2. Euthanasia and Freedom

Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton

This chapter examines whether the state should permit an individual to end their own life. Physician-assisted suicide is only one way in which a doctor can hasten an individual’s death. In fact there are three ways in which a doctor may act. First, they can be passive by allowing an individual to die. Second, they can assist an individual by enabling them to bring about their own death. Third, they can be active in hastening an individual’s death by administering life-ending medication. The chapter argues that a doctor should be permitted to assist an individual to end their own life, as well as to intervene to hasten their death. It supports this view by appealing to the value of freedom, specifically the freedom to choose how to live and die. The chapter then considers the worry that it is wrong for the state to allow a doctor to assist an individual to end their life, since this is an affront to the sanctity of life. It outlines some implications of this argument for the design of public policy.

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Strate ◽  
Timothy Kiska ◽  
Marvin Zalman

At the November 1998 general election, Michigan citizens were given the opportunity to vote on Proposal B, an initiative that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS initiatives also have been held in Washington State, California, Oregon, and Maine, with only Oregon's passing. We use exit poll data to analyze the vote on Proposal B. Attributes associated with social liberalism—Democratic Party identification, less frequent church attendance, more education, and greater household income—led to increased odds of a “yes” vote. Attributes associated with social conservatism—Republican Party identification and frequent church attendance—led to decreased odds of a “yes” vote. Similar to the abortion issue, PAS's supporters strongly value personal autonomy, whereas its opponents strongly value the sanctity of life. Voter alignments like those in Michigan will likely appear in other states with the initiative process if PAS reaches their ballots.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNLÉ W.D. YOUNG

In brief compass, I will touch on three of the central ethical and public policy issues that divide those who are opposed to physician-assisted dying from those who are supportive of this practice. These are: (1) the moral distinction (if any) between actively hastening death and passively allowing to die; (2) how to interpret the Hippocratic tradition in medicine with respect to physician-assisted death; and (3) whether physician-assisted suicide can be effectively regulated. I shall summarize the arguments pro and con with respect to each issue, and also indicate my own position.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Gildenhuys

John Arras argues against the legalization of physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia on the basis of social costs that he anticipates will result from legalization. Arras believes that the legalization of highly restricted physician-assisted suicide will result in the legalization of active euthanasia without special restrictions, a prediction I grant for the sake of argument. Arras further anticipates that the practices of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia will be abused, so that many patients who engage in these practices will lose out as a result. He refers to these losses as social costs to legalization. But the social costs at play in typical public policy debates are borne by individuals other than the agent who engages in the controversial activity, specifically by people who cannot be held responsible for enduring those costs. Even if plausible interpretations of Arras’ predictions about the abuse of the practice are granted, legalization of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia brings no social costs of this latter sort. For this reason, and also because a ban on euthanasia is unfair to those who would profit from it, the losses in utility brought about by legalization would have to be very great to justify a ban.


Author(s):  
Margaret P. Battin

When the debate over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide emerged into public consciousness in the mid-1970s, the debate got off to a rousing start, as philosophers, doctors, theologians, public-policy theorists, journalists, social advocates, and private citizens became embroiled in the debate. On the one side were liberals, who thought physician-assisted suicide and perhaps voluntary active euthanasia were ethically acceptable and should be legal; on the other side were conservatives, who believed that it was imoral and/or dangerous to legalize assisted dying as a matter of public policy. Over the next few decades in which this debate was accelerating it achieved a lively, florid richness, both as a philosophical dispute and as a broad, international public issue. This article aims to explore the richness of this debate by showing something of the terrain of the debate and the figures who have inhabited it, both the public figures and the academic ones partly behind the scenes.


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH

Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in terms of a patient's wanting to die (autonomy) and the patient's having a medically established good reason for suicide. These are the common elements of the standard justification offered for the legalization of PAS. In what follows, I argue that these two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating according to distinct dynamics that render the justification for PAS an unstable “let it be so” basis for public policy. Moreover, no natural connection keeps these two criteria united. Indeed—as I argue—the two elements of the justification oppose and threaten to exclude one another. Thus, the PAS justification is too labile a basis for sound public policy.


Almost Over ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 245-296
Author(s):  
F. M. Kamm

Chapter 8 considers how one should reason about assisted suicide as a matter of public (and legal) policy in the absence of a constitutional right to it by critically examining anti-legalization views such as those of Ezekiel Emanuel. The chapter considers the role of (i) moral rights and wrongings and how they come about as well as (ii) harms and benefits and how to aggregate them. How arguments for the distinctive role of the state in enabling or interfering with behavior bears on these issues is considered by reviewing some arguments about capital punishment. Finally, in the light of empirical data about effects of legalizing physician-assisted suicide and given what else Emanuel believes, the chapter considers whether he should no longer oppose legalization.


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