scholarly journals The role of the Biological Weapons Convention in disease surveillance and response

2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 486-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Enemark
1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winfried Lang

Recent advances in the biosciences and biotechnology erode confidence in the reliability of the Biological Weapons Convention (1972). During its review conferences (1980, 1986) concerns were expressed as to the military misuse of civil research. Although some improvements were achieved at these conferences, there still exist major deficiencies related to the definition of substances and activities to be controlled, to verification and to cooperation (transfer of technology). It is suggested that in light of the positive international climate an entirely new regime should be built. This endeavor might draw on experience acquired in environmental treaty making. An institution should be entrusted with adapting the scope of the regime (controlled substances and activities) to scientific progress, with monitoring compliance, and with organizing cooperation. Thus would be matched the rigidity of international law with the flexibility required by science and politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatma Saleh ◽  
Jovin Kitau ◽  
Flemming Konradsen ◽  
Leonard E. G. Mboera ◽  
Karin L. Schiøler

Abstract Background Disease surveillance is a cornerstone of outbreak detection and control. Evaluation of a disease surveillance system is important to ensure its performance over time. The aim of this study was to assess the performance of the core and support functions of the Zanzibar integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) system to determine its capacity for early detection of and response to infectious disease outbreaks. Methods This cross-sectional descriptive study involved 10 districts of Zanzibar and 45 public and private health facilities. A mixed-methods approach was used to collect data. This included document review, observations and interviews with surveillance personnel using a modified World Health Organization generic questionnaire for assessing national disease surveillance systems. Results The performance of the IDSR system in Zanzibar was suboptimal particularly with respect to early detection of epidemics. Weak laboratory capacity at all levels greatly hampered detection and confirmation of cases and outbreaks. None of the health facilities or laboratories could confirm all priority infectious diseases outlined in the Zanzibar IDSR guidelines. Data reporting was weakest at facility level, while data analysis was inadequate at all levels (facility, district and national). The performance of epidemic preparedness and response was generally unsatisfactory despite availability of rapid response teams and budget lines for epidemics in each district. The support functions (supervision, training, laboratory, communication and coordination, human resources, logistic support) were inadequate particularly at the facility level. Conclusions The IDSR system in Zanzibar is weak and inadequate for early detection and response to infectious disease epidemics. The performance of both core and support functions are hampered by several factors including inadequate human and material resources as well as lack of motivation for IDSR implementation within the healthcare delivery system. In the face of emerging epidemics, strengthening of the IDSR system, including allocation of adequate resources, should be a priority in order to safeguard human health and economic stability across the archipelago of Zanzibar.


Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen ◽  
Tobias Vestner

Abstract Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 97 (4_Suppl) ◽  
pp. 12-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Juin ◽  
Nicolas Schaad ◽  
Donald Lafontant ◽  
Gerard A. Joseph ◽  
Ezra Barzilay ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-06
Author(s):  
Robert Skopec

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.


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