Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Voon ◽  
A. Mitchell ◽  
J. Munro
2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-131
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Alshahrani

AbstractInternational investment law, particularly the global backlash against investment treaties, has evolved recently. This article aims to clarify how international investment law evolved over history, from the early Arab traders in the 7th century to the Ottoman Empire, to understand its hidden aims. It investigates the practice of signing investment treaties, which appear first during the Fatimid Caliphate2 and Mamluk Sultanate3 periods. It then explains when control over foreign investment started to diminish during the Ottoman Empire period.4 Further, it explains the links between the USA Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties (FCNs), and current investment treaties, explaining the impact of colonization and imperialism on drafting treaty provisions. Within this historical context, this article illustrates the need to understand the roots of international investment law in order to urge Arab countries to terminate or renegotiate current bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as a number of developing and developed countries have done.


Author(s):  
Echandi Roberto

This chapter argues that investment disputes, particularly those that have arisen in the context of the implementation of NAFTA, have influenced the refinement of the provisions of new generation international investment agreements (IIAs) as well as the inclusion of a series of procedural and substantive innovations. It addresses the main distinction between BITs and investment chapters in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), focusing on the evolution of their respective rationales. It looks at the main features of the new generation of IIAs and explains how such features respond to challenges derived from the interpretation of substantive and procedural provisions included in previous agreements. The discussion is organized under two themes: (i) moving from the original exclusive focus on investment protection towards also promoting liberalization of investment flows; and (ii) the impact of investor-state dispute settlement on investment rule-making.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001573252110273
Author(s):  
Jaivir Singh ◽  
Vatsala Shreeti ◽  
Parnil Urdhwareshe

After a run of adverse investor-state dispute settlements, India has recently denounced all its erstwhile investment treaties. New investment treaties need to be negotiated on the basis of a new Model Treaty that privilege state rights over investor rights. We study the impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into India before the denunciation with the intent of inferring the consequences of changing the system. Our work captures the effects of international investment agreements on FDI inflows specifically into India. We construct an empirical model drawing on the Gravity Model, and estimate parameters using generalised method of moments. The results show that while the individual signing of bilateral investment treaties does not influence the inflow of FDI, the effect of the cumulative bilateral investment treaties signed is statistically very significant—suggesting that the spill over effect of signing a series of bilateral investment treaties are important, signalling a regime of overall protection to investors. The importance of institutional variables in influencing FDI tells us that overall participation in a system governed by international investor agreements influenced the inflow of FDI positively and therefore recent policy changes should be viewed with caution. JEL Codes: F21, F23, F550, F63, K33, O19, C22, C29


Author(s):  
Bonnitcha Jonathan ◽  
Skovgaard Poulsen Lauge N ◽  
Waibel Michael

This chapter surveys the impact of investment treaties on decision-making at the firm and government levels. The focus is on whether investment treaties’ influence on the decisions of firms and states leads to improvements in efficiency. The first section examines the ‘hold-up’ problem, which provides the most influential and coherent microeconomic justification for the inclusion of investment protection provisions in investment treaties. The second section explores the problem of ‘fiscal illusion’ in host state decision-making, which could result in ‘over-regulation’ of foreign investment in the absence of an investment treaty. The third section considers whether investment treaties solve problems of discrimination against foreign investors, as well as the possibility that investment treaties lead to discrimination in favour of foreign investors.


Author(s):  
Nicolás M. Perrone

The long 1970s was a difficult time for those promoting investment treaties and ISDS. OECD members had not adopted a multilateral convention, and the Global South was demanding a change in the rules of the game. The norm entrepreneurs’ self-confidence was decreasing. In this challenging context, the International Chamber of Commerce took the initiative and put forward a conception of foreign investor obligations consistent with investment treaties and ISDS. This move conceded little to the Global South: the best companions to strong foreign investor rights are weak or even voluntary investor obligations. For a while the outcome was uncertain, as different imaginations competed for the space of international investment law. This chapter examines some of these competitors, including the 1974 UN report on the impact of MNCs, the US position on the topic, and the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.


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