How Content Explains

Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea

The varitel accounts of content allow us to see how the practice of representational explanation works and why content has an explanatory role to play. They establish the causal-explanatory relevance of semantic properties and are neutral about causal efficacy. Exploitable relations give the accounts an advantage over views based only on outputs. Content does valuable explanatory work in areas beyond psychology, but it need not be explanatorily valuable in every case. The varitel accounts illuminate why there should be a tight connection between content and the circumstances in which a representation develops. The accounts have some epistemological consequences. Representations at the personal level are different in a variety of ways that are relevant to content determination. Naturalizing personal-level content thus becomes a tractable research programme. Most importantly, varitel semantics offers a naturalistic account of the content of representations in the brain and other subpersonal representational systems.

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Landreth ◽  
John Bickle

We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each line. Then, focusing on electrophysiological methods, we consider a puzzle within neuroeconomics whose solution we believe could facilitate contributions to both neuroscience and economics, in line with category (2). This puzzle concerns how the brain assigns reward values to otherwise incomparable stimuli. According to the common currency hypothesis, dopamine release is a component of a neural mechanism that solves comparability problems. We review two versions of the common currency hypothesis, one proposed by Read Montague and colleagues, the other by William Newsome and colleagues, and fit these hypotheses into considerations of rational choice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
V.V. Apanovich ◽  
B.N. Bezdenezhnykh ◽  
V.V. Znakov ◽  
M. Sams ◽  
J. Jaaskelainen ◽  
...  

To investigate specific features of systemic organization of behavior in individuals with analytic and holistic cognitive styles we presented a simple decision-making task to pairs of subjects who performed the same task in several modes of social interaction (independent, competition, and cooperation). We assumed that the modes of social interaction would reveal differences in the behavioral and EEG characteristics, related to the cognitive styles. The behavior timing and brain potentials were recorded in 78 participants. The response latencies and parameters of P300 in this task were found to be more variable in the group of participants with holistic thinking compared to analytic. The interaction mode-related differences were also more evident in the group of holistic thinkers. These results are discussed within the system-evolutionary view of brain bases of behavior. The study was supported by RFHR №14-26-18002; Academy of Finland, grant 273469. The study is performed within the research programme of one of the Leading Scientific Schools of Russian Federation “System Psychophysiology” (НШ-9808.2016.6).


Author(s):  
Ned Block ◽  
Georges Rey

The computational theory of mind (CTM) is the theory that the mind can be understood as a computer or, roughly, as the ‘software program’ of the brain. It is the most influential form of ‘functionalism’, according to which what distinguishes a mind is not what it is made of, nor a person’s behavioural dispositions, but the way in which the brain is organized. CTM underlies some of the most important research in current cognitive science, for example, theories of artificial intelligence, perception, decision making and linguistics. CTM involves a number of important ideas. (1) Computations can be defined over syntactically specifiable symbols (that is, symbols specified by rules governing their combination) possessing semantic properties (or ‘meaning’). For example, addition can be captured by rules defined over decimal numerals (symbols) that name the numbers. (2) Computations can be analysed into ‘algorithms’, or simple step-by-step procedures, each of which could be carried out by a machine. (3) Computation can be generalized to include not only arithmetic, but deductive logic and other forms of reasoning, including induction, abduction and decision making. (4) Computations capture relatively autonomous levels of ordinary psychological explanation different from neurophysiology and descriptions of behaviour.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 195-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lambros Malafouris

SummaryConsensus is growing, in many areas of the humanities and social sciences, that aspects of the material world we live in have causal efficacy on our minds – the major dynamic being the plasticity of the brain linked to the affordances of our bodily engagements with things. The implications of that on how we approach and understand important mental health issues have not been adequately addressed. This paper proposes a material engagement approach to the study of the processes by which different forms of materiality achieve their effects. Focusing on the example of dementia, I propose that a collaboration between archaeology, anthropology, philosophy and psychiatry could help us to fill this gap in our knowledge, allowing us to understand the exact effects of everyday objects, personal possessions and forms of material engagement on people with dementia.


1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 769-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antti Revonsuo

Pessoa et al. fail to make a clear distinction between visual perception and subjective visual awareness. Their most controversial claims, however, concern subjective visual awareness rather than visual perception: visual awareness is externalized to the “personal level,” thus denying the view that consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon somehow constructed inside the brain.


Author(s):  
André Leclerc

Intentionalists believe that intentionality, the relational property of being about something, is constitutive of mentality. Brentano’s thesis says: 1) the mental is intentional; 2) nothing physical exhibits that property. Dispositionalism, I believe, should be extended to include all mental properties, which are also dispositional and realized physically in the brain, like the solubility of sugar which is realized in its molecular structure. My aim is to show how we can be intentionalists (by accepting the first part of Brentano’s Thesis) and dispositionalists at the same time (by accepting that mental states, acts and events have a physical base of realization). In a nutshell: the intentional is the manifestation of mental dispositions. Dispositions in general, psychological dispositions in particular, are two-sided and presupposes, on the one hand, a physical realization, and a manifestation which is properly mental, on the other. Something has to be said about language in that context, because public representations instantiate semantic properties which also are intentional, and many of our mental states have their content specified by the use of a sentence belonging to a public language.


1960 ◽  
Vol 106 (443) ◽  
pp. 531-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Smythies ◽  
C. K. Levy

There are, in the main, two principal methods of biological research into the problem of causation of schizophrenia. In the first, or direct method, studies are made of the body fluids and of the metabolism of schizophrenics in the hope of turning up some toxic factor or error of metabolism. Such studies are currently under way in a number of centres and, although many claims as to positive findings have been made, none of these has as yet been substantiated and the majority have actually been refuted by subsequent analysis. These studies have been directed by two main hypotheses of the causation of the illness described in a previous communication (14). Now it is clear that one great difficulty entailed in using this approach is that our basic knowledge of neuro-chemistry and neuropharmacology is still extremely limited. The very complexity of the neurochemical processes of the brain would seem to offer a large number of possible loci of metabolic disturbance, any of which might be responsible for the onset of schizophrenia. Thus, we can say that the probable results of all such investigations at present will be purely negative, i.e. we will discover that the given metabolism of injected adrenaline, serotonin, etc., is normal in the illness. Thus, the second, or indirect, method becomes increasingly important. This consists of two parts. The first is implied merely by the general statement that the advance of neurochemistry and neuropharmacology may disclose other areas of function in which specific hypotheses of the causation of the illness may be constructed. The second consists of a detailed study of the precise mode of action of known psychotomimetic agents. Knowledge of the mode of action of mescaline and LSD-25 in detail would pinpoint areas for research in the metabolism of schizophrenics. Unfortunately, however, very little seems to be known at present of the mode of action of these drugs. Most of the work that has been done has been carried out on LSD-25 (see e.g. the annotated bibliography put out by Sandoz Inc., Hanover, New Jersey, 1958). However, the important field of the structure-activity relationships (SAR) of mescaline seems to have been strangely neglected. The research programme here would include the synthesis of a number of analogues of mescaline according to systematic principles to determine the role the details of its molecular structure play in the mode of action. These analogues would be subjected to a number of tests—psychopharmacological, neurophysiological and neurochemical—comparison between the results of which would give important information not only of the SAR of mescaline but also of the details of its mode of action and the interrelationships between behavioural, neurophysiological and neurochemical factors involved that would help us explain the former effects in terms of the latter, which reduction is the main aim of biological science. The present paper reviews the little that is known at present about the SAR of mescaline and then reports some new studies in the psychopharmacology of this field.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250
Author(s):  
Eduardo Giannetti

Abstract Modern science has undermined belief in countless imaginary causalities. What is the nature of the relation between mind and brain? Philosophers have debated the issue for millennia, but it is only in the last twenty years that empirical evidence has begun to uncover some of the secrets of this ancient riddle. This lecture explores the possiblity that advances in neuroscience will undermine and subvert our intuitive, mentalist understanding of the mind-body relationship. Recent findings in neuroscience seem to support the notions that (i) mental events are a subclass of neurophysiological events, and (ii) they are devoid of causal efficacy upon the workings of the brain. If physicalism is true then the belief in the causal potency of conscious thoughts and free will are bound to join company with countless other imaginary causalities exploded by the progress of science.


The mind can be viewed as an information-driven control system. To make this work, the idea of information must be operationalized in such a way as to give semantic properties (meaning, content) a role in the explanation of system behaviour. This can be achieved by exploiting a statistical concept - mutual information - from communication theory. On this interpretation, some of the behaviour of information-driven control systems is causally explained by the statistical correlations that exist between internal states and the external conditions about which they carry information.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Peter Wilson ◽  
Clara Humpston ◽  
Rajan Nathan

SUMMARY Significant developments in schizophrenia psychopathology are ready to be incorporated into clinical practice. These advances allow a way forward through the well-described challenges experienced with current diagnostic and psychopathological frameworks. This article discusses approaches that will enable clinicians to access a wider and richer spectrum of patient experience; describes process-based models of schizophrenia in the domains of both the brain and the mind; and considers how different levels of analysis might be linked via the predictive processing framework. Multiple levels of analysis provide different targets for varying modalities of treatment – dopamine blockade at the molecular level, psychological therapy at the level of the mind, and social interventions at the personal level. Psychiatry needs to align itself closer to neuroscientific research. It should move from a symptom-based understanding to a model based on process. That is – after having asked about a patient's symptoms and experience clinicians need to introduce steps involving a consideration of what might be the brain and mind processes underlying the experience.


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