Alternatives to Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. 619-636
Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski

The other contributions in this volume take seriously the proposition that having a universal grand strategy is essential for a great power. This chapter considers three alternative propositions: (1) that in many cases grand strategy in a classic sense is not achievable given bureaucratic and political impediments, (2) that all great powers do not require a grand strategy, and, (3) that under some circumstances, the great power can thrive by pursuing calibrated grand strategies depending on both region and threats. The first proposition will build upon the work of scholars (Jervis 1998; Metz 1997) who have argued that the United States and other countries often “muddle through” both strategic formulation and implementation. The second considers arguments about the process of developing grand strategies, such as those advanced by Ionut Popescu (2017) who advocate focusing on “emergent strategies” as understood by scholars studying business corporations. The final proposal builds upon my own research (Reich and Dombrowski 2018) that argues that it is impossible to implement one coherent grand strategy: there are six variants and the United States has inevitably pursued many if not all of them simultaneously in the post–Cold War era. Inverting top-down formulations, the choice of any one strategy in a theater of (potential) conflict is contingent upon the nature of the threat, the actors, and the potential conflicts as interpreted by senior political and military leaders, and the bureaucratic environment in which they operate. In the end, this chapter offers both conceptual and substantive challenges to traditional understandings of grand strategy.

2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1317-1333
Author(s):  
Norrin M Ripsman

Abstract Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
pp. 01
Author(s):  
Ali Muhammad

AbstrakPaper ini berupaya memahami memburuknya hubungan antara Rusia dan Barat (Uni Eropa danAmerika Serikat) terkait dengan dengan Ukraina. Yang akan menjadi fokus pembahasan adalahmengapa Rusia melakukan anekasi semenajung Krimea dan melakukan intervensi di Ukraina Timur.Inti argumennya adalah bahwa, pertama, aksi aneksasi Rusia sebenarnya adalah hal yang bisadipahami sebagai puncak reaksi terhadap aksi ekspansi masif pengaruh Barat ke Eropa Timur sejakberakhirnya Perang Dingin. Ukraina hanyalah salah satu sisa-sisa dan benteng akhir mitra Rusia diEropa Timur. Kejatuhan tragis presiden Viktor Janukovych yang pro-Rusia di negara tersebut hanyalahmenjadi faktor pemicu bagi tindakan petualangan Rusia. Kedua, sejauh mana efektivitas respons ataureaksi Barat yang berupa sanksi ekonomi dan diplomatik negara-negara Barat atas Rusia belum bisadipastikan. Bagi Barat, upaya mengendalikan aksi �illegal� Rusia sangat dilematis mengingat Rusiaadalah negara great power. Serangkian aksi Rusia sangat mengkawatirkan Barat dan telah memicuketegangan serius, yakni, �Perang Dingin Baru� yang tak terelakkan Kata-kata Kunci: Rusia, Barat, Ukraina, Krimea, Ukraina Timur, Perang Dingin AbstractThis paper attempts to explain the worsening relationship between Russia and the West (EuropeanUnion and the United States) related to Ukraine issue. The focus of the discussion is to elaborate whyRussia carried out an annexation of Crimea peninsula and intervention in the Eastern Ukraine. Themain argument of the paper consists of two points; firstly, annexation by Russia is a peak of reactionsagainst massive expansion of the Western to Eastern Europe since the end of Cold War. Ukraine wasthe last standing partner of Russia in the Eastern Europe. The tragic fall of Victor Janukovych whichwas pro-Russia in the country was only a trigger to Russia�s action. Secondly, the extent of effectivityof response or reaction from the West, for example the economic and diplomatic sanction of Westercountries to Russia is still uncertain. For the West, the attempts to control the �illegal� action of Russiais found to be a dillematic issue considering that Russia is one of the great powers. This worrisomeaction by Russia has led to a sirious tension, namely �a New Cold War�. Keywords: Rusia, West, Ukraine, Crimea, East Ukraine, Cold War


Author(s):  
Fredrik Logevall

This chapter assesses how grand American grand strategy has been. If the containment followed by the United States in the Cold War is the most successful, or at least most celebrated, grand strategy the United States has ever pursued, it is worthy of a closer look. This chapter considers two foundational writings from the early Cold War: George Kennan's “X” Article, published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 (under the pseudonym “X”), which laid out the containment policy—that is to say, the containment of Soviet power—and National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) of April 1950. Both of these documents are held to have played major roles in shaping the grand strategy that helped the United States deal successfully with the Soviet threat and ultimately win the Cold War. Each has indeed been referred to as the “blueprint” for US policy in the struggle. The chapter then addresses a second question: How much does grand strategy matter in the context of American history? History suggests that grand strategies do not alter the trajectory of great-power politics all that much. In the case of the United States, even radically imperfect strategies have not fundamentally affected its rise and fall.


Author(s):  
Manjari Chatterjee Miller

What are rising powers? Do they challenge the international order? Why do some countries, but not others, become rising powers? Why Nations Rise answers these questions and shows that some countries rise not just because they develop the military and economic power to do so, but because they develop particular narratives about how to become a great power in the style of the great power du jour. These active rising powers accept the prevalent norms of the international order in order to become great powers. On the other hand, countries that have military and economic power but not these narratives do not rise enough to become great powers—they remain reticent powers. This book examines the narratives in historical (the United States, the Netherlands, Meiji Japan) and contemporary (Cold War Japan, post–Cold War China and India) cases to show patterns of active and reticent rising powers. It ends with lessons for how to understand two rising powers today, China and India.


Author(s):  
Christopher Layne ◽  
William Wohlforth ◽  
Stephen G. Brooks

This chapter presents two opposing views on the question of whether US power is in decline, and if so, what would be the best grand strategy that the United States need to pursue. According to Christopher Layne, the United States is now in inexorable decline and that this process of decline has been hastened by the pursuit of global primacy in the post-Cold War era. He also contends that primacy engenders balancing by other great powers as well as eroding America’s ‘soft power’ global consensual leadership. On the other hand, William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks insist that the United States remains the sole superpower in the world and that it faces comparatively weak systemic constraints on the global exercise of its power. The chapter considers issues of unipolarity and multipolarity, along with the implications of China’s rise as a great power status for US foreign policy and hegemony.


2021 ◽  
pp. 558-574
Author(s):  
Hal Brands ◽  
Peter Feaver

Grand strategy is essential to effective foreign policy. Yet even as the study of grand strategy has flourished within the academy, many academics have remained skeptical of grand strategy as a concept or been harshly critical of grand strategy as practiced by the United States. This essay defines the concept of grand strategy, emphasizing that it is best understood as the logic undergirding state action. The essay also explains why common academic critiques are mistaken; they set fire to straw-person visions that either reduce grand strategy to impractically detailed and rigid plans rather than recognizing the logic that guides purposeful state action, however imperfectly implemented, or to impossibly grandiose visions of American power in the post-Cold War era that ignores the genuine achievements of the last thirty years. Finally, the essay discusses how academics can usefully contribute to public debates on American grand strategy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Józef M. Fiszer

The purpose of the article is to show the essence and perspectives of the new international order that is emerging in the world, and which is referred to in the literature as the post-Cold War system. In other words, the article includes perspectives and visions of the world in the mid-21st century. In addition, the article is the analysis of the competition and opportunities for cooperation between the United States, China and Russia in the process of shaping the new international system in the world today. The author attempts to show the opportunities and threats for the new order that is emerging in the world, and answer many questions related to this process, including when it will rise and what its shape and character will be. Will it be a democratic and peaceful order, or an undemocratic order, based on rivalry and confrontation between its main subjects, and especially between the great powers, such as the United States, China and Russia?


2009 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 176-176

William C. WohlforthUnipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power Wardoi:10.1017/S0043887109000021World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009)Pages 28–57The author neglected to acknowledge the following unpublished manuscript in footnote 71 (page 54) of the original article: Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “United States' Grand Strategy and Rising Powers: Russia and China.” This paper by Larson and Shevchenko is the most comprehensive application of SIT to post-cold war Russian and Chinese strategy.


Author(s):  
Kevin Zhou

Canada is known for its close relations with the United States in the domains of economic affairs, defence and international diplomacy. This arrangement, however, was a product of the great changes brought about by the Second World War. The combination of British decline, Ottawa’s desire to achieve full independence from London, and the looming Soviet threat during the Cold War created a political environment in which Canada had to become closely integrated with the United States both militarily and economically. Canada did so to ensure its survival in the international system. With the exception of a few controversial issues like US involvement in Vietnam (1955) and Iraq (2003) as well as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Ottawa has been Washington’s closest ally since 1945. On numerous occasions like the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and as recently as the War in Afghanistan and the War Against IS (Islamic State), Canada had provided staunch military and diplomatic support to Washington in its engagements around the globe. In an era of relative peace, stability, and certainty, particularly during the Post-Cold War period and the height of American power from 1991 to 2008, this geopolitical arrangement of continental integration had greatly benefited Canada. This era of benefits, however, is arguably drawing to a close. The Great Recession of 2007-09, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the insistence on pursuing a foreign policy of global primacy despite its significant economic cost, are sending the US down an uncertain path. Due to its close relations and geographical proximity with the US, Canada now faces a hostile international environment that is filled with uncertainty as a result of superpower decline, great power rivalries, environmental degradation, and failed US interventions.


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