5. Creation of agency, and the authority of the agent

2020 ◽  
pp. 118-157
Author(s):  
D Fox ◽  
RJC Munday ◽  
B Soyer ◽  
AM Tettenborn ◽  
PG Turner
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agency Relationship ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

This chapter focuses on the creation of the principal–agent relationship and the authority of the agency and the four ways of creating it: through an express or implied agreement between the principal and the agent; under the doctrine of apparent authority; by operation of law; and through ratification of an unauthorised agent’s acts by the principal. Agency arising out of agreement will always be consensual, but it need not be contractual. After explaining how the agency relationship is created, the chapter examines the authority of the agent such as actual authority, apparent authority, and usual authority.

5. Creation of agency, and the authority of the agent

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
MA Clarke ◽  
RJA Hooley ◽  
RJC Munday ◽  
LS Sealy ◽  
AM Tettenborn ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agency Relationship ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

This chapter focuses on the creation of principal–agent relationship and the authority of the agency. The relationship between principal and agent may be created in four ways: through express or implied agreement between principal and agent; under the doctrine of apparent authority; by operation of law; and through ratification of an unauthorised agent's acts by the principal. Agency arising out of agreement will always be consensual, but it need not be contractual. An agency may be gratuitous. Even in the commercial context, the agency may not be contractual (although this is rare). After explaining how the agency relationship is created, the chapter examines the authority of the agent such as actual authority, apparent authority, and usual authority. A number of relevant cases are cited throughout the chapter.

scholarly journals Intellectual Property Management in Publicly Funded R&D Program and Projects: Optimizing Principal–Agent Relationship through Transdisciplinary Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (23) ◽  
pp. 9923
Author(s):  
Shuto Miyashita ◽  
Shogo Katoh ◽  
Tomohiro Anzai ◽  
Shintaro Sengoku
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
The Body ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Property Management ◽  
Publicly Funded ◽  
Intellectual Property Management ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Large-scale, publicly funded research and development (R&D) programs are implemented to accelerate state-of-the-art science, technology, and innovation applications that are expected to solve various societal problems. The present study aims to build on the body of theory on the mechanisms that promote or impede the creation of intellectual property in such programs. Using a mixed methods approach and combining quantitative network analysis and qualitative semistructured interviews, we conducted a case study to investigate best practices in terms of intellectual property creation in a Japanese governmental research and development program. The results of the network analysis showed that the core/periphery structure in the co-inventor network of patents and joint application by a university and a startup promoted intellectual property creation. The results of the interview confirmed the significance of a reciprocal mindset, which the researchers in academia could acquire through collaboration with a startup. These results suggest that a knowledge logistics system for agile intellectual property management can be established by learning to acquire tacit knowledge on social implementation. Furthermore, we focus on the principal–agent relationship between knowledge producers and knowledge consumers as a factor that impedes the creation of intellectual property. We also discuss adverse selection and moral hazards caused by information asymmetry between knowledge producers and knowledge consumers and how to deal with them.

scholarly journals Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2193-2208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Kvaløy ◽  
Trond E. Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Relational Contracting ◽  
Strong Assumption ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that this probability is endogenously determined. We analyze a principal-agent relationship where the verifiability of the agent's output is determined by the principal's investment in drafting an explicit contract. The model is well suited for analyzing the relationship between explicit contracting, legal courts, trust, and relational contracting. In particular, we show how trust—established through repeated interaction—and legal courts may induce contractual incompleteness. (JEL D82, D86)

4. The creation of the agency relationship

2016 ◽  
pp. 58-82
Author(s):  
Eric Baskind ◽  
Greg Osborne ◽  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Agency Relationship ◽  
The Creation
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