in the context of civil proceedings. It begins with a consideration of Section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (CEA). Doubts have been raised as to whether the Act is compatible with the ECHR, and on any basis, there are procedural differences between the methods of adducing different forms of hearsay under the provisions of the act. Consideration of the effect of the act in changing the law thus constitutes the first, and more important, section of this chapter. The chapter then turns to how the provisions of the act indicate that some of the existing rules relating to the admissibility of hearsay in civil proceedings remain in force.


1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-101
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson

No expert long range forecast is needed to predict that in the near future a wind of change of a velocity and a turbulence hitherto unknown is going to sweep away many common law principles of the law of evidence regarded in the past as fundamental. In civil proceedings, the hurricane is upon us, with the thirteenth report of the Law Reform Committee, and the Civil Evidence Bill 1967, virtually providing for the abolition of the rule against first-hand hearsay and the rule against narrative, and substituting a wide discretion in the court. All the signs are that in a short time analogous reforms for criminal proceedings will be announced, and already previous statements have been rendered widely admissible by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The object of this article is to look at the common law relating to the rule against narrative in criminal proceedings, as it is applied in England and in the United States, and to make a few comments on the procedure introduced by section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.The rule against narrative is sometimes called the rule against self-corroboration. This is misleading, in that a witness can never corroborate himself where corroboration is required by any rule of law or practice. In the thirteenth report, the first description is said to be a misnomer, but a helpful summary of the rule is given: “what the witness himself said outside the witness-box is not evidence.” Wills describes the rule in this way: “… the witness may not repeat to the Court his own previous narratives or statements concerning the relevant facts made to other persons out of Court; when he is in the witness-box he must take his mind back, directly so to speak, to the facts he is called to prove, and must give to the Court his present recollection of those facts.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-439
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

In Uganda legislation requires witnesses to adduce direct evidence in court. However, this may not be possible in all cases and the law provides for circumstances in which hearsay may be admissible. The Evidence Act is the main piece of legislation which governs the issue evidence. In this article, the author relied on 539 cases in which the Ugandan High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have dealt with hearsay evidence to establish the principles which these courts have developed on this issue. This case law shows, inter alia, that there are three major issues that Ugandan courts are still grappling with when it comes to hearsay evidence: the definition of hearsay; the admissibility of hearsay (exceptions to the hearsay rule) and the probative value of hearsay evidence. The author suggests ways in which courts can handle these issues.


1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 269-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bridgit Dimond

This paper explores the law relating to strikes and other industrial action in the UK and the problems faced by nurse practitioners. It also reviews the advice given to nurses by the professional associations. If any employee takes part in industrial action, he or she could personally face four arenas of accountability for this action: disciplinary proceedings before the employer; criminal proceedings; civil proceedings for negligence; and professional conduct proceedings.


2020 ◽  
pp. 412-432
Author(s):  
Adrian Keane ◽  
Paul McKeown

Under the common law rule against hearsay, any assertion, other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings, was inadmissible if tendered as evidence of the facts asserted. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 constituted a major assault upon the common law rule in civil proceedings by making provisions for the admissibility of both oral and written hearsay subject to certain conditions. In June 1988 the Civil Justice Review recommended an inquiry by a law reform agency into the usefulness of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings and the machinery for rendering it admissible. The subsequent recommendations of the Law Commission were put into effect by the Civil Evidence Act 1995. This chapter discusses the admissibility of hearsay under the Civil Evidence Act 1995; safeguards; proof of statements contained in documents; evidence formerly admissible at common law; and Ogden tables.


Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter, which focuses on hearsay evidence and its relationship to confessions, first considers the rule against hearsay and its application to out-of-court statements of witnesses in civil and criminal cases. It then looks at statements, both oral and written, and gestures, as well as the admissibility of hearsay in criminal proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and, in outline, in civil proceedings under the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The chapter also explains the legal distinction between first-hand (what X told Y) and multiple hearsay (what X told Y who told Z), and concludes by discussing the recent landmark decisions under Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).


1968 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehuda Z. Blum

Two recent decisions handed down by the Hebron magistrate, Mr. Hussein El-Shajuchi, and by the Bethlehem magistrate, Mr. Tawfik El-Sakka, on February 5, 1968 and on February 27, 1968, respectively, have brought to the fore some interesting legal problems arising from the Six Day War of June, 1967 as a result of which Judea and Samaria (formerly known as the “West Bank” of the Kingdom of Jordan) have come under Israeli control.The immediate cause that has given rise to the elaboration by the two learned magistrates of the problems to be dealt with in this paper was the promulgation by the Officer Commanding, Israel Defence Forces in Judea and Samaria, on October 23, 1967, of Order No. 145, concerning the status of Israeli advocates in the courts of Judea and Samaria. Article 2 of the said Order provides that “notwithstanding any existing provisions to the contrary, any party to civil proceedings and any defendant in criminal proceedings may authorise an Israeli advocate to represent him in such proceedings.” Article 4 of the same Order stipulates that the Order shall be in force for a period of six months from the date of its entry into force (i.e. October 23, 1967) unless it is terminated at an earlier date by the Officer Commanding, Israel Defence Forces in Judea and Samaria. In the preamble to the Order the reasons given for its promulgation are “to ensure the efficient maintenance of the law, to enable the uninterrupted functioning of the Courts in the District [of Judea and Samaria] and to make available the services of advocates to the local population.” As will be more fully explained later, the reason for promulgating this Order was the strike of Arab lawyers in Judea and Samaria, which threatened to deprive courts and clients there of legal services.


2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Michael Stockdale ◽  
Joanne Clough

The admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales is now governed by provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a result of Law Commission reform proposals. The Law Commission's Report left several issues concerning the admissibility of confessions in the context of its proposed hearsay regime unclear, some of which have not yet been clarified by the post-2003 Act jurisprudence. In particular, whilst the authorities have established that confessions made by third parties may be admissible in exceptional circumstances, the courts have not yet engaged with s. 128(2) of the 2003 Act which limits the extent to which confessions made by defendants may be admissible under the 2003 Act's provisions. Moreover, whilst the Court of Appeal has recognised both that certain confessions may exist outside the 2003 Act's statutory framework and that the admissibility of such a confession for the prosecution when made by a defendant is governed by s. 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, other issues concerning the admissibility of such confessions have not yet been resolved.


2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-335
Author(s):  
Michael Stockdale ◽  
Emma Piasecki

Section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 gave the criminal courts discretion to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of justice. The Law Commission envisaged that the courts would only exercise this inclusionary discretion in exceptional circumstances. Whilst the admissibility threshold created by s. 114(1)(d) is not as high as the Law Commission had intended, the recent jurisprudence suggests that the courts will exercise the s. 114(1)(d) discretion much as the Law Commission had anticipated except that, contrary to the Law Commission's intentions, there is authority for the proposition that where a confession is admitted under s. 114(1)(d) it may be admissible against persons other than its maker and there is also authority for the proposition that the hearsay evidence of a witness who cannot be identified is not admissible under s. 114(1)(d).


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