25. US decline or primacy? A debate

Author(s):  
Christopher Layne ◽  
William Wohlforth ◽  
Stephen G. Brooks

This chapter presents two opposing views on the question of whether US power is in decline, and if so, what would be the best grand strategy that the United States need to pursue. According to Christopher Layne, the United States is now in inexorable decline and that this process of decline has been hastened by the pursuit of global primacy in the post-Cold War era. He also contends that primacy engenders balancing by other great powers as well as eroding America’s ‘soft power’ global consensual leadership. On the other hand, William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks insist that the United States remains the sole superpower in the world and that it faces comparatively weak systemic constraints on the global exercise of its power. The chapter considers issues of unipolarity and multipolarity, along with the implications of China’s rise as a great power status for US foreign policy and hegemony.

2021 ◽  
pp. 619-636
Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski

The other contributions in this volume take seriously the proposition that having a universal grand strategy is essential for a great power. This chapter considers three alternative propositions: (1) that in many cases grand strategy in a classic sense is not achievable given bureaucratic and political impediments, (2) that all great powers do not require a grand strategy, and, (3) that under some circumstances, the great power can thrive by pursuing calibrated grand strategies depending on both region and threats. The first proposition will build upon the work of scholars (Jervis 1998; Metz 1997) who have argued that the United States and other countries often “muddle through” both strategic formulation and implementation. The second considers arguments about the process of developing grand strategies, such as those advanced by Ionut Popescu (2017) who advocate focusing on “emergent strategies” as understood by scholars studying business corporations. The final proposal builds upon my own research (Reich and Dombrowski 2018) that argues that it is impossible to implement one coherent grand strategy: there are six variants and the United States has inevitably pursued many if not all of them simultaneously in the post–Cold War era. Inverting top-down formulations, the choice of any one strategy in a theater of (potential) conflict is contingent upon the nature of the threat, the actors, and the potential conflicts as interpreted by senior political and military leaders, and the bureaucratic environment in which they operate. In the end, this chapter offers both conceptual and substantive challenges to traditional understandings of grand strategy.


As the reasonings of the actuary, when extended beyond the mere official routine of a Life Assurance Office, depend upon the proper collection of data relating to population, and the other important elements of the condition and progress of a country, we need make no apology to our readers for presenting to them the following very interesting supplement to the valuable Report of Dr. Farr on the Statistical Congress at Paris in 1855:—“There are seven great powers in the world.“England, France, Turkey, and Austria, have existed as great powers for several centuries. Prussia, Russia, and the United States of America, have entered this class within the last hundred years.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Józef M. Fiszer

The purpose of the article is to show the essence and perspectives of the new international order that is emerging in the world, and which is referred to in the literature as the post-Cold War system. In other words, the article includes perspectives and visions of the world in the mid-21st century. In addition, the article is the analysis of the competition and opportunities for cooperation between the United States, China and Russia in the process of shaping the new international system in the world today. The author attempts to show the opportunities and threats for the new order that is emerging in the world, and answer many questions related to this process, including when it will rise and what its shape and character will be. Will it be a democratic and peaceful order, or an undemocratic order, based on rivalry and confrontation between its main subjects, and especially between the great powers, such as the United States, China and Russia?


Author(s):  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell ◽  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell

From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power. This book explains why the United States needs a new grand strategy that uses strong frontier alliance networks to raise the costs of military aggression in the new century. The book describes the aggressive methods which rival nations are using to test American power in strategically critical regions throughout the world. It shows how rising and revisionist powers are putting pressure on our frontier allies—countries like Poland, Israel, and Taiwan—to gauge our leaders' commitment to upholding the American-led global order. To cope with these dangerous dynamics, nervous U.S. allies are diversifying their national-security “menu cards” by beefing up their militaries or even aligning with their aggressors. The book reveals how numerous would-be great powers use an arsenal of asymmetric techniques to probe and sift American strength across several regions simultaneously, and how rivals and allies alike are learning from America's management of increasingly interlinked global crises to hone effective strategies of their own. The book demonstrates why the United States must strengthen the international order that has provided greater benefits to the world than any in history.


Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

After the end of the Cold War, it seemed as if Southeast Asia would remain a geopolitically stable region within the American imperious for the foreseeable future. In the last two decades, however, the re-emergence of China as a major great power has called into question the geopolitical future of the region and raised the specter of renewed great power competition. As this book shows, the United States and China are engaged in a broad-gauged and global competition for power. While this competition ranges across the entire world, it is centered in Asia, and here this text focuses on the ten countries that comprise Southeast Asia. The United States and China constantly vie for position and influence in this enormously significant region, and the outcome of this contest will do much to determine whether Asia leaves the American orbit after seven decades and falls into a new Chinese sphere of influence. Just as important, to the extent that there is a global “power transition” occurring from the United States to China, the fate of Southeast Asia will be a good indicator. Presently, both powers bring important assets to bear. The United States continues to possess a depth and breadth of security ties, soft power, and direct investment across the region that empirically outweigh China’s. For its part, China has more diplomatic influence, much greater trade, and geographic proximity. In assessing the likelihood of a regional power transition, the book looks at how ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the countries within it maneuver between the United States and China and the degree to which they align with one or the other power.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Biba

Abstract As the Sino-American Great Power competition continues to intensify, newly-elected US President Joe Biden's administration now seeks to enlist the support of its allies and partners around the world. As Europe's largest economy and a, if not the, leading voice within the European Union, Germany represents an important puzzle-piece for Biden. But Germany, at least under outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel, has been reluctant to take sides. It is against this backdrop that this article looks into Germany's past and present trilateral relationships with the US and China through the theoretical lens of the so-called strategic triangle approach. Applying this approach, the article seeks to trace and explain German behaviour, as well as to elucidate the opportunities and pitfalls that have come with it. The article demonstrates that Germany's recently gained position as a ‘pivot’ (two positive bilateral relationships) between the US and Chinese ‘wings’ (positive bilateral relations with Germany and negative bilateral relations with each other) is desirable from the perspective of the strategic triangle. At the same time, being pivot is also challenging and hard to maintain. Alternative options, such as entering a US–German ‘marriage’ directed against China, are also problematic. The article therefore concludes that Germany has tough decisions to take going forward.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 92-106
Author(s):  
Vitaly KOZYREV

The recent deterioration of US–China and US–Russia relations has stumbled the formation of a better world order in the 21st century. Washington’s concerns of the “great power realignment”, as well as its Manichean battle against China’s and Russia’s “illiberal regimes” have resulted in the activated alliance-building efforts between Beijing and Moscow, prompting the Biden administration to consider some wedging strategies. Despite their coordinated preparation to deter the US power, the Chinese and Russian leaderships seek to avert a conflict with Washington by diplomatic means, and the characteristic of their partnership is still leaving a “window of opportunity” for the United States to lever against the establishment of a formal Sino–Russian alliance.


1974 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 23-37

The world economic position and prospects have worsened further in the last three months. In the United States and Japan, in particular, recessionary conditions are proving to be more marked and more prolonged than we had expected, and it looks as though by the end of the year all the major industrial countries, with the possible exception of France, will have experienced at least one quarter in which output has fallen or at best shown no appreciable rise. The other developed countries have fared better, but we no longer expect there to be any growth of output in the OECD area either in the second half of the year or in the year as a whole. In 1975 the position should be rather better, at least by the second half. We expect OECD countries' aggregate GNP to grow by about 2 per cent year-on-year and nearly 3 per cent between the fourth quarters of 1974 and 1975.


Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.


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