24. Frustration: contracts discharged for failure of a basic contractual assumption

Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies
Keyword(s):  

This chapter examines contracts which were avoided because of the failure of a basic contractual assumption after the contract has been concluded. If the failure of a basic contractual assumption occurs after the contract has been concluded, the contract may be frustrated. A frustrating event kills off the contract automatically. However, everything that was done from the making of the contract up to its frustration was, and remains, validly done in pursuance of that contract. A contract cannot be frustrated where the risk of an assumption failing has been allocated to one of the parties under the contract (for example by a force majeure clause), or where the failure is attributable to the fault of one of the parties. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 will determine the consequences of frustration. This legislation provides a statutory mechanism for adjusting the rights of parties after a contract has been frustrated.

Author(s):  
Janet O’Sullivan

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter examines the doctrine of frustration, which can only be invoked where the parties have not allocated the risk of the relevant event in their bargain, such as by means of a force majeure clause. It explains that issues of frustration arise where circumstances change radically after the contract has been entered into, which show that an assumption held by both parties at the time of contracting no longer applies. It analyses the effects of frustration at common law and discusses the current test for frustration. This chapter also considers the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.


Author(s):  
Janet O’Sullivan

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter examines the doctrine of frustration, which can only be invoked where the parties have not allocated the risk of the relevant event in their bargain, such as by means of a force majeure clause. It explains that issues of frustration arise where circumstances change radically after the contract has been entered into, which show that an assumption held by both parties at the time of contracting no longer applies. It analyses the effects of frustration at common law and discusses the current test for frustration. This chapter also considers the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.


2021 ◽  
pp. 352-373
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies
Keyword(s):  

This chapter examines contracts which were avoided because of the failure of a basic contractual assumption after the contract has been concluded. If the failure of a basic contractual assumption occurs after the contract has been concluded, the contract may be frustrated. A frustrating event kills off the contract automatically. However, everything that was done from the making of the contract up to its frustration was, and remains, validly done in pursuance of that contract. A contract cannot be frustrated where the risk of an assumption failing has been allocated to one of the parties under the contract (for example by a force majeure clause), or where the failure is attributable to the fault of one of the parties. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 will determine the consequences of frustration. This legislation provides a statutory mechanism for adjusting the rights of parties after a contract has been frustrated.


Author(s):  
McMeel Gerard

This chapter looks at regimes for change of circumstances and other future events which have an impact on performance. These are universally known as force majeure provisions. Such clauses opt out of the narrow and uncertain scope of the common law doctrine of frustration. They avoid the common law rule that any element of choice or election as to which contracts to perform is incompatible with frustration. The parties can design their own remedial scheme, including suspension of performance (if appropriate) as well as complete relief from the obligation to perform. Furthermore, they can make appropriate adjustments to the parties' liabilities and circumvent the arcane regime of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.


Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

The Casebook series provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. Without the fault of either party, a contract may be automatically discharged due to frustration that renders further performance of the contract impossible, illegal, or radically different from what was originally conceived. In this case, the parties will be excused further performance of their contractual obligations. However, the frustration doctrine applies only where there is no express provision in the contract (a force majeure clause) allocating the risk. This chapter, which examines the frustration doctrine and discharge for subsequent impossibility, first considers the contractual risk allocation before turning to the theoretical basis for the doctrine of frustration. It then discusses limitations on the operation of the frustration doctrine before examining the effects of frustration and the effects on the parties’ positions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-479
Author(s):  
Sridevi Thambapillay

The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) which was passed in 1976 and came into force on 1st March 1982, standardized the laws concerning non-Muslim family matters. Many family issues concerning non-Muslim have emerged ever since, the most important being the effects of unilateral conversion to Islam by one of the parties to the marriage. There has been a lot of public hue and cry for amendments to be made to the LRA. After much deliberation, the Malaysian Parliament finally passed the amendments to the LRA in October 2017, which came into force in December 2018. Although the amendments have addressed selected family law issues, the most important amendment on child custody in a unilateral conversion to Islam was dropped from the Bill at the last minute. Howsoever, at the end of the day, the real question that needs to be addressed is whether the amendments have resolved the major issues that have arisen over the past four decades? Hence, the purpose of this article is as follows: first, to examine the brief background to the passing of the LRA, secondly, to analyse the 2017 amendments, thirdly, to identify the weaknesses that still exist in the LRA, and finally, to suggest recommendations to overcome these weaknesses by comparing the Malaysian position with the Singaporean position. In conclusion, it is submitted that despite the recent amendments to the LRA, much needs to be done to overcome all the remaining issues that have still not been addressed.


Author(s):  
Mariya Zinovievivna Masik

The article is devoted to the clarification of the peculiarities of risk management during the implementation of PPP projects. The author identifies a set of risks for a private partner, business risks of PPP projects and the main risks associated with the protests of the public, as well as public and international organizations. The typical risks of PPP projects are presented, including force majeure, political risks, profitability risks, operational, construction, financial risks, and the risk of default. The world experience of sharing risks between the partners is presented. Also named are the main methods for assessing the risks of PPP projects. It has been determined that the conditions on which the parties should reach agreement in order for the contract to be concluded are essential. Risk management can be implemented within the framework of the essential conditions for the allocation of risks. However, the provisions of the law provide for the allocation of only those risks identified by the results of an analysis of the effectiveness of the PPP project. Legislation does not directly determine how risks can be allocated to the risks identified during the pre-contract negotiations (or even at a later stage), but not taken into account in the analysis of efficiency. For example, suggestions on the terms of the partnership agreement as part of the bidding proposal may include suggestions on risk management mechanisms. There are no definite and can not be fully defined possible ways of managing risks in view of their specificity for a particular project. For this purpose, it is advisable to provide for a period of familiarization with the draft tender documentation and the possibility of making changes to it based on the findings received from potential contestants. It is also advisable to foresee cases in which it is possible to review certain terms of the contract without a competition. It is substantiated that the law does not restrict the possibility of foreseeing specific terms of an agreement on the implementation of the PPP project or to conclude additional (auxiliary) contractual instruments (for example, an investment agreement). At the same time, when laying down conditions not provided for by law, it is necessary to take into account the scope of competence of the state partner. Also, in order to ensure the principle of equality of conditions, the state partner should provide such additional conditions in the tender documentation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Andrew J Serpell

Payday loans are small-amount, short-term, unsecured, high-cost credit contracts provided by non-mainstream credit providers. Payday loans are usually taken out to help the consumer pay for essential items, such as food, rent, electricity, petrol, broken-down appliances or car registration or repairs. These consumers take out payday loans because they cannot — or believe that they cannot — obtain a loan from a mainstream credit provider such as a bank. In recent years there has been a protracted debate in Australia — and in several overseas jurisdictions — about how to regulate the industry. Recent amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) — referred to in this article as the 2013 reforms — are designed to better protect payday loan consumers. While the 2013 reforms provide substantially improved protection for payday loan consumers, further changes to the law may be warranted. This article raises several law reform issues which should be considered as part of the 2015 review into small amount credit contracts, including whether the caps on the cost of credit are set at the right level, whether the required content and presentation of the consumer warnings needs to be altered, whether more needs to be done to protect consumers who are particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable and whether a general anti-avoidance provision should be included in the credit legislation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Jowett ◽  
Belinda Carpenter ◽  
Gordon Tait

This article examines the role of coroners in making legal determinations of suicide in Australia. Research indicates that the requirement to make findings of intent and capacity in unexpected, violent deaths can be difficult for coroners and recent government inquiries have suggested that the law contributes to the problem. A review of laws and commentary that guide coroners in Australian states and territories reveals not only that coroners are the only persons tasked with making routine legal determinations of suicide, but that such legal guidance lacks clarity. This article concludes that law reform would aid coroners by clarifying definitional issues, removing inconsistency between state jurisdictions and increasing the transparency of case law. Along with requirements for a determination of intent, which is a practical matter previously raised by the Victorian Coronial Council, such changes would go some way to ensuring that Australian suicide statistics are more reliably created.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (2020) ◽  
pp. 186-202
Author(s):  
Ion GÂLEA ◽  

The study examines possible defences that States could invoke in order to justify or excuse measures designed to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, which prima facie might not be in conformity with certain international obligations. The study examines only defences available in general international law – beside certain exceptions that might be provided by the clauses of the respective treaties. Two grounds for suspending international obligations, stemming from the law of treaties – impossibility of performance and rebus sic stantibus – and three circumstances precluding wrongfulness, stemming from the law of international responsibility – force majeure, distress and state of necessity – are subject to examination. The study argues that, even if “common sense” might draw the public opinion towards the plausibility of invoking force majeure, impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances, such a conclusion does not reflect general international law. In reality, the “best candidate” as a justification or excuse is distress, while the “second best candidate” might be represented by the state of necessity.


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