The Limits of Collective Financial Statecraft: Regional Development Banks and Voting Alignment with the United States at the United Nations General Assembly

Author(s):  
Anastassia V Obydenkova ◽  
Vinícius G Rodrigues Vieira

Abstract Which limitations does the hegemon face when exerting financial statecraft through multilateral institutions? Recent studies indicate that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that are tools of collective financial statecraft sponsored by the United States, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, lead developing states to align with Washington in the United Nations (UN). The same effect is verified in the case of US bilateral aid. Little, however, has been discussed about the effect of American-sponsored regional development banks (RDBs) in the same context. RDBs are IGOs with unique characteristics as each of them covers a region of the world and relies on resources from developed sponsors and developing borrowing members alike. In this article we aim to fill this gap in the debates on economic and financial statecraft by demonstrating through tobit models that the higher the material capabilities of a borrowing state that takes loans, the less likely it is to align with the United States at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Membership of all RDBs but the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) yields the same effect. Results indicate the need to develop further research on RDBs to assess whether they create incentives for challenging the hegemon.

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. LeBlanc

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) in December 1948. A representative of the United States signed the Convention, and President Truman later transmitted it to the Senate with a request that it give its advice and consent to ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Convention in 1950. It has since held hearings on four occasions (1970, 1971, 1977 and 1981), and favorably reported the Convention to the Senate four times (1970, 1971, 1973 and 1976). However, the Senate has failed to act; a resolution of ratification was debated on the floor in 1973-1974, but it fell victim to a filibuster and the Convention remains in committee.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward T. Rowe

In recent years considerable concern has been expressed in the United States over the changing composition of the United Nations membership and the failure of the one-state, one-vote formula in the General Assembly to reflect the actual power and significance of the different United Nations Members. “Malapportionment” as such is frequently not the issue here, for whether one looks at population, wealth, or budget assessments the United Nations General Assembly has always been “malapportioned.” And, at least in terms of population, the United Nations is no more malapportioned now than it was in 1945. Rather than a concern with a new situation, the growing emphasis on this issue is often a reflection of the fear that malapportionment will now operate to the disadvantage of the United States; that is, the ”overrepresented” states of today may not be as closely associated with the United States as the ”overrepresented” states of the past.


1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward T. Rowe

The nature of political relationships in the United Nations is of considerable interest to students of international organization and, to a lesser degree, to students of international politics. One important aspect of this question concerns the extent to which Western states as a group and the United States in particular dominate the organization. In their examination of this issue many authors contend that the United States prevailed over the United Nations General Assembly during the assembly's earliest years but progressively lost its control as the membership of the organization increased. Their findings, with some variations in detail, indicate that prior to the first significant membership increase in 1955 the United States, with an automatic two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, was dominant. In their view the United States position from 1955 through 1959 was considerably weakened but remained strong enough to ensure favorable decisions by the organization. With further increases in membership during and after 1960, however, they suggest that United States predominance came to an end. Now the newer, less developed, and nonaligned states determine the character and concerns of the UN.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane McAdam

On September 19, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of commitments to enhance the protection of refugees and migrants, known as the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. In the Declaration, all 193 member states of the United Nations reaffirmed the importance of the international protection regime and committed to strengthening and enhancing mechanisms to protect people on the move. They also agreed to work toward the adoption of a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration. These two compacts were drafted through separate processes over eighteen months in 2017–18 and formally adopted by the General Assembly in December 2018. One hundred and fifty-two states voted in favor of the adoption of the Migration Compact, while twelve countries abstained from the vote (Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore, and Switzerland), and five countries voted against (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the United States).


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Srdjan Vucetic ◽  
Bojan Ramadanovic

All Canadian governments say that Canada must look to its “friends and allies” and “like-minded partners” to achieve greater cooperation on global issues. But who are these countries exactly? To gain a better understanding of where Ottawa stands in the world, with whom, and under what conditions, we analyze Canada’s voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly from 1980 to 2017. We find that Canada’s overall record tends towards that of Western European states. We find no evidence of greater affinity with US positions either when the Democrats are in power in Washington or when the conservative parties reign in power in Ottawa. We identify a sharp pro-US turn in the Harper years, and also confirm that the government of Justin Trudeau started off by maintaining rather than reversing this trend.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wertheim

Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior internationalist efforts to end power politics, even as they based the design of the UN on a thoroughgoing critique of the League, precisely for assuming that power politics could be transcended.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-295
Author(s):  
Keith Allan Clark II

In 1955, Jiang Tingfu, representing the Republic of China (roc), vetoed Mongolia’s entry into the United Nations. In the 26 years the roc represented China in the United Nations, it only cast this one veto. The roc’s veto was a contentious move because Taipei had recognized Mongolia as a sovereign state in 1946. A majority of the world body, including the United States, favored Mongolia’s admission as part of a deal to end the international organization’s deadlocked-admissions problem. The roc’s veto placed it not only in opposition to the United Nations but also its primary benefactor. This article describes the public and private discourse surrounding this event to analyze how roc representatives portrayed the veto and what they thought Mongolian admission to the United Nations represented. It also examines international reactions to Taipei’s claims and veto. It argues that in 1955 Mongolia became a synecdoche for all of China that Taipei claimed to represent, and therefore roc representatives could not acknowledge it as a sovereign state.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 788-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. L. M. Burns

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.


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