VI. The course of evidence

2018 ◽  
pp. 277-329
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

This chapter concerns the principal rules governing examination in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination of witnesses. Such an account is not entirely satisfactory because it is concerned with regulations that are either matters of common knowledge or else can be thoroughly mastered only by experience. However, the rules with which it deals have been highly characteristic of the English law of evidence. The elucidation of facts by means of questions put by parties or their representatives to witnesses mainly summoned by them has been an essential feature of the English ‘adversarial’ or ‘accusatorial’ system of justice. The chapter argues that not only is an appreciation of this procedure desirable for its own sake, but it is necessary for a proper understanding of such matters as the law concerning the admissibility of the convictions, character, and credibility of parties and witnesses.

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter introduces the principles and key concepts underlying the law of evidence, with an emphasis on criminal evidence. It reviews Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), now part of English law as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998. It concludes by highlighting the importance of analysis of the relevance of the facts in a trial.


Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

Cross & Tapper on Evidence has become firmly established as a classic of legal literature. This thirteenth edition reflects on all recent changes and developments in this fast-moving subject. In particular, it fully examines new case law relevant to evidence of privilege, character, and hearsay. The inclusion of some comparative material provides an excellent basis for the critical appraisal of English law. This book remains the definitive guide to the law of evidence.


Archaeologia ◽  
1883 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-428
Author(s):  
Alfred Bailey

A knowledge of the working of the English Law of Attainder and Forfeiture for High Treason is essential to a proper understanding of the History of England in the Middle Ages, especially during the period of the Wars of the Roses.Perhaps the working of the law can be shown best in individual cases. Let us select as examples the fortunes of the dignities and estates which but for forfeiture and other intervening circumstances would have centred in the ill-fated Edward Earl of Warwick, last male scion of the splendid House of Plantagenet.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Khai Liew

Abstract This article argues that unconscionability provides no good basis for arguments in favour of lumping equitable doctrines in English law. It explores three areas of equity where unconscionability has most strongly divided lumpers and splitters: undue influence and unconscionable bargains; proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts; and the ‘rule in Re Rose’ and the decision in Pennington v Waine. In relation to each discussion, the paper explains how lumpers rely on the idea of unconscionability to argue in favour of merging or expanding those established doctrines, and argues against lumping, by explaining how this distorts a proper understanding of the law.


1985 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. C. Munday

“The law is no stranger to the philosophy of ‘As if’. It has built up many of its doctrines by a make-believe that things are other than they are.” In writing these words, Benjamin Cardozo could easily have had in mind the English law of evidence. For a number of its rules can be seen to proceed upon postulates about human nature and about the structure of the world which are unverified and, one has reason to suspect, all too seldom accurate. This paper will examine one of the more arresting examples of this phenomenon, section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, where English law adheres to a doctrine which, it is feared, derives from a blend of misconceptions and wishful thinking.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-396
Author(s):  
Fraser Davidson
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

1987 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand Schoeman

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-120
Author(s):  
’Mampolokeng ’Mathuso Mary-Elizabet Monyakane

AbstractThe Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.


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