The Unquiet Frontier

Author(s):  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell ◽  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell

From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power. This book explains why the United States needs a new grand strategy that uses strong frontier alliance networks to raise the costs of military aggression in the new century. The book describes the aggressive methods which rival nations are using to test American power in strategically critical regions throughout the world. It shows how rising and revisionist powers are putting pressure on our frontier allies—countries like Poland, Israel, and Taiwan—to gauge our leaders' commitment to upholding the American-led global order. To cope with these dangerous dynamics, nervous U.S. allies are diversifying their national-security “menu cards” by beefing up their militaries or even aligning with their aggressors. The book reveals how numerous would-be great powers use an arsenal of asymmetric techniques to probe and sift American strength across several regions simultaneously, and how rivals and allies alike are learning from America's management of increasingly interlinked global crises to hone effective strategies of their own. The book demonstrates why the United States must strengthen the international order that has provided greater benefits to the world than any in history.

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 1137-1148
Author(s):  
JOHN A. THOMPSON

Two central features of global history over the past century have been the pre-eminent power of the United States in world politics and the growth of international organizations. The relationship between these phenomena has been variously interpreted, in ways that reflect theoretical and methodological commitments as well as political perspectives. The Realist school, for whom power relationships are always determinative, have followed Carl Schmitt and E. H. Carr in seeing international institutions, and the norms and laws they uphold, as instruments through which dominant powers seek legitimacy as well as influence. By contrast, liberal theorists have viewed the pursuit of a rule-governed world order, and the development of the idea of a ‘world community’, as a more autonomous and broadly based enterprise, one spurred by increased interdependence and greater concern with matters of common interest to all nations – not least that of avoiding the devastating effects of great power warfare in the modern era. As is usually the case with such analytically sharp distinctions, neither of these positions conveys the whole truth. From the Concert of Europe on, great powers have recognized a collective interest in peace and stability but the growth of international institutions has also been the product of wider ideals and interests. As Mark Mazower has shown in his wide-ranging study, Governing the world, the relationship between the narrower interests of great powers on the one hand and various forms of internationalism on the other has been a complex one, involving elements both of conflict and of congruence. But, Mazower emphasizes, since the Second World War, the structure and activities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international organizations have been largely shaped by Washington. A generation earlier, however, the United States did not even become a member of the League of Nations, making it more possible to distinguish between the role of American power and that of other sources of support for international bodies, and also to assess the relationship and comparative importance of these two novel elements in world politics. It is perhaps not surprising that much of the recent scholarship on the international history of the post-First World War period has focused, in one way or another, on this issue.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had become the world’s preeminent economic power. Yet for such a large and wealthy country, by 1890 the United States was in a curious position: it was an economic colossus, but a diplomatic and military dwarf. In comparison to the great powers of Europe or Japan, America was a minor actor on the world stage. That would all soon change. ‘Global America’ explores two phenomena—globalization and world war—that brought America deeper into world affairs. By the end of the period, in 1919, the United States had become one of the greatest powers of the world—and yet refused to play its part.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wertheim

Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior internationalist efforts to end power politics, even as they based the design of the UN on a thoroughgoing critique of the League, precisely for assuming that power politics could be transcended.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

The United States dominates the world as no state has. It emerged from the Cold War the world's only superpower, and no geopolitical or ideological contenders are in sight. Europe is drawn inward and Japan is stagnant. A half-century after their occupation, the United States still provides security and garrisons troops in Japan and Germany – the world's second and third largest economies. US military bases and carrier battle groups ring the world. Russia is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has accommodated itself to US dominance, at least for the moment. For the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the counterbalancing constraints of other great powers. We have entered the American unipolar age.


Author(s):  
L. L. Fituni

The article lays out a hypothesis that the global order slides into a new bipolarity in the context of the escalating geo-economic and geopolitical confrontation between the two poles that currently dominate the world - the United States and China. The neo-bipolar construction cannot yet be regarded as an established new world order, but the general movement of the world economy and international relations in this direction is obvious. The neo-bipolar bipolar confrontation manifest itself with varying intensity in different regions of the world. The author argues that at present the peripheral regions which are strategically important for the prospects of competition are becoming an important testing ground for relatively “safe” elaboration of methods and tactics of geo-economic rivalry and h mutual exchange of systemic attacks. Today, Africa has become practically the leading theater of the new bipolar confrontation. The article analyzes the economic, military and strategic aspects of the rivalry between the United States and China on the African continent. It provides a comparative analysis of the new African strategies of the two superpowers adopted at the end of 2018. The author asserts that in the context of the emerging global bipolarity, the strategies of the USA and China represent antagonistic programs based on fundamentally different initial messages. In the case of the US strategy, this is to deter by denial the spread of the competitor’s influence using tough policies, including forceful (while not necessarily military) confrontational actions. While China seeks to neutralize the opposition of the United States and its allies to Beijing’s expansion on the continent and to win the freedom of interaction with any partners in Africa causing minimal direct confrontation possible. Therefore, despite the seemingly “peripheral” importance of the confrontation on the continent, for the establishment of a neo-bipolar world order, the proclamation of the new US regional geopolitical strategy, which focuses on the containment of China in the name of protecting democracy and independence, can serve not only for Africa, but for the whole planet the same milestone signal as Churchill’s Fulton speech for the final advent of bipolarity in the postwar world.


2020 ◽  
pp. 186-202
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon

After two decades, American global hegemony is almost certainly reaching its expiration date. America will remain a great power, if the not greatest power. But, barring a major shock to emerging powers—and especially China—the world will fully transition to a new global order. This chapter sketches out some possible futures. These include a new bipolar system, perhaps with China and the United States locked in a new Cold War; a multipolar system that maintains the veneer of liberal global governance, but in the service of authoritarianism; and an international system characterized by globalized oligarchy and kleptocracy. There is still time to avoid the worst versions of these orders, and to push back against the full hijacking of liberal institutions in the service of worldwide corruption. But on these, and a number of other matters, American policymakers should assume the window of outsized American influence is fast closing.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

Despite rejecting the internationalist marriage Woodrow Wilson had arranged for it with the world, America was still the strongest state in the international system. ‘The American century?’ explains how the myth of isolationism emerged in this period, and why it was so powerful. The Depression did more damage to America’s role in the world than anything in the decades before it, yet in the late 1930s Franklin D. Roosevelt began rebuilding the structures of American power. Thanks to Roosevelt, during World War II the United States transitioned from a major, but often peripheral actor on the world scene, to one of the most powerful states the world has ever seen.


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 3-10
Author(s):  
Alberto R. Coll

Never before in its history has the United States enjoyed such a favorable strategic environment as it does today. There are few deadly enemies anywhere in sight. The U.S. military budget surpasses that of China, Russia, and the five Western European powers combined, and U.S. military capabilities are well ahead of those of any ally or potential adversary. America's booming economy and domestic social arrangements—with crime and unemployment down to the levels of thirty years ago—are a puzzle to those who, as recently as a decade ago, were predicting inexorable American decline. Such a surfeit of U.S. power and prestige, and the apparent absence of any significant obstacles to it, have prompted many to argue that this is a unique historic opportunity for the United States to fulfill the Wilsonian dream of remaking the world in America's image. Among conservatives, the argument has been made most forcefully by William Kristol and Robert Kagan of the Project for the New American Century; among liberals, by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Tony Smith, whose essay follows.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-114
Author(s):  
Amr G. E. Sabet

Emerging from the heap of the Soviet empire into a backwater landmass,the CentralAsian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan have been increasingly gaining in significance andimportance as the rumblings of a new Great Game is being sounded on theirterritory.According to this book, the three great powers – the United States,Russia, and China – are expected to play determinate roles in the politics and shaping of this region’s evolution on the world stage. The role of thesenewly independent republics, however, is less clear or easy to forecast,however, for they seem to be still in the process of forging their nationalidentities and deciding upon the thrust of their global relations, alliances,and interests.In addition, whether they will continue to be able to maintain theirnewly gained independence, particularly given their vulnerability as landlockedcountries, remains a significant question. Russia, their earlier master,is seeking to reassert its position in what it considers to be its natural sphereof influence. The rising neighboring Chinese giant is developing both economicand strategic interests beyond its borders and into that region. TheAmerican superpower is intruding as a major player into both countries’backyard under the pretext of fighting terrorism and spreading freedom anddemocracy (p. 2). The outcome of the interplay of sometimes traversing yetfrequently conflicting geopolitical as well as economic interests is what thisbook seeks to explore. Fusing the explosive elements of geopolitics, religion,and energy, this four-part book brings together twenty internationalpolicy and security analysts in a conversation about the meaning, from differentperspectives, of a post-9/11 world to the United States and its allies(actual or potential), Russia, and China, as well as to regional powers andthe CentralAsian republics ...


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-16
Author(s):  
R. Oehlmann ◽  
A. Czirfusz

The vaccination rate is on the decline as parents avoid making frequent visits to healthcare facilities to visit doctors. The high cost of healthcare access in Germany, the United States, and other parts of the world has resulted in many people remaining under vaccinated or unvaccinated. The rate of pandemic outbreaks in Europe has highlighted the significance of improved communication and education about the safety and the efficacy of vaccinations alongside effective strategies of reducing the rate of disease transmission1 . Pandemics have unprecedented impacts on the families’ health and pressure on healthcare systems in Europe. During pandemics, there is widespread fear in families concerning how the pandemics will affect families and communities more especially to the compromised people in society, such as pregnant women and people with chronic illnesses. Although pharmaceutical practices are under intensive scrutiny, pharmacies' vaccinations comprise an important element in the healthcare system for pandemic diseases.


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