Fraïssé’s theorem for logics of formal inconsistency

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 1060-1072
Author(s):  
Bruno R Mendonça ◽  
Walter A Carnielli

Abstract We prove that the minimal Logic of Formal Inconsistency (LFI) $\mathsf{QmbC}$ (basic quantified logic of formal inconsistency) validates a weaker version of Fraïssé’s theorem (FT). LFIs are paraconsistent logics that relativize the Principle of Explosion only to consistent formulas. Now, despite the recent interest in LFIs, their model-theoretic properties are still not fully understood. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the situation. Our interest in FT has to do with its fruitfulness; the preservation of FT indicates that a number of other classical semantic properties can be also salvaged in LFIs. Further, given that FT depends on truth-functionality (a property that, in general, fails in LFIs), whether full FT holds for $\mathsf{QmbC}$ becomes a challenging question.

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley B. Klein ◽  
Leda Cosmides ◽  
Kristi A. Costabile ◽  
Lisa Mei
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-215
Author(s):  
Luke Connolly

This essay proposes that the picture of a broken circle encountered by Watt during the second part of his tale marks a crucial collision point between Beckett's literary and mathematical interests and triggers a process of fractal scaling self-similarity. Building on recent interest concerning the role of the mathematics and mathematical forms found in Beckett's work, I argue that the broken circle depicted in the picture from Watt is a geometric form which (re)appears within at least three interlocking scales throughout Beckett's novel-length prose: (i) its moment of arrival in the picture from Watt, (ii) a macroscopic reinscription in the names of the protagonists populating the five novels spanning Watt through to The Unnamable and (iii) buried within the narratological depths of How It Is. As a structural principle, the interminable irregularity of fractals offered Beckett a viable solution for what he considered the defining task of the modern artist: ‘to find a form to accommodate the mess’. Moreover, the specific shape selected for his fractal is shown to contain within its geometry one of Beckett's most universal and pressing concerns: the inevitable insufficiency of language. Therefore, although this essay restricts itself to examining Beckett's novel-length prose, the idea of a broken circle fractal promises to provide a valuable heuristic through which to reassess the author's other generic avenues. Fractals thus offer a means through which one can bind together the length and breadth of Beckett's oeuvre without ever reducing dynamic chaos to stable order.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Norde ◽  
Sarah Sippach

Libfixes are parts of words that share properties with both blends, compounds and affixes. They are deliberate formations, often with a jocular character, e.g. nerdalicious ‘delicious for nerds’, or scientainment ‘scientific entertainment’. These are not one-off formations – some libfixes have become very productive, as evidenced by high type frequency in a single corpus. Libfix constructions are particularly interesting for a network analysis for three reasons: they do not always have discrete morpheme boundaries, they feature a wide variety of bases (including phrases, as in give-me-a-break-o-meter), and they may be the source of back formations such as infotain. In this paper, we present a corpus-based analysis of eight English libfixes (cracy, fection, flation, gasm, licious, (o-)meter, tainment, and tastic), detailing their formal and semantic properties, as well as their differences and similarities. We argue that libfixes are most fruitfully analysed in a Bybeean network model, in which nodes are connected on the basis of phonological similarity, which allows for both fully compositional and non-compositional constructions to be linked without an exhaustive analysis into morphemes.


Author(s):  
Joanna Innes ◽  
Michael J. Braddick

The Introduction offers a brief overview of Paul Slack’s contribution to early modern history, distinguishing between an earlier phase concerned with social policy and the ideas which informed it, and a later phase concerned with the history of political economy, and particularly the shifting discourse of happiness which, he argued, informed it. It then explores recent interest in the history of emotions, distinguishing a variety of approaches to that subject. Reviewing three broad approaches taken by the contributors to the volume, it goes on to suggest that the history of emotions is most stimulating when seen as a focal point for different kinds of history rather than as a discrete subject of enquiry. A further implication is that a variety of forms of expertise need to be brought to bear.


Author(s):  
Mark Sainsbury

Display theory predicts that no inferential relations among attitude attributions are based on the logical or semantic properties of the expressions in attribution complements. This chapter shows various ways in which there may be an illusion that such relations obtain. One common basis for the illusion is that we implicitly appeal to psychological facts. Since there is no reason to think these are necessary, the inferences are not truth preserving of necessity, even if they generally have true conclusions when they have true premises. They are examples of “plausible reasoning”. Wanting and fearing are discussed in detail as potential sources of the apparently inferential phenomena.


Concepts stand at the centre of human cognition. We use concepts in categorizing objects and events in the world, in reasoning and action, and in social interaction. It is therefore not surprising that the study of concepts constitutes a central area of research in philosophy and psychology. Since the 1970s, psychologists have carried out intriguing experiments testing the role of concepts in categorizing and reasoning, and have found a great deal of variation in categorization behaviour across individuals and cultures. During the same period, philosophers of language and mind did important work on the semantic properties of concepts, and on how concepts are related to linguistic meaning and linguistic communication. An important motivation behind this was the idea that concepts must be shared, across individuals and cultures. However, there was little interaction between these two research programs until recently. With the dawn of experimental philosophy, the proposal that the experimental data from psychology lacks relevance to semantics is increasingly difficult to defend. Moreover, in the last decade, philosophers have approached questions about the tension between conceptual variation and shared concepts in communication from a new perspective: that of ameliorating concepts for theoretical or for social and political purposes. The volume brings together leading psychologists and philosophers working on concepts who come from these different research traditions.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea

The varitel accounts of content allow us to see how the practice of representational explanation works and why content has an explanatory role to play. They establish the causal-explanatory relevance of semantic properties and are neutral about causal efficacy. Exploitable relations give the accounts an advantage over views based only on outputs. Content does valuable explanatory work in areas beyond psychology, but it need not be explanatorily valuable in every case. The varitel accounts illuminate why there should be a tight connection between content and the circumstances in which a representation develops. The accounts have some epistemological consequences. Representations at the personal level are different in a variety of ways that are relevant to content determination. Naturalizing personal-level content thus becomes a tractable research programme. Most importantly, varitel semantics offers a naturalistic account of the content of representations in the brain and other subpersonal representational systems.


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