7. Basic Income and Distributive Justice

This chapter defends basic income. This policy requires the state to make regular cash payments to each member of society, irrespective of their other income or wealth, or willingness to find employment. It starts by describing three effects of basic income. The first is that it will raise the incomes of the least advantaged. The second is that it will protect against the threats of exploitation and abuse. The third is that it will remove one obstacle to finding employment. The chapter then explains the significance of these effects by drawing on ideas about distributive justice, emphasizing the relevance of John Rawls’s justice as fairness and Elizabeth Anderson’s democratic equality. It also considers the claim that basic income should be rejected because it would require the state to interfere with the lives of those who would be taxed to fund it, arguing that it is a mistake to oppose taxation in such a wholesale way. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the economic sustainability of basic income.

15. Development Aid and Global Justice

This chapter examines whether affluent states should commit significant funds to alleviate poverty abroad. It argues not only that they should, but also that their duties to those who live in poverty go far beyond this. This argument in favour of development aid is based on the idea that an individual has a duty to prevent something very bad from happening when they can do so at little cost to themselves. The chapter then highlights that the global order plays a significant role in the persistence of global poverty, and this further supports the case for development aid. It also considers the claim that states should prioritize meeting the claims of their own members ahead of the claims of those who live abroad. The chapter shows that, even if this is true, it does not undermine the case for committing significant funds to alleviate global poverty.

13. Environmental Taxes and Intergenerational Justice

This chapter evaluates environmental taxes as part of a set of policies to address the threats that climate change poses. These taxes increase the price of activities that are environmentally harmful. In doing so, they discourage such behaviour and raise revenue that the state can use to redress its effects. The chapter embeds these considerations in an account of intergenerational justice, arguing that the current generation has a duty to provide future generations with prospects at least equal to its own. It also examines the objection that the proposed approach allows historical emitters off of the moral hook, showing that the state can adjust environmental taxes to take account of this. Finally, the chapter explores how to amend these taxes so that they are not regressive and that they do not present undue barriers to particularly valuable activities.

4. Recreational Drugs and Paternalism

This chapter explores whether it is justifiable for a state to discourage an individual from using recreational drugs. It focuses on paternalist arguments—that is, arguments that appeal to the idea that a state may intervene in an individual’s life for their own good. The chapter argues against the justifiability of these policies, except in some extreme cases. It offers three arguments for the anti-paternalist claim that a state may not intervene in an individual’s life for their own good. These are that there is value in an individual acting autonomously; that it is disrespectful to intervene in an individual’s life for their own good; and that an individual is a better judge of their interests than the state. The chapter also examines whether it is justifiable for a state to intervene in an individual’s life for their own good when that individual is misinformed about the options. In the case of recreational drugs, the appropriate response to misinformation is to educate an individual about the effects of drugs, rather than to discourage their use. Finally, the chapter outlines some implications of this argument for the design of drug policy.

11. Prison Sentences and Punishment

This chapter assesses whether the state should shorten the length of prison sentences, exploring the justification for state punishment. It argues in favour of shorter prison sentences, drawing on the idea that an individual who commits a crime has a remedial duty to those they have wronged, and that one way to discharge this duty is by spending time in prison in order to deter future crime. This justification for punishment supports shorter prison sentences because the beneficial effect of longer prison sentences on crime rates is too low to justify the burdens they impose. The chapter then considers a retributivist objection, which claims that the state should favour longer prison sentences because an individual who commits a crime deserves to suffer. Concerns about retribution are unable to justify the high costs of the prison system and, more fundamentally, they provide an unattractive justification for all forms of punishment. The chapter also discusses the appeal and relevance of a communicative account of punishment, according to which the state should punish an individual who commits a crime in order to condemn their actions.

5. Affirmative Action and Discrimination

This chapter argues that affirmative action is sometimes justifiable. ‘Affirmative action’ refers to policies beyond anti-discrimination law that directly regulate selection procedures to enhance the representation of members of various socially salient groups, such as those based on gender, race, and ethnicity. The chapter outlines an argument in support of affirmative action by distinguishing three prominent forms of wrongful discrimination and by showing that affirmative action is the appropriate response to the past and present wrongful discrimination suffered by members of socially salient groups. It also adds a second argument for affirmative action that appeals to the importance of enhancing diversity and social integration. The chapter then tackles several objections and reflects on the implications of these arguments for the design of affirmative action policies.

6. Schools and Equality of Opportunity

This chapter addresses the value of equality of opportunity and assesses its implication for the design of the school system, arguing for the radical conclusion that the state should prohibit elite private schools. It begins by outlining how elite private schools create inequalities in prospects between children, and develops an account of why this is morally problematic. A challenge to the chapter’s argument comes from those who reject equality of opportunity in favour of educational adequacy. The chapter then considers the possibility that it is wrong for the state to prohibit elite private schools because this interferes too much in family life. It offers a framework for assessing which choices should be protected on these grounds, and argues that the choice to send one’s child to an elite private school does not fall in this set.

1. Doing Political Philosophy

This chapter provides an overview of how to do political philosophy. It identifies some of the main aims of the discipline, showing that one can make progress with the subject by studying arguments about the justifiability of various public policies. Political philosophers are mostly concerned with exploring the moral claims of an argument, and the relationship between an argument’s claims and its conclusion. It is here that the discipline connects to other parts of philosophy, particularly moral philosophy and logic. This chapter discusses two tools in the practice of political philosophy. One of these involves arranging arguments in clear and organized terms, and the other involves the use of examples and thought experiments in the analysis of moral claims. The chapter then discusses how to employ these tools in the service of a political argument.

12. Intensive Animal Farming and Moral Status

This chapter studies which principles should govern the state’s regulation of the treatment of non-human animals raised for human consumption. It defends the claim that it is wrong to inflict pain on or to kill animals, and that the state should prohibit intensive animal farming on these bases. The chapter then considers the objection that there is no moral duty to act in this way because animals are not part of the relevant community of moral concern. It demonstrates that it is implausible to restrict the scope of moral duties in this way. Finally, the chapter explores the claim that it would be wrong for the state to enforce compliance with these duties, but it contends that limiting the state’s role in this way leads to various implausible conclusions regarding how it should regulate the treatment of both animals and humans.

10. Judicial Review and Democracy

This chapter argues that the state should use judicial review to constrain democracy. It identifies several rights that individuals possess, and then defends judicial review as a mechanism for protecting these rights. The chapter then considers the objection that judicial review is undemocratic because it constrains the laws that an electorate or their representatives might adopt. To explore this idea, it distinguishes two arguments in defence of democracy. The first holds that democracy is valuable because it produces good outcomes, and the second holds that democracy is valuable because it treats each member of a society equally when they disagree about which outcomes are good.