US Supreme Court holds willfulness unnecessary for award of profits in trade mark infringement case

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 497-499
Author(s):  
Bruce McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Trade Mark ◽  
Trade Mark Infringement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Lanham Act

Abstract Romag Fasteners, Inc v Fossil, Inc, No 18–1233, --- S.Ct. ----, 2020 WL 1942012 (23 April 2020) On 23 April 2020, the US Supreme Court held that a trade mark infringement plaintiff is not required to prove that a defendant acted ‘willfully’ in order to recover profits as an equitable remedy under section 35(a) of the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the ‘Lanham Act’), 15 USC s 1117(a).

US Supreme Court holds that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 826-829
Author(s):  
Charles R Macedo ◽  
Marion P Metelski ◽  
David P Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Lanham Act

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

Religious Neutrality and the Government’s Freedom of Speech in the Jurisprudence of the us Supreme Court

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The State ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Hard Cases

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.

Judges and Policy Making Authority in the United States and the European Union

ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios E. Kouroutakis
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

AbstractInstitutions such as the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice in due time have developed a status of supremacy through judicial activism. The main target of the article is to identify the judicial activism exercised by these Courts and to reason its need in the legal order. In the first part the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice are placed in the overall polity that they belong to and the development of their status and their characteristics are analyzed. The major concern of the first part is to examine how those declared their supremacy and focus on major cases and their reason­ing.In the second part the extent of the judicial supremacy in each legal order is discussed and its effects in the decision making process are examined. The assumption that judicial activ­ism is acceptable only if it expresses consensus in the legal order is tested and it is argued that up to an extent, Judicial Activism does not distort the political agenda when it ex­presses the consensus of the legal system. Finally, it is argued that when such activism exceeds the boundaries of the consensus, the other actors in the legal system would even­tually react and would limit such activism.

Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The State ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Court Case ◽  
State Laws ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Us Constitution

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.

scholarly journals The Value of Information in the Court: Get it Right, Keep it Tight

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Iaryczower ◽  
Matthew Shum
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K10)

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