scholarly journals An Emerging Human Right to Protection against Unjustified Dismissal

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Collins
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Professional Relationships ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Human Right ◽  
European Court ◽  
Grand Chamber

Abstract Although a right to protection against unjustified dismissal is not widely recognised in human rights law, the European Court of Human Rights has begun to use Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights to develop a general right based on the adverse consequences to ordinary private life caused by an unjustified dismissal. Instead of requiring the employer’s reason for the dismissal to be connected to an aspect of an employee’s private and family life in order to engage Article 8, the Court’s new, broader approach focuses on major adverse effects or consequences caused by dismissals to an employee’s family life, personal and professional relationships, to self-respect, and to their chosen way of life and career. The consequence-based approach permits the application of Article 8 whatever reason the employer puts forward for the dismissal. The article assesses the extent and limits of the protection against unjustified dismissal under the Convention as a result primarily of this extension from a reason-based approach to a consequence-based approach to Article 8, an approach that was confirmed by the Grand Chamber in Denisov v Ukraine.

The European Court of Human Rights has the Turkish Security Forces Held Responsible for Violations of Human Rights: The Case of Akdivar and Others

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Zwaak
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Violent Conflict ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Eastern Region ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
South Eastern ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

In this article, special attention will be given to the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Right in the case of Akdivar and Others v. Turkey. Since 1985, a violent conflict has raged in the South-Eastern region of Turkey, between the Turkish security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan). Since 1987, 10 of the 11 provinces of South-Eastern Turkey have been subjected to emergency rule, which was in force at the time of the facts complained of. The main issue in this case concerned the fact that during this conflict, a large number of villages have been destroyed and evacuated by the security forces. According to the applicants, the alleged burning of their houses by the security forces constituted, inter alia, a violation of Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment) and Article 8 (the right of respect for private life, family life, and home) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (property rights).

scholarly journals RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 8 ECHR IN IMMIGRATION CASES: A HUMAN RIGHT TO REGULARIZE ILLEGAL STAY?

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Immigration Laws ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

AbstractApplying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States' autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life’. This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularize their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonization measures adopted in recent years.

Marriage, Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: An Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the European Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence on LGBT Rights

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1746-1763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lucy Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Registration System ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
European Court ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been considering whether same-sex couples should have the rights to marry and to be recognized as a family under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) for over thirty years. In the 1980s the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the ECtHR respectively rejected the notion that same-sex relationships constituted a “family life” under Article 8 of the ECHR, and that post-operative transgendered persons had the right to marry under Article 12. However, throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, the ECtHR handed down a body of judgments that incrementally liberalized these rights (albeit not always smoothly) in favor of LGBT persons. This evolution culminated in part on 24 June 2010, when the ECtHR passed judgment inSchalk and Kopf v. Austria.In that case the First Section of the ECtHR made a number of major, but seemingly contradictory rulings. For the first time in its history, the ECtHR ruled that same-sex relationships expressly constitute a “family life” under Article 8, and that the right to marry under Article 12 was not confined to opposite-sex couples in “all circumstances.” However, the ECtHR simultaneously ruled that Member States are under no obligation to protect that “family life,” by providing same-sex couples with access to marriage under Article 12, or an alternative registration system under Articles 8 and 14. The Grand Chamber denied the applicants' subsequent request for a referral.

Free Life after Life Imprisonment as a Human Right under the European Convention: European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 9 July 2013, Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Szydło
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Court ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Human Right ◽  
National Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
Life Sentences

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) in Vinter and Others reflects a very significant change in the Court's attitude to those actions of the states parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the Convention’ or ‘the ECHR’) that consist in the imposition and further execution of whole life sentences. In this judgment, the Court concluded that Article 3 of the Convention – which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading punishment – requires the reducibility of all whole life sentences as imposed by national courts, in the sense of a review mechanism which allows domestic authorities to conclude whether in the course of a life sentence the legitimate peno-logical grounds justifying the further incarceration of a life prisoner still exist. Moreover, such a mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence must be provided for by a national law and, consequently, must be known to a life prisoner already at the moment of imposition of the whole life sentence. What is also important, a life prisoner, at the outset of his/her sentence, must know when (i.e. after how many years) and under what conditions a review of his/her sentence will take place or may be sought, and what he/she must do to be considered for release. Otherwise, the very imposition of a life sentence by a national court infringes Article 3 of the Convention.

The ties that bind: family and private life as bars to the deportation of immigrants

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-296
Author(s):  
Yaël Ronen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
Two Bodies

AbstractThis article analyses the way in which the use of the rights to family life and to private life has evolved as a bar to the deportation of immigrants. The analysis focuses on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which uses a rights-based framework; and of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) with respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which uses a status-based framework. It notes the interaction between the two bodies and the attempt in each forum to modify its normative framework to follow the other's. The article further considers the implications of each normative framework for both integrated immigrants and other immigrants.

The European Court of Human Rights: Nada v. Switzerland

2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 268-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miša Zgonec-Rožej
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Family Life ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
Effective Remedy ◽  
The Right

On September 12, 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) ruled in Nada v. Switzerland that the implementation by Switzerland of the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime violated the right to private and family life under Article 8, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

scholarly journals MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 58-63
Author(s):  
Oana Ghiţă
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Marriage And Family ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The article 8 and 12 – European Convention of Human Rights regulate the right to family and private life and, respectively, the right to marriage. These rights have been transposed into the national legislation of the States-members of European Union. The two rights that we are speaking of, which can be found as a constitutional principle and as an ordinary law, tries to reduce the public authorities interference into the private and personal family field. The reality proves that the right to marriage has been broken by the impossibility of the spouses to marry because they can not be divorced. This is the reason why we have two different rights in European Convention: the right to private, family life and the right to marriage. Many European states still have a limited regulation of the reasons for getting the dissolution of marriage. The European Convention has nothing to do with such cases because does not regulates the right to divorce and it would be an interference into the national law. How can a person be married again if he/she doesn’t have the possibility to divorce? In these conditions, can we take the European Convention into consideration as a real instrument of protection for the right to marriage? The first precedent of ECHR jurisprudences limits the infringement of the right to marriage made by the national Courts because of the lack of regulations or a bad interpretation of it.

scholarly journals The Peculiarities of Private and Family Life Protection: The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-45
Author(s):  
Oksana MELENKO ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
European Court ◽  
Essential Questions ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right

One of the most vulnerable spheres of life of any individual is his / her private and family life. Therefore, this issue could not slip the attention of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (hereinafter - the Convention) (Council of Europe, 1950). In fact, there have always been some prejudices within this issue, as it is not a secret that accusations of violating an individual’s right to privacy often provoke discussion in the public sphere. For example, when the UK Special Forces eliminated three terrorists (who were no longer resisting) on the territory of Gibraltar (Case of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1995), the media did not particularly intend to protect the right to life of these criminals. On the other hand, quite a few liberal media sources have resonantly responded to the interference with private life, when a group of stockbrokers and bankers were prosecuted for sadomasochism in a private residence. A similar behavior of the press was observed when discussing the mandatory use of seat belts. However, when considering the issues related to the violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), it is important to find answers to a few rather essential questions: Has there been an interference with private life under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950)? If so, then – Is this interference sufficiently justified in the light of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), namely: Was the interference lawful? If yes, then – Did the interference have a lawful purpose? If yes, then – Was the interference necessary for a democratic society (can it be regarded as an adequate response to socially urgent necessity)? In case there arises a question concerning state’s positive obligations, it will no longer belong to the jurisdiction of paragraph 2, but will touch upon the analysis of the issue whether state’s positive obligation exists at all.

S.A.S. v. France (Eur. Ct. H.R.)

2014 ◽  
Vol 53 (6) ◽  
pp. 1025-1072
Author(s):  
Tom Syring
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Private Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
Full Face ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

On July 1, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court or the Grand Chamber) delivered its judgment in the case of S.A.S. v. France pertaining to the legality of the French ban on wearing full-face veils in public, introduced by Law No. 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010. The decision comes on the heels of a number of related judgments in adjacent areas of dispute circumscribing the right to privacy and religion and delimiting the circumstances that may justify interference with such fundamental human rights. In the present case, the Court for the first time had to deal with a general ban on certain clothing that arguably, for those most affected, epitomizes the manifestation of their religion. Accepting the principle of “living together (le ‘vivre ensemble’)” as an inherent element of the “rights and freedoms of others” in the French context and conceding a wide margin of appreciation to the respondent state in preserving that principle, the Court found no violation of the applicant’s rights to respect for her private life (Article 8) and to freedom of religion (Article 9) under the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention).

Fernández Martínez v. Spain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Martínez-Torrón
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Education ◽  
Family Life ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
Ordinary Teaching

This chapter analyses the European Court of Human Right’s Grand Chamber judgment in Fernández Martínez v. Spain. Although the author agrees with the outcome of the judgment, he does not share part of the decision’s rationale. Among other things he argues that there was no actual interference with the applicant’s right to private and family life; that the case should have been examined from the perspective of the State’s positive obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and that the conflict of rights approach was probably not the best way to decide the case, taking into account that the applicant’s job consisted in performing a strictly religious function and not ordinary teaching duties. The chapter concludes with some remarks about how to deal with the practical difficulties raised by systems of religious education such as the one in Spain.

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